The Gaza or Grozny choice
Pepe Escobar, Asia Times, April 1, 2003
There are two options for Washington to win this war: the Gaza option or the Grozny option.
The suicide bombing near Najaf is proof that the "Palestinization" of Iraq is in full swing. The repeated calls for jihad from Islamic scholars in al-Azhar in Cairo, the Grand Mufti of Syria and a powerful imam in Najaf show that the jihad in Mesopotamia is also in full swing. In mass protests from Rabat in Morocco to Peshawar in Pakistan, from Kolkata in India to Jakarta in Indonesia, the Arab - and Muslim - street continues to demonstrate its opposition to the events unfolding in Iraq.
And certainly the majority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims - and seemingly most Iraqis themselves - don't believe that the coalition has marched on Iraq to liberate its people. The message of the "Prince of Darkness" Richard Perle - "When we leave, the oil will be left behind to the people of Iraq" - rings hollow in many a Middle Eastern ear.
And with every day that the war drags on, with mounting casualties on both sides, and especially civilian deaths, the crucial question remains: What price victory? By choosing the Gaza option - a war of attrition - Washington falls into Saddam Hussein's trap: it will serve him on a plate the explosive image he is seeking, that of an Israeli tank in the streets of Gaza juxtaposed with a US tank in the streets of Baghdad. By choosing the Grozny option - a scorched-earth policy - Washington will have to level Baghdad to win the war. [complete article]
In the line of fire: two holy cities that the US dares not desecrate
Justin Huggler and Paul Vallely, The Independent, April 1, 2003
American forces advancing on Baghdad were yesterday fighting on the outskirts of one of the holiest places in Shia Islam. The 101st Airborne Division surrounded the holy city of Najaf, and there was talk of it preparing for possible house-to-house fighting, a move that would run the risk of inflaming the Shia world.
The US military said it had killed 100 Iraqi paramilitaries around Najaf, and said more were lying in wait among the tombs of saints and martyrs in the great Wadi al-Salaam graveyard which encircles the city on three sides, one of the world's largest cemeteries.
Further north, US soldiers were fighting what was reported to be the most intense ground battle of the war so far, in Hindiyah. But on the road ahead of Hindiyah, between them and Baghdad, lies a Shia shrine of perhaps even greater symbolic potency, the holy city of Karbala. [...]
The fall of the two holy cities [Najaf and Karbala] would be a blow to President Saddam, but it would be a blow he would try to turn to his advantage. Any damage to the great gold-domed shrines of the two cities could turn the Iraqi Shias against the British and Americans, and cause fury across the Shia world.
More than that, the two cities are shrines to martyrs. The concept of martyrdom is at the heart of Shia Islam, and none is more laden with significance than the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala. Any large-scale casualties in these holy cities would be charged with extraordinary symbolism. [the complete article]
The smell of war
Philip Caputo, Los Angeles Times, March 30, 2003
It is said that our most evocative sense is the sense of smell, and after the names of the villages and the numbers and the dates have grown dim in your memory, the thing you can never forget about a battlefield is the smell. [the complete article]
The battle for Shi'ite hearts and minds
Pepe Escobar, Asia Times, March 29, 2003
Najaf and Karbala are the holiest sites of Shi'ite Islam. Najaf - where Ayatollah Khomeini lived before returning to lead the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 - is the site of Imam Ali's tomb, the Prophet Mohammed's cousin and revered 14th century founder of the Shi'ite branch of Islam. Karbala is the site of the famous 7th century battle where Imam Hussein was killed and subsequently buried.
To the utmost horror of Shi'ites everywhere - Arabs, Persians, South Asians - American tanks are now rumbling around Najaf and Karbala. If the conquest of Baghdad - the iconic seat of the Caliphate for 700 years - is bound to ignite fury in the Sunni Arab world, one shudders to imagine what would happen in the Shi'ite world if Najaf and Karbala are desecrated during the war or under American occupation. [the complete article]
US draws up secret plan to impose new regime on Iraq
Brian Whitaker and Luke Harding, The Guardian, April 1, 2003
A disagreement has broken out at a senior level within the Bush administration over a new government that the US is secretly planning in Kuwait to rule Iraq in the immediate period after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Under the plan, the government will consist of 23 ministries, each headed by an American. Every ministry will also have four Iraqi advisers appointed by the Americans, the Guardian has learned.
The government will take over Iraq city by city. Areas declared "liberated" by General Tommy Franks will be transferred to the temporary government under the overall control of Jay Garner, the for mer US general appointed to head a military occupation of Iraq.
In anticipation of the Baghdad regime's fall, members of this interim government have begun arriving in Kuwait.
Decisions on the government's composition appear to be entirely in US hands, particularly those of Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defence. [the complete article]
Shi'ite headache for the Americans
Gwynne Dyer, Straits Times, March 31, 2003
'Wimps go to Baghdad,' they say in neo-conservative circles in Washington. 'Real men go to Teheran.'
It sounds tough at dinner parties, and the macho intellectuals who talk like that never worry that genuinely hard men can overhear their silly chatter. But they can, and they are already taking measures to protect themselves. They live in Iran.
Iran's Islamist government is split between the moderate reformers around President Mohammad Khatami and the radical mullahs around Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but it is the mullahs who control the army and foreign policy.
They are terrified by the imminent arrival of the United States army on Iran's western frontier, only a couple of hours' drive from the country's biggest oil fields, especially as US President George W. Bush has put Iran on his 'axis of evil' hit-list. So the more trouble the US has in Iraq, the better. [the complete article]
Why is my country bombing these poor people?
James Doran, The Times, March 31, 2003
At the front of the 1375 [Greyhound bus] to Pittsburgh is Mary Singletary, 60, from Connecticut, who is off to visit her daughter in Newark, New Jersey. Like many Americans, she does not like the idea of flying during the war. Her son, Raymond, 38, is in the US Navy aboard the USS Constellation somewhere in the Gulf. She hears from him almost every day, but still worries constantly.
"I don't like war, period. That's it," she says, "but all you can do is keep on living. And hope that he does, too."
Hearing a discussion about the war, the dozen passengers aboard the stuffy bus look up from their newspapers or open dozing eyes, hopeful for a distraction from the stench of the chemical lavatory.
None of them likes the idea of war -- and none understands why the US is engaged in conflict in Iraq at all. [the complete article]
Refugees hurl abuse and stones at the British Desert Rats
Daniel McGrory, The Times, March 31, 2003
Shaking his fist at the British armoured column speeding past him, Abdiraza Jeri and his friends spat out a volley of insults as others in the weary trail of refugees threw stones at the Desert Rats.
