Category Archives: nuclear issues

Report says Iran has data to make a nuclear bomb

Report says Iran has data to make a nuclear bomb
By William J Broad and David E Sanger, New York Times, October 4, 2009

Senior staff members of the United Nations nuclear agency have concluded in a confidential analysis that Iran has acquired “sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable” atom bomb.

The report by experts in the International Atomic Energy Agency stresses in its introduction that its conclusions are tentative and subject to further confirmation of the evidence, which it says came from intelligence agencies and its own investigations.

But the report’s conclusions, described by senior European officials, go well beyond the public positions taken by several governments, including the United States.

Two years ago, American intelligence agencies published a detailed report concluding that Tehran halted its efforts to design a nuclear weapon in 2003. But in recent months, Britain has joined France, Germany and Israel in disputing that conclusion, saying the work has been resumed.

A senior American official said last week that the United States was now re-evaluating its 2007 conclusions. [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — The New York Times is at it again: putting on quite a convincing performance as a clandestine operation that acts at the behest of governments and intelligence agencies.

Ah, but the Times is simply a messenger, relaying important information provided by “a senior European official’ who wanted to make public the contents of a so-far unpublished and incomplete IAEA report.

The political agenda here seems transparent. A report whose existence has been debated for weeks now becomes front-page news, right at the moment that delicate negotiations have only just begun.

Is this coming out now in order to add an increased sense of urgency to the diplomatic effort? I don’t think so. On the contrary, it’s about undermining that effort and the work of the IAEA.

Comments by the IAEA’s director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, published in an interview with The Hindu seem particularly relevant here:

I have been making it very clear that with regard to these alleged studies, we have not seen any use of nuclear material, we have not received any information that Iran has manufactured any part of a nuclear weapon or component. That’s why I say, to present the Iran threat as imminent is hype.

Q: In a sense, this one outstanding issue is far less serious than the issues which prompted Iran’s referral to the Security Council!

It is a serious concern but I am not going to panic, to say it is an imminent threat that we are going to wake up and see Iran with nuclear weapons. Our job is to make sure we do not overstate or understate a case. There are enough people around to use or abuse what we say. The judgment call is very difficult, but based on what we have seen so far — we are concerned, we need to clarify this issue, we need to build confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme, we need Iran to adhere to the Additional Protocol because that will help me build confidence. But I am not going to sound an alarm and say that Iran is on the verge of developing nuclear weapons.

Israel names Russians helping Iran build nuclear bomb

Israel names Russians helping Iran build nuclear bomb
By Uzi Mahanimi, Mark Franchetti and Jon Swain, The Sunday Times, October 4, 2009

The West says the plant [near Qom] is tailor-made for a secret weapons programme and proves Iran’s claim that its nuclear programme is intended only for peaceful purposes is a lie. The plant is designed to hold 3,000 centrifuges — enough to produce the material needed for one bomb a year.

Iran’s conduct over the next few weeks will determine whether the West continues its new dialogue or is compelled to increase pressure with tougher United Nations and other sanctions.

Ephraim Sneh, a former Israeli deputy defence minister, warned that time was running out for action to stop the programme. “If no crippling sanctions are introduced by Christmas, Israel will strike,” he said. “If we are left alone, we will act alone.” [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — The Sunday Times has amazing intelligence sources!

Not a single IAEA inspector has set foot in the Fordo facility or seen its plans and yet we know that it is “tailor-made for a secret weapons programme”.

Right! I suppose you can argue the fact that it’s a deeply concealed structure makes it “tailor-made” for such a purpose, but that would seem to be a case of inferring that something is certain because it is unknown.

That might be so in the mind of a Sunday Times reporter, but I for one, have yet to observe such a quasi-mystical correspondence between the known and the unknown.

As for yet another Israeli threat — I’m sorry, but the more often they are made, the more implausible they become, at least to me.

The military option: Could they do it?
By Greg Miller and Julian E. Barnes, Chicago Tribune, October 3, 2009

The U.S. military is developing technologies, including a new generation of “bunker-busting” bombs, that could destroy facilities like the one near Qom.

But there are doubts about the effectiveness of those weapons, prompting current and former U.S. officials to say that a military effort aimed at crippling Iran’s nuclear program would require dozens of missile strikes and possibly even the insertion of U.S. troops.

“If you’re going to have an effective campaign to go in and throw [Iran’s nuclear program] back years, you’re talking about a massive, massive effort,” said a former senior U.S. intelligence official who was involved in examining such scenarios.

