<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Afghanistan seen through the Wakhan Corridor</title>
	<atom:link href="http://warincontext.org/2009/10/21/afghanistan-seen-through-the-wakhan-corridor/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://warincontext.org/2009/10/21/afghanistan-seen-through-the-wakhan-corridor/</link>
	<description>... with attention to the unseen</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2012 08:49:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: David James</title>
		<link>http://warincontext.org/2009/10/21/afghanistan-seen-through-the-wakhan-corridor/comment-page-1/#comment-7520</link>
		<dc:creator>David James</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 07:35:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://warincontext.org/?p=2272#comment-7520</guid>
		<description>I didn&#039;t make it clear that I left the army in 2005 and this is very much a personal effort with frustratingly little support from any government or other institutions.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I didn&#8217;t make it clear that I left the army in 2005 and this is very much a personal effort with frustratingly little support from any government or other institutions.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: David James</title>
		<link>http://warincontext.org/2009/10/21/afghanistan-seen-through-the-wakhan-corridor/comment-page-1/#comment-7519</link>
		<dc:creator>David James</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 07:33:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://warincontext.org/?p=2272#comment-7519</guid>
		<description>Dear Drs Markey and Muller,

I served on two tours of Afghansitan with the British army and quickly became convinced that the creation of jobs was of vital importance to success in Afghanistan.

Last year we established Mountain Unity.org as a socail enterprise to promote the Wakhan as a viable destination for trekking and mountaineering expeditions.

Our intent is to increase the number of visitors who experience for themselves the Other Afghanistan and become emotionally connected to the remarkable Wakhi people.

We hope these &#039;Ambassadors&#039; will return home and help build bridges between their own communities and the people of Afghanistan which will lead to increased sustainable trade and development.

You can find out more on our website: www.mountainunity.org.

Thanks for your article and for coming to the Wakhan.

David James</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dear Drs Markey and Muller,</p>
<p>I served on two tours of Afghansitan with the British army and quickly became convinced that the creation of jobs was of vital importance to success in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Last year we established Mountain Unity.org as a socail enterprise to promote the Wakhan as a viable destination for trekking and mountaineering expeditions.</p>
<p>Our intent is to increase the number of visitors who experience for themselves the Other Afghanistan and become emotionally connected to the remarkable Wakhi people.</p>
<p>We hope these &#8216;Ambassadors&#8217; will return home and help build bridges between their own communities and the people of Afghanistan which will lead to increased sustainable trade and development.</p>
<p>You can find out more on our website: <a href="http://www.mountainunity.org" rel="nofollow">http://www.mountainunity.org</a>.</p>
<p>Thanks for your article and for coming to the Wakhan.</p>
<p>David James</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Jody Ricci</title>
		<link>http://warincontext.org/2009/10/21/afghanistan-seen-through-the-wakhan-corridor/comment-page-1/#comment-6372</link>
		<dc:creator>Jody Ricci</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 13:46:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://warincontext.org/?p=2272#comment-6372</guid>
		<description>Federations that use the grass root support of the people would be successful if they get buy-in from the citizens of this area.  The U.S.A. has not given this idea enough investment.  There will be a problem of if the local groups are given power as they will fight violently over it amongst themselves unless you have some very sophisticated dispute resolution methods.  The U.S. military should be supporting the local people fight the Taliban instead of having the citizens be spectators.   Some military prescence has to exist especially with the neighbors in the area as Russia&#039;s behavior towards Georgia and Ukraine has clearly shown.  It is an interesting article but not accurate in my opinion that Afghanistan is an artificial state.  It was formed in 1747 before Russia and Great Britain had much sway and put together later by the Pashtuns through a very aggressive khan.  What Afghanistan needs in part is a local George Washington, but if you go through history they are very few and far between in the records.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Federations that use the grass root support of the people would be successful if they get buy-in from the citizens of this area.  The U.S.A. has not given this idea enough investment.  There will be a problem of if the local groups are given power as they will fight violently over it amongst themselves unless you have some very sophisticated dispute resolution methods.  The U.S. military should be supporting the local people fight the Taliban instead of having the citizens be spectators.   Some military prescence has to exist especially with the neighbors in the area as Russia&#8217;s behavior towards Georgia and Ukraine has clearly shown.  It is an interesting article but not accurate in my opinion that Afghanistan is an artificial state.  It was formed in 1747 before Russia and Great Britain had much sway and put together later by the Pashtuns through a very aggressive khan.  What Afghanistan needs in part is a local George Washington, but if you go through history they are very few and far between in the records.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: William deB. Mills</title>
		<link>http://warincontext.org/2009/10/21/afghanistan-seen-through-the-wakhan-corridor/comment-page-1/#comment-6326</link>
		<dc:creator>William deB. Mills</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2009 20:15:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://warincontext.org/?p=2272#comment-6326</guid>
		<description>Invaluable article. I would argue from a high level political science perspective that the following three principles should govern US planning on Afghanistan:
1.	Muslim socio-political reform should be managed first by locals and second by neighboring non-Western societies;
2.	the method should always give precedence to civil society reform with military action firmly subordinated;
3.	the goal should not be incorporation into the American system but the establishment of an independent society.
This article approaches the issue from the opposite direction – from the level of individuals, thus illuminating the specific conditions to be faced by any agency trying to implement those three high-level principles.

Can we connect the two?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Invaluable article. I would argue from a high level political science perspective that the following three principles should govern US planning on Afghanistan:<br />
1.	Muslim socio-political reform should be managed first by locals and second by neighboring non-Western societies;<br />
2.	the method should always give precedence to civil society reform with military action firmly subordinated;<br />
3.	the goal should not be incorporation into the American system but the establishment of an independent society.<br />
This article approaches the issue from the opposite direction – from the level of individuals, thus illuminating the specific conditions to be faced by any agency trying to implement those three high-level principles.</p>
<p>Can we connect the two?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: DE Teodoru</title>
		<link>http://warincontext.org/2009/10/21/afghanistan-seen-through-the-wakhan-corridor/comment-page-1/#comment-6311</link>
		<dc:creator>DE Teodoru</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2009 02:38:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://warincontext.org/?p=2272#comment-6311</guid>
		<description>Afghanistan is a mozaic of immiscible territorial ethnicities from all the nations around it and this article proves it. Abdullah&#039;s prospects as a Tajik at beating Karzai, a Pashtun warlord, are as bad as the ability of Karzai to keep the country in one piece. Please get my &quot;sons&quot; out of Afghanistan so they can pick up their lives with their wives and kids in America. We are making pathologic killers out of good men who only joined the National Guard to protect the homeland. Obama must show the determination Nixon showed in 1967 when he told me: WE MUST GET OUT OF VIETNAM NOW!Save our troops, fire McChrystal!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Afghanistan is a mozaic of immiscible territorial ethnicities from all the nations around it and this article proves it. Abdullah&#8217;s prospects as a Tajik at beating Karzai, a Pashtun warlord, are as bad as the ability of Karzai to keep the country in one piece. Please get my &#8220;sons&#8221; out of Afghanistan so they can pick up their lives with their wives and kids in America. We are making pathologic killers out of good men who only joined the National Guard to protect the homeland. Obama must show the determination Nixon showed in 1967 when he told me: WE MUST GET OUT OF VIETNAM NOW!Save our troops, fire McChrystal!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