The 42-year-old haulage contractor had been walking for three hours to escape the siege of Basra. He was intending to return with his fleet of lorries filled with water so that some of the city's 1.4 million parched residents had something to drink. But he and thousands more tramping along this main road could not understand yesterday why such a formidable array of British tanks was parked on the edge of his city while gangs of Saddam loyalists slowly strangled Basra. British soldiers sitting on their Warrior vehicle looked stunned when a couple of packets of sweets that they had thrown to children were hurled back by their fathers. [the complete article]
Post D-Day depression
Geov Parrish, WorkingForChange, March 27, 2003
Until two weeks ago, there was a clear alternative to war: the inspection process, which at minimum bought time, at best was a path out of an artificially induced, but nonetheless real, crisis. When that was lost, so too were many members of the new anti-war movement, because there was no "next step," no contingency plans in the peace movement's demands beyond lame and hypocritical calls to "support the troops." Possibilities abound, from a movement to have the U.N., rather than United States, take part or all of the post-invasion administration of Iraq, to a concerted push to unseat Bush in 2004. Yet at the moment more protesters are trying to impeach Bush (which is not, repeat not, repeat not going to happen) than to elect a Democratic president in less than 20 months. [the complete article]
THE PROPHETS OF WAR
Remembering what we were told to expect
Saddam's ultimate solution
An interview with Richard Perle
WNET, July 11, 2002
Richard Perle: Support for Saddam, including within his military organization, will collapse at the first whiff of gunpowder.
Now, it isn't going to be over in 24 hours, but it isn't going to be months either. And if I had to guess I would guess that a strategy that combines effective collaboration with the opposition and a readiness to send in Americans if necessary is where we'll wind up.
[…] The evolution of American air power since the last war against Saddam Hussein has been phenomenal. We can now see what's going on on the ground, and from a safe distance. And what we can see we can destroy with great precision. Saddam has no notion of what's coming. But what's coming is the ability to target precisely everything of consequence in his military establishment.
James P. Rubin: […] Do you agree that we have to be ready for the worst scenario, namely that Saddam doesn't collapse in a matter of days?
Richard Perle: Yes, of course we have to be ready for the worst scenario. But a proper integration of the opposition in Iraq with American air power, backed up by American Special Forces, and ultimately a larger force if necessary should be sufficient. Both to assure that we won't have a debacle, we have to have an integrated approach. And that means the use of American air power to prevent Saddam from massing his forces to attack the opposition on a ...
James P. Rubin: And what about American ground forces?
Richard Perle: Well, we'll need some American forces.
James P. Rubin: So what would your guesstimate be of the level of effort that would be involved?
Richard Perle: Well, I would be surprised if we need anything like the 200,000 figure that is sometimes discussed in the press. A much smaller force, principally special operations forces, but backed up by some regular units, should be sufficient. Of the 400,000 in Saddam's army, I'll be surprised if ten percent are loyal to Saddam. And the other 90 percent won't be completely passive. Many of them will come over to the opposition.
[…]
James P. Rubin […] …you've been a strong advocate of taking action against Saddam Hussein. How quickly do you think we should act and what specifically do you think the United States should do militarily in this situation?
Richard Perle: This evidence is very powerful. There is collaboration between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, which means to destroy us. It entails chemical weapons, biological weapons, training in their application. And he's working on nuclear weapons. The message is very clear - we have no time to lose, Saddam must be removed from office. Every day that goes by is a day in which we are exposed to dangers on a far larger scale than the tragedy of September 11.
James P. Rubin: So what specific military plan would you put forward and discuss with your colleagues and friends in the government right now?
Richard Perle: There is an internal opposition to Saddam Hussein. The Kurds in the north, and we've seen what their motives are for his removal, the Shi'a in the south, who have risen up without support in the past, together with American air power, American special forces, and potentially American ground forces beyond special forces, we have the ability to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime. And it will be quicker and easier than many people think. He is far weaker than many people realize.
James P. Rubin: Top officials of the Pentagon, top Department of Defense officials, top military officials from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down appear to be telling members of Congress and the media that the only serious way to go about this problem is to deploy a large ground force that can deal with all unexpected contingencies. You've put forward an optimistic scenario, and it may be right, but don't you think it's the job of the administration to be prepared for the worst? And what is your reaction to the military's suggestion that you need 200,000-plus forces for this mission?
Richard Perle: The 200,000 number sounds large to me. But if we're going to err, we should err on the side of too many rather than too few. Provided that reaching for that large number doesn't make it impossible for us to establish the base and the infrastructure from which to operate. If it were self-defeating then it would be foolish. I think we discovered in 1991 that we really didn't need the very sizeable force that we sent in. It was over very quickly with little resistance. There were people surrendering to journalists after all.
You always want to err on the side of caution. But it's possible to be too cautious.
Offense and defense
The battle between Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon
Seymour M. Hersh, The New Yorker, March 31, 2003
As the ground campaign against Saddam Hussein faltered last week, with attenuated supply lines and a lack of immediate reinforcements, there was anger in the Pentagon. Several senior war planners complained to me in interviews that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his inner circle of civilian advisers, who had been chiefly responsible for persuading President Bush to lead the country into war, had insisted on micromanaging the war's operational details. Rumsfeld's team took over crucial aspects of the day-to-day logistical planning -- traditionally, an area in which the uniformed military excels -- and Rumsfeld repeatedly overruled the senior Pentagon planners on the Joint Staff, the operating arm of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "He thought he knew better," one senior planner said. "He was the decision-maker at every turn."
On at least six occasions, the planner told me, when Rumsfeld and his deputies were presented with operational plans -- the Iraqi assault was designated Plan 1003 -- he insisted that the number of ground troops be sharply reduced. Rumsfeld's faith in precision bombing and his insistence on streamlined military operations has had profound consequences for the ability of the armed forces to fight effectively overseas. "They've got no resources," a former high-level intelligence official said. "He was so focussed on proving his point -- that the Iraqis were going to fall apart."
Horrific human suffering in this insane war
Brian Reade, The Mirror, March 31, 2003
She could be asleep. In her flannel pyjama bottoms and 101 Dalmatians top, her eyes gently closed, little Sarah looks like any other seven-year-old.
Except she is lying on a stainless steel mortuary tray, another victim of this bloody war.
She had just finished breakfast and was playing with her brother and sisters on Friday when her life was violently stolen.
Her mum Shafaa was washing the dishes, happy that her Baghdad home was ringing to the sound of children's laughter, until a huge explosion knocked her to the floor. After the shock had subsided, she saw "blood splattered against the walls" and her four babies lying silently in the rubble. [...]
As usual, the Iraqis blamed coalition bombs and our apologists said it may have been stray Iraqi anti-aircraft missiles. But Shafaa doesn't care. It was you and me who started this war and it us who stole away her flesh and blood.
British mothers who lose their children in this conflict get them back in coffins draped in Union Jacks as brass bands play them off the plane. Feted for their courage and honoured for their sacrifice.
But this is how we treat the Iraqi mothers who lose their children. With contempt, disdain and the cowardly, de-humanising epitaph: Collateral damage.