“This is not an Iraqi reactor or a Syrian reactor,” the official said, referring to Israel’s strikes in 1981 and 2007, respectively, on above-ground nuclear facilities in those countries. “This is a different game.”

The official and others spoke on condition of anonymity when discussing millitary planning.

President Obama said shortly after taking office that he was prepared to use “all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.” Last week, he reiterated that he would not “rule out any options when it comes to U.S. security interests.”

The increasingly difficult nature of upholding that pledge through military strikes, however, became clearer last week when U.S. officials described the newest Iranian site, believed to be a uranium enrichment which plant which could furnish fissile material for a bomb. [continued…]

Iran’s brilliant chessmanship

Brilliant chessmanship
By Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Washington Times, October 4, 2009

ike back-winding in a sailing race, Iran has gotten ahead of the United States and its allies that met for the nuclear talks in Geneva Thursday. Iran pulled a rabbit out of the diplomatic hat in the form of a self-disclosure to the International Atomic Energy Agency about a second uranium-enrichment plant in Qom.

On the surface, President Obama and other leaders of the G-20 group of major economic countries meeting recently in Pittsburgh seized on this revelation to mount timely new pressure on Iran. Mr. Obama went so far as claiming that the Qom site’s “configuration” indicates it is for military purposes. Iran’s initiative seemed to have all but backfired on it, as manna from heaven for the “P5 + 1” nations – permanent U.N. Security Council members Britain, France, Russia, China and the U.S. plus Germany – that are pondering fresh sanctions on Iran in case the Geneva talk fails.

Yet Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s air of certainty – that the disclosure about the “hidden site” will add to the pressure on Iranians at the talk to “come out clean” on their nuclear program – may prove premature. More than anything, this is leverage for Iran to the detriment of Western strategy, for several reasons. [continued…]

Real progress with Iran

Real progress with Iran
By Gary Sick, The Daily Beast, October 2, 2009

The Geneva nuclear talks were just baby steps along a long and perilous path. Still, this was a historic moment after 30 years of mutual recriminations and hyperbole.

If you have any doubt that the Geneva meetings with Iran were surprisingly productive, just go back and look at the commentary the day before they began. Even allowing for the fact that the United States and its negotiating partners (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany–the P5+1–plus European Union negotiator Javier Solana) were trying to lower expectations to the political equivalent of absolute zero, it was still difficult to find anyone who anticipated anything like real progress. Yet that is what happened.

Iran had issued a bland five-page document that scarcely mentioned the nuclear issue. They insisted that the newly discovered Qom enrichment site was not only perfectly legal but utterly routine. They let it be known that they had no intention of discussing their own nuclear program in these talks. Yet, from the accounts we have so far, it appears that Iran came prepared to make concessions about Qom, permitting IAEA inspections to begin within the next two weeks or so. As for their nuclear program, almost nothing else seems to have been discussed. [continued…]

Obama pwns Bush-Cheney on Iran

Obama pwns Bush-Cheney on Iran
By Juan Cole, October 2, 2009

For 8 years, Bush-Cheney practiced what I call “belligerent Ostrichism” toward Iran. They refused to talk to Tehran. They wanted to ratchet up sanctions on it. Bush sent 2 aircraft carriers to the Gulf to menace Iran. Bush’s spokesmen professed themselves afraid of Iran’s unarmed little speedboats in the Gulf. Aside from issuing threats to attack and destroy Iran the way they did Iraq, Bush-Cheney had nothing else to say on the matter. During the 8 years, Iran went from being able to enrich to .2% to being able to enrich to 3.8%, and increased its stock of centrifuges significantly. Bush-Cheney gesticulated and grimaced and fainted away at the horror of it all, but they accomplished diddly-squat.

Barack Obama pwned Bush-Cheney in one day, and got more concessions from Iran in 7 1/2 hours than the former administration got in 8 years of saber-rattling. [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — A State Department background briefing provides more details on the lead up to the agreement and how it will be implemented:

During the plenary and on the margins and during our sidebar discussion… we discussed the question of the Tehran research reactor. And maybe a little background would be helpful. This is a research reactor which has been in operation in Tehran for decades, producing medical isotopes under strict IAEA safeguards. The last supply of fuel for this reactor, which is at roughly 19.75 percent LEU, was supplied by the Argentine government in the early 1990s and it’s going to run out in roughly the next year, year and a half.

Iran came to the IAEA a few months ago with the request to replace this supply. The IAEA consulted us and some others, some other members, and to make a long story short the United States and Russia joined together in a proposal to the IAEA which the IAEA subsequently conveyed as a response to the Iranians, to use Iran’s own LEU stockpile as the basis, as the feedstock for the reactor fuel that’s required.