Speaking a different language - but we've got the Phrasealator
James Meek, The Guardian, March 31, 2003
The marines have brought the whole encyclopaedia of military technology with them to Iraq. From aircraft to x-ray machines, they have a myriad ways to kill, heal wounded, survey, spy, reconnoitre, communicate with each other, shell, defend, attack, enfilade. They have brought all the machines and all the skilled people trained to use them.
The equipment necessary to talk to Iraqis, understand their problems and respond to their needs, however, seems to have been left on the quayside in California.
Maj Cooper and his colleague, Major Mark Stainbrook, are part of a tiny number of civil affairs officers attached to the marines. Neither speaks Arabic, and their interpreter has poor English.
Even before Saturday's suicide bomb attack on US troops, the response of marines towards Iraqi civilians has been characterised by fear, suspicion and mistrust. While there is no sign of ill-treatment of civilians, there has been little attempt to actively make friends in Iraqi communities, to carry out foot patrols in villages to assure locals that the US is providing security, or to systemise the movement of Iraqi civilians across US-held territory.
Any fire on the marines has characteristically been met with overwhelming firepower in return, often involving artillery, air strikes by helicopters and the marines' own F-18 fighters. While there are genuine attacks by Iraqi irregulars on marines' convoys, it is impossible to verify whether all the "attacks" are genuine, and the light casualties and low loss of vehicles strongly suggest that some "ambushes" are simply civilians being shot at by jumpy marines.
America and the Shiites
Claude Salhani, UPI, March 28, 2003
While top brass military analysts in the Pentagon burn the midnight oil trying to figure out the reasons why their strategy may have not gone entirely according to plan, they might want to consider the fact that the Iraqi south is mostly populated by Shiite Muslims.
Although the Shiites that live in Basra and its surrounding areas have no love whatsoever for Saddam, his Republican Guards, Baath Party paramilitaries, or Fedayeen goons, they nevertheless have just as much distrust of America and its foreign policy.
Shiites and Americans have history in this region -- and none of it is really any good.
People have long memories in this part of the world. The Shiites recall, for instance, that when the Baath Party came to power in a bloody coop, it was with the help of the CIA. And they have suffered much since.
They recall the bloody eight-year war with Iran -- a nation of fellow Shiites -- during which the United States supported Saddam, providing him with weapons, even helping him get started on some of the chemical and biological warfare agents they now have come to collect.
And most of all, they recall the period after the first Gulf War in 1991, when they rose up in open revolt against Saddam. U.S.-led coalition forces -- having driven the Iraqi army from Kuwait -- were only a few miles away from the outskirts of Basra, but remained there, abandoning the Shiites at the last minute to the wrath of Saddam's thugs.
About 200,000 Iraqi Shiites were brutally slaughtered in the south by Saddam's forces after the failed uprising. This is not a typographical error. Read it again, two hundred thousand dead after the end of Desert Storm.
This fact alone explains why coalition troops fighting "to liberate" Iraqis have not yet been greeted with open arms.
Israelis trained US troops in Jenin-style urban warfare
Justin Huggler, The Independent, March 29, 2003
The American military has been asking the Israeli army for advice on fighting inside cities, and studying fighting in the West Bank city of Jenin last April, unnamed United States and Israeli sources have confirmed. Reports that US troops trained with Israeli forces for street-to-street fighting have been denied.
If the US army believes the road to Baghdad lies through Jenin, there is reason for Iraqi civilians to be concerned. During fighting in the Jenin refugee camp last April, more than half the Palestinian dead were civilians. There was compelling evidence that Israeli soldiers targeted civilians, including Fadwa Jamma, a Palestinian nurse shot dead as she tried to treat a wounded man. A 14-year-old boy was killed by Israeli tank-fire in a crowded street after the curfew was lifted. A Palestinian in a wheelchair was shot dead, and his body was crushed by an Israeli tank.
Israeli soldiers prevented ambulances from reaching the wounded and refused the Red Cross access. Using bulldozers, the Israeli army demolished an entire neighbourhood – home to 800 Palestinian families – reducing it to dust and rubble.
Martin van Creveld, a professor of military history and strategy at Jerusalem's internationally respected Hebrew University, has told reporters that, following his advice to US Marines, the American military bought nine of the converted bulldozers used in the Jenin demolitions from Israel.
Professor van Creveld said he gave advice to marines last year in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He said he was questioned about Israeli tactics in Jenin, and told them the giant D9 bulldozers, manufactured for civilian use in the US but fitted with armour-plating in Israel, were among the most useful weapons.
Defenders of the faith
Dan De Luce, The Guardian, March 29, 2003
The US has warned Iran to keep out of the war, but Iraqi Shia troops armed by Tehran may be difficult to sideline in war or peace.
Washington has long harboured suspicions about the Iranian-based Badr Corps due to their allegiance to Iran's conservative clerical leaders, who have funded and armed the group for the past two decades.
Composed of Iraqi refugees and those Iraqi prisoners of war who chose not to return home during the Iran-Iraq war, the Badr Corps portrays itself as the defenders of the Shia majority in Iraq. Apart from some 1,500 troops that were deployed into northern Iraq before the war, the Badr Corps has kept a low profile since the war started more than a week ago.
But threats from US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld yesterday that the Badr Corps soldiers will be treated as "combatants" could aggravate tensions between coalition forces and the largest Shia opposition organisation.
See also Ayatollah al-Hakim warns US will repeat its errors
The good, the bad and the propaganda
Gideon Levy, Ha'aretz, March 30, 2003
It's hard to tell which propaganda is of inferior quality in this war, the American or the Iraqi.
Last Thursday, for example, U.S. General Vincent Brooks spoke with reporters at his headquarters in Qatar. He showed photographs of a U.S. Marines officer shaking hands with Iraqi children.
The children looked embarrassed, perhaps even stunned, and the handshakes looked constrained.
And what did the officer-propagandist say to the press? "We are looking at children who, for the first time in their lives, are getting a taste of freedom." No less: The taste of freedom is a handshake with an invader.
The next day, a similar photograph was published in Israel - an American soldier carrying a horrified Iraqi infant, who is naked from the waist down. "In good hands" was the caption the mass-circulation daily Yedioth Ahronoth chose for this huge front-page picture. Good hands? And why is the child unclothed? What happened to its parents? Why is the child frightened?
So meager is the stock of genuine justification for the war in Iraq, that America has to resort to cheap propaganda like pictures of children in the arms of its soldiers.
In the eyes of the American propaganda machine, the U.S. occupation - which has so far killed at least 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and 350 civilians - is the epitome of justice. America behaves like America and we [in Israel], unfortunately, follow its lead: This war, like all those before it, is waged between the forces of absolute good, i.e. the United States, and the forces of absolute evil, this time Iraq.
DREAMS OF LIBERATION
Leaders of the Iraqi National Congress (including Kanan Makiya, whose latest article in The Washington Post appears below) have long championed the idea that Iraqis in exile, under INC leadership, should play a crucial role in the liberation of Iraq. Richard Perle and James P. Woolsey have been among the INC's most vocal supporters. How the INC and other groups in exile might ever be capable of turning their dreams into reality remains far from clear.
Mobilization of Iraqi exiles falls short
Sonya Yee and Robin Wright, Los Angeles Times, March 29, 2003
They're called the Free Iraqi Forces, and many of them sport paunches and gray-tinged mustaches. Their average age is 42.
The Iraqi exiles, trained by U.S. forces at this remote air base in southwestern Hungary, graduated Friday and will soon take up positions in Iraq as liaisons between the American military and the Iraqi population.
The trouble is, only 21 men were in Friday's graduating class. A meager total of 74 have been trained so far in the program, which U.S. officials say may be doomed to insignificance because Iraqi dissident groups have failed to provide enough candidates to undergo training.
The program was approved last year and launched in January with much fanfare, a congressional mandate and more than $90 million to train and equip as many as 3,000 Iraqis. So few have been trained that some U.S. officials have taken to calling it the "million-dollar-a-man army."
Iraqis must share in their liberation
Kanan Makiya, Washington Post, March 30, 2003
The United States is failing to make use of what should be its most valuable asset in this war: the many Iraqis who are willing to fight and die for their country's liberation.
Those who imply that a rising surge of "nationalism" is preventing Iraqis from greeting American and British troops with open arms are wrong. What is preventing Iraqis from taking over the streets of their cities is confusion about American intentions -- confusion created by the way this war has been conducted and by fear of the murderous brown-shirt thugs, otherwise known as Saddam's Fedayeen, a militia loyal to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who control the streets of Iraqi cities and who are conducting the harassing attacks on American and British soldiers.
The coalition forces have not yet sent clear and unmistakable signals to the people of Iraq that, unlike in 1991, there will be no turning back before Hussein's regime has been overturned. In order to do this effectively they must count on the Iraqi opposition, which has so far been marginalized.
Winning Iraqi hearts and minds
Unless America wins support from the Iraqi people, a prolonged guerrilla war could result
Michael Hill, Baltimore Sun, March 30, 2003
As coalition forces continue the push into Iraq, it is important to realize that history is full of cautionary tales for great powers that assume overwhelming military superiority will bring easy victory over an outmatched opponent.
If the people of Iraq see these troops from the United States and Britain as forces freeing them from an oppressive dictator, then the war could be short and the transition to peace easy.
But if they instead view the troops as illegitimate invaders of their nation, then that could help form an indigenous opposition, leading to a lengthy struggle.
The important fight is for the hearts and minds of people on all sides of the military struggle.
THE PROPHETS OF WAR
Remembering what we were told to expect
First strike, then what?
Marian Wilkinson, The Age, September 28, 2002
General Joseph Hoar, who served as a senior American officer during the 1991 Gulf War, was clearly itching to take a swipe at the armchair generals in the Defence Department. Their most optimistic scenarios for war with Iraq suggest Saddam Hussein will be defeated within weeks of United States-led forces launching their attack.
Testifying to the US Senate this week, Hoar spoke cuttingly about "people in this city who believe the military campaign against Iraq will not be difficult". He hoped they were right, he said, but he wanted to put another scenario to them. This was that Saddam had learnt a bitter lesson in the last Gulf War and would not try to take on the US in the open desert.
"The nightmare scenario," said Hoar, "is that six Iraqi Republican Guard divisions and six heavy divisions, reinforced with several thousand anti-aircraft artillery pieces, defends the city of Baghdad. The result would be high casualties on both sides, as well as in the civilian community."
US forces would inevitably prevail, he said, "but at what cost, as the rest of the world watches while we bomb and have artillery rounds exploded in densely populated Iraqi neighbourhoods".
What would it look like? Senator Ted Kennedy asked.
"All our advantages of command and control, technology, mobility, all of those things are in part given up and you are working with corporals and sergeants and young men, fighting street-to-street. It looks like the last 15 minutes of Saving Private Ryan", said the general. "That's what we are up against."
The Neocons' war
This is supposed to burnish our reputation?
Harold Meyerson, LA Weekly, March 28, 2003
When the histories of the U.S.-Iraqi war are written, someone is going to have to track down when exactly the neoconservatives sold the Brooklyn Bridge to our president.
I don't mean the idea of the war itself, though the neocons have been promoting it ever since Poppy Bush let Saddam off the hook in 1991. I have in mind, rather, the notion that the war would unleash the genie of democracy throughout the Middle East, that with our victory would come a quantum leap in America's prestige and reputation. Television would beam to all the world heartwarming images of U.S. troops being rapturously received as they speed across Iraq; and we would again become the liberators we were in 1944-5.
It was a lovely scenario, but to believe it, the neos had to willfully forget countless lessons of history, and at least one law of thermodynamics: That for every action, there is an equal but opposite reaction. In the world according to the neos, world-shaking changes in U.S. policy -- arrogating to itself the right to wage preventive war, and plunging Iraq into that war -- might encounter some resistance along the way, but in the end lead to an outpouring of support.
Man who would be 'king' of Iraq
Oliver Morgan, The Observer, March 30, 2003
President, viceroy, governor, sheriff. It is difficult to know what to call Jay Garner, the retired US general who will run Iraq if and when Saddam Hussein is deposed.
The 'call me Jay' 64-year-old would prefer 'co-ordinator of civilian administration'. That's the bland description of his job heading the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the Pentagon agency preparing to govern Iraq's 23 million people in the aftermath of war, provide humanitarian support and administer the lucrative business of reconstruction.
Garners credentials are intriguing. He has a fine record in United Nations-backed humanitarian operations, playing a senior role in protecting the Kurds of northern Iraq from Saddam after the 1991 Gulf war in Operation Provide Comfort. Crucially he is now out of khaki, a vital counterpoint to General Tommy Franks, who is likely to act as a US military governor. On the other hand, he is closely linked with the group of hawks centred on US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (who gave him his latest job), his deputy Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney, who are as keen to bypass the UN in the aftermath of war as they were before it.
He appears to share their strong pro-Israeli views. He has been involved in formulating their more controversial defence policies, including the US national missile defence system that has done much to undermine the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty. The company he now works for is a missile specialist and makes money from systems deployed in Israel and by coalition forces in Iraq.
Bloodied but still unbowed, Baghdad prepares to fight
Patrick Graham, The Observer, March 30, 2003
In an interview with The Observer almost a month ago, an adviser to Saddam Hussein laid out a battle plan that seems to be unfolding with surprising accuracy. It appears the Iraqis had thought through this war more thoroughly than their adversary.
The adviser described the war as '10 Vietnams' that would be waged long after the invading forces arrived. He also believed that images of the war, especially dead American soldiers and Iraqi casualties, would sway US domestic opinion and an international outcry would force the US to stop fighting. While President George W. Bush says the outcome is inevitable, earlier predictions about Iraq's capabilities have proved inaccurate.