This would then entail taking its LEU, which is enriched to about 3.5 percent, enriching it up to 19.75 percent in Russia, which the Russians have now publicly confirmed that they’re prepared to do, and then fabricating that into fuel assemblies which can be used at this safeguarded reactor, and the French have now confirmed their willingness to play that last role. Those are the basic details involved in the proposal. The potential advantage of this, if it’s implemented, is that it would significantly reduce Iran’s LEU stockpile which itself is a source of anxiety in the Middle East and elsewhere.

During our talks today the Iranians agreed to accept this proposal in principle, and there’s to be a meeting in Vienna on the 18th of October, led by IAEA experts, to try to work out the details.

So again, at least in our view, the research reactor proposal made by the IAEA would be a positive interim step to help build confidence so that we’d have more diplomatic space to pursue Iran’s compliance with its obligations under the Security Council Resolutions, the NPT and the IAEA, and to tackle the more fundamental question of Iran’s nuclear program.

Obama agrees to keep Israel’s nukes secret

Obama agrees to keep Israel’s nukes secret
By Eli Lake, Washington Times, October 2, 2009

President Obama has reaffirmed a 4-decade-old secret understanding that has allowed Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to international inspections, three officials familiar with the understanding said.

The officials, who spoke on the condition that they not be named because they were discussing private conversations, said Mr. Obama pledged to maintain the agreement when he first hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House in May.

Under the understanding, the U.S. has not pressured Israel to disclose its nuclear weapons or to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which could require Israel to give up its estimated several hundred nuclear bombs. [continued…]

Iran ‘has secret nuclear arms plan’

Iran ‘has secret nuclear arms plan’
By James Blitz, Daniel Dombey and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Financial Times, September 29, 2009

Britain’s intelligence services say that Iran has been secretly designing a nuclear warhead “since late 2004 or early 2005”, an assessment that suggests Tehran has embarked on the final steps towards acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

As world powers prepare to confront Iran on Thursday on its nuclear ambitions, the Financial Times has learnt that the UK now judges that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, ordered the resumption of the country’s weapons programme four years ago. [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — The American line is still, we’re all looking at the same intelligence but their are a variety of ways it can be interpreted. British intelligence is making an assertion which, if true, should be backed up by hard evidence. The US position implies that it regards this evidence as weak.

In dispute with Iran, path to Iraq is in spotlight
By Scott Shane, New York Times, September 30, 2009

Gary Sick, an expert on Iran at Columbia University, said that ever since 1992, American officials had claimed that Iran was just a few years away from a nuclear bomb. Like Saddam Hussein, the clerical government in Iran is “despised,” he said, leading to worst-case assumptions.

“In 2002, it seemed utterly naïve to believe Saddam didn’t have a program,” Mr. Sick said. Now, the notion that Iran is not racing to build a bomb is similarly excluded from serious discussion, he said.

Mr. Sick, like some in the intelligence community, said he believed that Iran might intend to stop short of building a weapon while creating “breakout capability” — the ability to make a bomb in a matter of months in the future. That chain of events might allow room for later intervention.

Without actually constructing a bomb, Iran could gain the influence of being an almost nuclear power, without facing the repercussions that would ensue if it finished the job.

Greg Thielmann, an intelligence analyst in the State Department before the Iraq war, said he believed that the Iran intelligence assessments were far more balanced, in part because there was not the urgent pressure from the White House to reach a particular conclusion, as there was in 2002. But he said he was bothered by what he said was an exaggerated sense of crisis over the Iranian nuclear issue.

“Some people are saying time’s running out and we have to act by the end of the year,” said Mr. Thielmann, now a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association. “I’ve been arguing that we have years, not months. The facts argue for a calmer approach.” [continued…]

Iran offers conflicting messages
By Paul Richter and Christi Parsons, Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2009

Tehran offers remarks by turns defiant and cooperative, leaving diplomats unsure if it will take seriously this week’s nuclear talks in Geneva. [continued…]

Iran is seeking a ‘two-way street’ at talks
By Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, September 30, 2009

The Iranian foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said Tuesday that talks between Iran and six major powers, which are to take place on Thursday, must be a “two-way street” and not just a long list of demands focused on his country’s nuclear program. [continued…]

Israel mutes its rhetoric against Iran as talks loom
By Richard Boudreaux, Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2009

Israeli leaders say they are willing to wait as President Obama plays out his strategy of negotiating with Iran while threatening stronger world sanctions if the talks fail. [continued…]

Iran plant could defer Israel strike
By Amy Teibel, AP, September 30, 2009

It may seem counterintuitive, but the news that Iran has a second, clandestine uranium enrichment plant, and has just test-fired long-range missiles, could actually put off any plans for a quick Israeli strike. [continued…]

China’s ties with Iran complicate diplomacy
By Michael Wines, New York Times, September 30, 2009

Leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee swept into Beijing last month to meet with Chinese officials, carrying a plea from Washington: if Iran were to be kept from developing nuclear weapons, China would have to throw more diplomatic weight behind the cause.