The regime planned to make Baghdad and the Sunni heartland around it the final battle ground that would tie up foreign troops for months, perhaps years. The adviser dismissed the possibility that the Iraqi leadership could be hunted down.
As usual, it will be the civilians who are unable to hide. It appears now that the allies will either lay siege to the city, evoking connotations of the Serbs surrounding Sarajevo, or try to enter by force. The latter will require the kind of fight through neighbourhoods unsuited to the allies' technical superiority and sensitivity to images of civilian casualties.
Rumsfeld ignored Pentagon advice on Iraq
Reuters, March 29, 2003
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly rejected advice from Pentagon planners that substantially more troops and armor would be needed to fight a war in Iraq, New Yorker Magazine reported.
In an article for its April 7 edition, which goes on sale on Monday, the weekly said Rumsfeld insisted at least six times in the run-up to the conflict that the proposed number of ground troops be sharply reduced and got his way.
"He thought he knew better. He was the decision-maker at every turn," the article quoted an unidentified senior Pentagon planner as saying. "This is the mess Rummy put himself in because he didn't want a heavy footprint on the ground."
It also said Rumsfeld had overruled advice from war commander Gen. Tommy Franks to delay the invasion until troops denied access through Turkey could be brought in by another route and miscalculated the level of Iraqi resistance.
"They've got no resources. He was so focused on proving his point -- that the Iraqis were going to fall apart," the article, by veteran journalist Seymour Hersh, cited an unnamed former high-level intelligence official as saying.
A spokesman at the Pentagon declined to comment on the article.
U.S. hope of swaying Arab opinion fading
Sally Buzbee, Associated Press, March 29, 2003
One chief goal of the war in Iraq is to convince Arabs that America was on their side and that getting rid of Saddam Hussein will benefit them, too.
But as prospects rise for a longer war and more dead Iraqi civilians, U.S. hopes of quickly swinging Arab and European public opinion to its favor are starting to fade.
The problem was summed up last week, perhaps unintentionally, by Secretary of State Colin Powell. The anti-American feeling now evident across the globe is a "transient problem" that will go away once the world sees liberated Iraqis celebrating Saddam's end, Powell said.
"What we have to do is get this Iraq crisis behind us and show the better life that's waiting for the Iraqi people ... and this will turn," Powell said.
The problem is that no one knows what might happen if that transition period -- the fighting in Iraq -- goes on longer than expected, or if television screens across the Mideast continue to show dead Iraqi children, not cheering Iraqi crowds.
Iraq's guerrillas shock allied forces
Peter Spiegel, Financial Times, March 28, 2003
"I think the Iraqis have read the American defence literature over the last 12 years," says Michael O'Hanlon, a military analyst with the Brookings Institution, noting that the Iraqi army has all but abandoned attempting to fight set battles in the open desert. "They figured out they better not do that again, if they didn't figure it out at the time. Now they're in a much better position."
Instead of meeting US forces on the open battlefield, most of the engagements have seen the use of guerrilla tactics, with Iraqis switching into civilian clothes and driving pick-up trucks and sport utility vehicles into ambushes; hiding guns at pre-positioned points so they can pick them up and start firing; mounting hit-and-run raids on more vulnerable forces behind the main US and British lines; and sniping at patrols near cities from rooftops and windows.
In most of these engagements, Iraqi forces have come out on the losing side. Only about 50 US and UK soldiers have been killed in more than a week's fighting, while 300 Iraqi irregulars were killed in Tuesday's fight with the 7th Cavalry alone.
Still, the tenacity of the Iraqi resistance has caught many allied military leaders by surprise and forced them to rethink their own tactics to accommodate a different kind of battlefield.
Iraqi civilians feed hungry US marines
Agence France-Presse, March 29, 2003
Iraqi civilians fleeing heavy fighting have stunned and delighted hungry US marines in central Iraq by giving them food, as guerrilla attacks continue to disrupt coalition supply lines to the rear.
Sergeant Kenneth Wilson said Arabic-speaking US troops made contact with two busloads of Iraqis fleeing south along Route Seven towards Rafit, one of the first friendly meetings with local people for the marines around here.
"They had slaughtered lambs and chickens and boiled eggs and potatoes for their journey out of the frontlines," Wilson said.
At one camp, the buses stopped and women passed out food to the troops, who have had to ration their army-issue packets of ready-to-eat meals due to disruptions to supply lines by fierce fighting further south.
THE PROPHETS OF WAR
Remembering what we were told to expect
'The Iraqis will welcome the US forces with flowers and sweets when they come in.'
The following is an extract from an article in al-Mutamar, the weekly newspaper of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) of 24-30 January, in which Kan'an Makiya (Head of the Iraqi Documentation and Studies Center, Harvard University and Professor at Brandeis University in the US) related the conversation that took place at a meeting with President George W Bush three weeks earlier, attended by two other Iraqi opposition figures, Randa al-Rahim and Hatim Mukhlis.
Prof Makiya said: "President Bush intimated that the coming war was inevitable and the Iraqi regime did not have long to go, whatever developments might occur at the UN or the Security Council. Mr Bush did not go into the details of the efforts of the UN, indicating that these were just a matter of routine."
Prof Makiya continued: "After this introduction, the president began to ask us about the Iraqis and Iraq. The first question was: 'What reaction do you expect from the Iraqis to the entry of US forces into their cities?'" Mr Makiya explained that "each of us agreed that all Iraqis of all sects would welcome these forces from the very first moment. I added: 'The Iraqis will welcome the US forces with flowers and sweets when they come in'."
President Bush then moved on to his second question: 'If the initial bombardment of Iraq is severe, will the reaction be the same? I mean, will they still welcome the US army?' Prof Makiya said he chose not to give a direct answer, but instead focused on the difference between the current situation and the way things were during the Gulf war of 1991, adding: "I spoke about the collapse of morale inside Iraq, the collapse of the military apparatus etc…I stressed to President Bush my personal opinion that 'the regime will be destroyed with the first blow', pointing out that 'the problem is no longer the resistance of the Iraqi army to the US forces because the situation has changed completely from 1991.'" Prof Makiya said he expected "no real fighting right from the start of the war," and concluded by expressing the view that there would be no need for the same level of bombardment as that of 1991.
Postwar democracy? Iraq is a hard place
David Corn, The Nation, March 26, 2003
The angry guy with the shoe.
Those who have been watching the war on television are familiar with the video footage: after the US military took control of Safwan, the southern Iraqi border town, this fellow was captured on film banging on a large, partially destroyed wall portrait of Saddam Hussein with his shoe. It was the closest the world has so far come to viewing joyous Iraqis dancing in the street before their American liberators. Such images may yet arrive, validating the assurances of American and British war advocates who maintained that this military action is indeed liberation, not conquest; that Iraqis would welcome such intervention; and that the invasion and occupation would place Iraq on the road to democracy. But if the dancing does not happen soon, the war planners can expect to have a tougher time securing Iraq and creating the environment necessary for reconstruction and democratization.
Consider the celebratory heel-banging in Safwan. A few days after the shoe-heard-around-the-world smacked against Hussein's forehead, ABC News reporter John Donvan and his crew--working unembeddedly--crossed the border into Kuwait and visited the town. They witnessed no rejoicing. Townspeople surrounded the journalists and passionately voiced their opinions of the US invasion. "We learned," Donvan reported, "that just because the townsfolk don't like Saddam, it doesn't mean they like the Americans trying to take him out....They were angry at America, and said US forces had shot at people in the town. They were also angry because they needed food, water and medicine and the aid promised by President Bush had not appeared....They asked us why the United States was taking over Iraq, and whether the Americans would stay in Iraq for ever. They saw the US-led invasion as a takeover, not liberation."
War in Iraq and Israeli occupation: A devastating resonance
Ali Abunimah and Hussein Ibish, The Electronic Intifada (and The Chicago Tribune), March 28, 2003
For all the physical devastation being produced by the war in Iraq, the political and diplomatic damage to the region and American foreign policy may be even more profound. Indeed, less serious attention seems to have been paid to the requirements of rebuilding political relations than repairing the infrastructure and society of Iraq.
This conflict is further poisoning the already noxious political atmosphere between Arabs and Americans. It has intensified dangerous feelings of humiliation and outrage among the Arab public, while paranoid rhetoric about Western attacks against Islam is spreading from the religious fringe to the mainstream.
Our government's failure to secure authorization for this war from the United Nations Security Council, largely dismissed as an unfortunate but minor detail here at home, has had a profound impact throughout the world. Almost no one in the Arab world accepts the administration's stated concerns about either Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or the brutality of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship. The consensus is that long-term American domination of the oil-rich Persian Gulf region is the actual aim. As a result, while most Americans see ourselves as liberators, near-universal Arab perception is that ordinary Iraqis are fighting courageously against incredible odds to defend their homeland. The profound Arab sense of violation trumps particulars about who is in charge of Iraq, even the reviled Hussein.
Riding alone into the sunset
William Pfaff, International Herald Tribune, March 28, 2003
Last Friday the most prominent of Washington's neoconservative policy groups, the American Enterprise Institute, held what one witness, a Financial Times correspondent, described as a "victory celebration."
Richard Perle, corporate consultant and member of the Pentagon's Defense Advisory Board, told the audience that the Iraq war was going well - that "there are more anti-war demonstrators in San Francisco than Iraqis willing to defend Saddam Hussein." He said that the pro-American coalition was growing, and Saddam Hussein's fall would be "an inspiration" to Iranians.
The members of the group, which is described as "the Bush administration ideological vanguard," discussed what to do about Iran, considered by them as even more dangerous than Iraq, in terms of its nuclear weapons program.
WHO MAKES THE RULES?
The bombing of marketplaces in Baghdad, twice this week, resulting in at least 70 deaths, has triggered renewed debate about war reporting and its impact on public perceptions. After the first market bombing, CNN delayed reporting this for several hours, one can only assume in order to give the Pentagon time to accompany the story with its own version on what may or may not have happened. While networks such as CNN took it upon themselves to shield their viewers and protect them from the risk of jumping to what might be false conclusions about the accuracy of coalition "smart" bombing, the rest of the world was being confronted with the carnage.
In response to this incident, as well as with the broadcast of images of POW's and dead coalition servicemen, frustration is now being expressed by many people in the United States, that foreign - and especially Arab - newscasters aren't playing by the rules. The deference to the Pentagon showed by a patriotic US media is contrasted against what is portrayed as irresponsible reporting by the likes of al Jazeera.
Meanwhile, little is being said about the fact that, like it or not, across the Middle East perception of the war is being shaped by and reflected in the Arabic media. Even if some Americans might feel like the United States is getting a bad rap, if US forces "prevail" in Iraq they will then have to deal with the consequences of having already lost the battle for hearts and minds. Whether the Bush administration manages to convince Americans that this is a war of liberation, it will count for nothing if the Iraqis now see this as a war of conquest and later see themselves as the victims of an occupation.
As Iraqis contemplate their future they must be acutely aware of the neighboring occupation in Palestine and the plight of its people who have for many years been treated with American indifference.
Vision and division
Mamoun Fandy, Washington Post, March 30, 2003
The recent airing of gruesome pictures of American casualties and POWs has again set the American media talking about the unbridled nature of Arab television, particularly the Qatar-owned al-Jazeera network. Indeed, the Arabs are watching a different war than we are here.
Their war is presented for television consumption using the templates of the recent past: the Palestinian intifada, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1956 Suez War. The imagery of the past infuses the interpretation of the current war with familiar meaning -- and makes coverage easy. [...]
Beneath the Arab modes of visual representation [in covering the war], the West is also present. Indeed, Arab coverage often copies the CNN and Fox News formats. Today, just like CNN, every one of the 10 Arab channels I watch, or appear on as a commentator, has a "war room" staffed with retired generals discussing the progress of the war and freely advising the Iraqis how to conduct it. In this way, these veterans of Arab wars are compensating for past defeat with on-air political speeches.
The tone of many reporters in Baghdad is much the same. The image drives the story. For example, an al-Jazeera reporter in the Iraqi capital falsely told his viewers on the first day of the air campaign, "Here in Baghdad, a city accused of hiding weapons of mass destruction is being hit by weapons of mass destruction." This kind of repetition is the stuff that has made Arabic poetry so justly admired. Here, the rhythm and sonority of the language act to encourage audience disregard for the true definitions of the words being used.
With few exceptions, ethical constraints are rarely discussed in the Arab media, where the notion of editorial judgment sounds to many like censorship. Several have said it reminds them of what they had to do while they were working for state-owned broadcasters. Reporters and producers know what their viewers want to see: images of empowerment and resistance because of past defeats. They also want to see what Hussein's information minister, Muhammed Said al-Sahaf, calls teaching the Americans a lesson. "We are no less than the Vietnamese. Just make it costly in body bags and the Americans will run," said a general who comments regularly on al-Jazeera. Some Arab journalists say they have little choice but to go along. "The cost of speaking out now -- even to simply say that Saddam is partially responsible for what is taking place -- is very high. It could cost you your job and could even cause you physical harm," said one.
Advisors of influence: Nine members of the Defense Policy Board have ties to defense contractors
Andre Verloy and Daniel Politi, Center for Public Integrity, March 28, 2003
Of the 30 members of the Defense Policy Board, the government-appointed group that advises the Pentagon, at least nine have ties to companies that have won more than $76 billion in defense contracts in 2001 and 2002. Four members are registered lobbyists, one of whom represents two of the three largest defense contractors.
The board's chairman, Richard Perle, resigned yesterday, March 27, 2003, amid allegations of conflicts of interest for his representation of companies with business before the Defense Department, although he will remain a member of the board. Eight of Perle's colleagues on the board have ties to companies with significant contracts from the Pentagon.
Members of the board disclose their business interests annually to the Pentagon, but the disclosures are not available to the public. "The forms are filed with the Standards of Conduct Office which review the filings to make sure they are in compliance with government ethics," Pentagon spokesman Maj. Ted Wadsworth told the Center for Public Integrity.
The companies with ties to Defense Policy Board members include prominent firms like Boeing, TRW, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and Booz Allen Hamilton and smaller players like Symantec Corp., Technology Strategies and Alliance Corp., and Polycom Inc.
FALSE EXPECTATIONS
War planners say "we overestimated the appeal of liberation." Perhaps it would be closer to the truth to say that Iraqis are not at all lacking in a desire for liberation. They simply doubt that that's what's on offer.
Plan's defect: No defectors
Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003
A highly publicized U.S. campaign to persuade senior Iraqi military and civilian leaders to surrender has failed to produce any significant defections, and U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that those closest to President Saddam Hussein are unlikely to give up.
The effort now appears to be one of several miscalculations in a high-stakes U.S. strategy to use bombing, secret contacts and inducements -- including cash payments -- to key Iraqi leaders to quickly overthrow Hussein.
"We underestimated their capacity to put up resistance," said a Bush administration official who requested anonymity. "We underestimated the role of nationalism. And we overestimated the appeal of liberation."
Hussein hopes to draw U.S. into urban combat
Sebastian Rotella, Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003
Saddam Hussein hopes to turn the battle for Baghdad into a Mesopotamian version of Stalingrad.
The Iraqi president is an admirer of Josef Stalin. He has modeled his ruthless rule and cult of personality on the Soviet leader. As the U.S.-led invasion force stretches its supply lines to reach Baghdad, military analysts and Iraq experts say Hussein's most loyal, best-equipped troops are digging in to try to inflict the kind of carnage that stopped Adolf Hitler at the Volga River in 1943.
A first and crucial test is likely to come near the cities of Karbala and Al Kut along a so-called "red line" that forms a ring south of Baghdad, where U.S. troops are massing now. If Hussein can avoid a military collapse there that would drag down his entire regime, analysts expect him to regroup his forces for street-to-street combat in the capital. And then, he appears to be counting on the modern weapons of media and world politics for his survival.
The Iraqi regime has spent years preparing for this showdown. Its strategists have researched U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia. Experts say videotapes of the movie "Black Hawk Down," which recounts the frenzied combat in Mogadishu in 1993, circulated among military men in Baghdad in recent months.
"People say to me you are not the Vietnamese, you have no jungles and swamps to hide in," said Tarik Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister, in an interview published recently by the International Institute for Strategic Studies here. "I reply, 'Let our cities be our swamps and our buildings be our jungles.' "
In tactics, technology and firepower, the force closing in on Baghdad is far superior to the U.S. military that fought in Vietnam, or the German army that slowly froze, starved and ran out of ammunition in the snow and rubble of Stalingrad. But Hussein's strategy relies as much on psychology as it does on armament.
Conservatives tailor tone to fit course of the war
Jim Rutenberg, New York Times, March 28, 2003
During the months leading up to war, many conservative commentators and policy makers fanned out across the news media to support the president's case for a preventive strike against Iraq.
Many of those commentators who argued for the doctrine of a United States-enforced world order, including Rush Limbaugh, William Kristol and Andrew Sullivan, said Iraqis would welcome allied troops as liberators. Others predicted a swift victory against a grossly outmatched and disloyal Iraqi military.
Now, with televised images of Iraqis chanting anti-American slogans, and with Saddam Hussein's troops fighting back hard, the pundits have returned to the offensive, echoing President Bush's optimism and denouncing what they see as pessimism in the news media.
There is a range of views among the so-called hawks. Some simply urge patience. Some agree that they may have added to the perception that victory would come easily.
But there have been some unifying themes, most notably that allied progress has been swift and that the news media have been exaggerating the negative.
'We will turn Bush into a dog'
The Americans badly miscalculated by believing that the Iraqis would welcome them as liberators
Christopher Dickey, Newsweek, March 27, 2003
Dogs do not live happy lives in Iraq. Considered "unclean" by Muslims and rarely kept as pets, most of those that you see are feral curs slinking through the streets late at night.
It's normal practice for Iraqi soldiers to cull the packs with machine guns. But the commandos of Saddam's fedayeen, terrorist-shock troops organized in the mid-1990s, sometimes tear a dog limb from limb and sink their teeth in its flesh. Repulsive brutality, after all, is a badge of honor for these troops; this particular rite of passage was even captured on a government video.
"The fedayeen are animals!" says a young Iraqi woman who fled her country for Jordan a few months ago. "They are trained to be like animals! Everybody is frightened of them." And even though there are only an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 of these militia, inside Iraq it feels as if the fedayeen -- meaning "those who sacrifice" -- are everywhere. These days, Iraqis say, they are forcing others to put their lives on the line in the face of the American invasion. "Saddam has succeeded in establishing a strong structure that is loyal to him," says Issam Chalabi, a former Iraqi oil minister now in exile. "These fedayeen are not only fighting the Americans, they are mainly against those who want to surrender or refuse to fight."
And yet, neither the frightened young woman, nor Chalabi (who is no relation to a would-be exile leader with the same last name), nor any of the other Iraqis or Arabs I've talked to since the fighting began last week, believes that the Iraqis' resistance to the United States is solely a matter of intimidation and fear. That plays a part; the role of the fedayeen is important. But the resistance to the United States "is a matter of Iraqi patriotism," says Chalabi. "No one will accept the Americans' presence there. And if you say anything about me, say this: I am against the war. I am against the occupation."
American administration officials and sympathetic pundits fundamentally miscalculated by believing that, as some exiles told them, because the Iraqi people hate Saddam, they would love their American "liberators." "That's where you went wrong," a Lebanese friend tells me, summing up sentiments I've heard all over the Arab world, "The Iraqis do hate Saddam -- but they do not love you."
Practice to deceive
Chaos in the Middle East is not the Bush hawks' nightmare scenario -- it's their plan.
Joshua Micah Marshall, Washington Monthly, April, 2003
Like any group of permanent Washington revolutionaries fueled by visions of a righteous cause, the neocons long ago decided that criticism from the establishment isn't a reason for self-doubt but the surest sign that they're on the right track. But their confidence also comes from the curious fact that much of what could go awry with their plan will also serve to advance it. A full-scale confrontation between the United States and political Islam, they believe, is inevitable, so why not have it now, on our terms, rather than later, on theirs? Actually, there are plenty of good reasons not to purposely provoke a series of crises in the Middle East. But that's what the hawks are setting in motion, partly on the theory that the worse things get, the more their approach becomes the only plausible solution.
Israelis fear Blair's influence over Bush
Chris McGreal, The Guardian, March 28, 2003
Israel protested to Tony Blair yesterday at what it called his "worrying and outrageous" comments linking the war in Iraq to a settlement of the Palestinian conflict, and at Jack Straw's accusations of western double standards over the enforcement of UN resolutions on Israel.
But the vehemence and timing of the protest, as the British prime minister met President George Bush to discuss the war and reaffirm their commitment to the "road map" to Middle East peace, reflected a growing Israeli fear that Mr Blair now exercises more influence than Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, over White House policy on the Jewish state.
The Israelis are particularly unnerved at the prospect of Mr Blair stiffening American demands over illegal Jewish settlements and forcing the pace on the creation of an independent Palestinian state far beyond the emasculated dependency Mr Sharon has in mind.
The director general of Israel's foreign ministry, Yoav Biran, called in the British ambassador, Sherard Cowper-Coles, to lodge the protest.
"The ambassador was told that we find the latest British statements worrying and outrageous," said Jonathon Peled, a foreign ministry spokesman.
THE PROPHETS OF WAR
Remembering what we were told to expect
War in Iraq seen as quick win
Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, September 18, 2002
Senior Bush administration officials have concluded that the United States will quickly win a war against Iraq, based on superior American technology and a sharp deterioration of Saddam Hussein's armed forces since the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict.
Officials also believe a significant number of Saddam's army commanders and units will either refuse to fight or will assist allied troops in toppling the Baghdad regime.
Senior Pentagon policy-makers have come to that conclusion in recent weeks, and some officials are beginning to state it publicly.
"I don't think it would be that tough a fight," Vice President Richard B. Cheney said on NBC's "Meet the Press." "That is, I don't think there's any question that we would prevail and we would achieve our objective."
Sen. John McCain, a Vietnam War combat pilot and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, agrees.
"I am very certain that this military engagement will not be very difficult," Mr, McCain, Arizona Republican, said last week. "It may entail the risk of American lives and treasure, but Saddam Hussein is vastly weaker than he was in 1991."
Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Buster Glosson, who designed the successful air war against Iraq in 1991, says victory can be achieved in weeks, not months, if the Pentagon exploits precision-guided munitions, special-operations troops and disloyalty within Iraq's military.
"If these basic steps are not violated and our war-fighting asymmetrical advantage is maximized, Saddam will not last 30 days," Gen. Glosson said in an interview.
Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, often reflects the thinking of other hard-liners in the department's policy shop. "I don't believe we have to defeat Saddam's army," he said in the winter. "I think Saddam's army will defeat Saddam."
Why the Iraqis are suspicious of their liberators
Patrick Cockburn, The Independent, March 28, 2003
In 1915 a British army led by Major General Charles Townsend advanced north from Basra in what he hoped would be an easy campaign to capture Baghdad. After initial victories he was forced to retreat. After suffering heavy casualties in a battle outside Baghdad the army fell back to Kut, then as now an evil-smelling and tumbledown city on a bend in the Tigris.
After a siege the army surrendered and it was only in 1917 that Baghdad was captured; 40,000 British soldiers died and were buried in the plains of Iraq. I used to visit a sad little cemetery in Kut that had turned into a swamp. The names of the dead on the tombstones were only just visible above the slimy green water.
The analogy with the present war should not be pushed too far. General Townsend's army and the Anglo-American force now fighting south of Baghdad both suffered from overextended communications. But otherwise the military superiority enjoyed by the British and the Americans against Saddam Hussein is far greater than that of the British against the Turks in the First World War.
But there is another, precise parallel between what happened south of Baghdad in 1915 and in 2003. In both cases the invading army and its political masters were grossly overconfident that they would win an easy victory. So far, this has not happened, though the Iraqi army might cave in under the terrible battering from US air power. The difficulties facing London and Washington are not just important in the context of the present campaign, but they are an ominous foretaste of the dangers in establishing any post-war settlement.
Raw, devastating realities that expose the truth about Basra
RobertFisk, The Independent, March 28, 2003
Two British soldiers lie dead on a Basra roadway, a small Iraqi girl – victim of an Anglo American air strike – is brought to hospital with her intestines spilling out of her stomach, a terribly wounded woman screams in agony as doctors try to take off her black dress.
An Iraqi general, surrounded by hundreds of his armed troops, stands in central Basra and announces that Iraq's second city remains firmly in Iraqi hands. The unedited al-Jazeera videotape – filmed over the past 36 hours and newly arrived in Baghdad – is raw, painful, devastating.
It is also proof that Basra – reportedly "captured'' and "secured'' by British troops last week – is indeed under the control of Saddam Hussein's forces. Despite claims by British officers that some form of uprising has broken out in Basra, cars and buses continue to move through the streets while Iraqis queue patiently for gas bottles as they are unloaded from a government truck.
Good morrrrrning, Iraq....
Tom Engelhardt, TomDispatch, March 27, 2003
...it's taken less than a week for American reporters to begin to doubt Pentagon briefers (foreign reporters began in that mode) – a passage that took years in Vietnam – and for the briefers to begin to look like participants in the long ago Saigon press briefings that included the infamous "body counts," mockingly nicknamed by reporters "the Five O'clock Follies." In other words, a week into the war the first cracks in what may become a media "credibility gap" are already showing. As it turns out, Pentagon policies for controlling the media were quite brilliant, but also dependent on the delivery of the promised war – a brief "cakewalk" of liberation.
Thousands flee Basra in search of food and water
David Fox and Paul Harris, The Independent, March 28, 2003
Thousands of tired and thirsty civilians trudged out of the besieged southern Iraqi city of Basra yesterday in a desperate search for food and water.
Families drove ramshackle vehicles or walked in single file down a rail track past British Army checkpoints on the western side of the city.
"It's been 'pow, pow, pow' all the time," said Maklim Mohammed as he crossed a main bridge leading south from the city, which stands at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates. "I can't stand it. I'm nervous and I'm thirsty."
Basra's 1.5 million inhabitants have endured days without water. Red Cross engineers have managed amid the battles around the city partly to restore a water treatment centre that had been down since last Friday when cables carrying electricity to the plant were cut by Allied bombardment. But most homes still have no access to potable water. People have resorted to collecting water from rivers around the city, which are polluted with sewage, prompting warnings from the UN of a potential cholera epidemic. Children are at risk from diarrhoea, which is already a big killer of Iraqi children under five.
Most of those leaving yesterday were on foot without their belongings, apparently seeking shelter with friends or relatives at Zubayr, 12 miles to the south. Most were men who said they would try to return to Basra if they could find supplies.
"We are very thirsty. Our families are very thirsty," one of those leaving said. "Where can we find water? The British told us to go down the road [south]."
In Zubayr the position was only marginally better. British and American troops handed out bottled water to an agitated crowd who begged them for more. Many said they had not had water for al | |