In fact, the appeal had been largely answered even before the legislators arrived.

In June, China National Petroleum signed a $5 billion deal to develop the South Pars natural gas field in Iran. In July, Iran invited Chinese companies to join a $42.8 billion project to build seven oil refineries and a 1,019-mile trans-Iran pipeline. And in August, almost as the Americans arrived in China, Tehran and Beijing struck another deal, this time for $3 billion, that will pave the way for China to help Iran expand two more oil refineries. [continued…]

Iran Guards group buys 50 pct stake in telecoms firm
By Hashem Kalantari, Reuters, September 30, 2009

A consortium affiliated to the elite Revolutionary Guards bought 50 percent plus one share in Iran’s state telecommunications company for the equivalent of around $7.8 billion, Iranian media reported on Sunday. [continued…]

How to press the advantage with Iran

How to press the advantage with Iran
By Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, New York Times, September 29, 2009

Absent some agreement with Washington on its long-term goals, Iran’s national security strategy will continue emphasizing “asymmetric” defense against perceived American encirclement. Over several years, officials in both the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami and the conservative Ahmadinejad administration have told us that this defensive strategy includes cultivating ties to political forces and militias in other states in the region, developing Iran’s missile capacity (as underscored by this weekend’s tests of medium-range missiles), and pushing the limits of Tehran’s nonproliferation obligations to the point where it would be seen as having the ability and ingredients to make fission weapons. It seems hardly a coincidence that Iran is accused of having started the Qum lab in 2005 — precisely when Tehran had concluded that suspending enrichment had failed to diminish American hostility.

American officials tend to play down Iranian concerns about American intentions, citing public messages from President Obama to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, as proof of the administration’s diplomatic seriousness. But Tehran saw these messages as attempts to circumvent Iran’s president — another iteration, in a pattern dating from Ronald Reagan’s Iran-Contra scandal, of American administrations trying to create channels to Iranian “moderates” rather than dealing with the Islamic Republic as a system. President Ahmadinejad underscored this point to us by noting that Mr. Obama never responded to his congratulatory letter after the 2008 United States election — which, he emphasized, was “unprecedented” and “not easy to get done” in Iran.

The Obama administration’s lack of diplomatic seriousness goes beyond clumsy tactics; it reflects an inadequate understanding of the strategic necessity of constructive American-Iranian relations. If an American president believed that such a relationship was profoundly in our national interests — as President Richard Nixon judged a diplomatic opening to China — he would demonstrate acceptance of the Islamic Republic, even as problematic Iranian behavior continued in the near term. [continued…]

IRGC air force commander: missile tests defensive;
pledges Iran to ‘no first strike’
By Juan Cole, September 29, 2009

he USG Open Source Center translated remarks to Iranian television of General Hoseyn Salami, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Air Force concerning Iran’s Monday missile tests (Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN), Monday, September 28, 2009):

Gen. Salami said, “as long as our enemies act within a political domain, our behavior will be completely political. However, if they want to leave the domain of political action and enter the domain of military threat, then our action will be exactly and completely military.” . . .

Many Western media reports implied that the missile tests were launched along with threats to wipe out Israel. But note that the commanding officer overseeing them explicitly restated Iran’s “no first strike” pledge. To my knowledge, no current high official in the Iranian executive has threatened war against Israel, which in any case would be foolhardy given Israel’s nuclear arsenal (see below). Iranian officials do say they hope the “Zionist regime” will collapse as the Soviet Union did. [continued…]

What else is Iran hiding?
By Nima Gerami and James M. Acton, Foreign Policy, September 28, 2009

Iran’s core obligation to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it says it fully upholds, is to ensure that all its nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes — building an underground nuclear facility on a military base certainly raises questions about Iranian intentions. Finally, because it was a clandestine plant, the Qom facility was clearly much more suited to military ends than the facility at Natanz, which is subject to IAEA monitoring.

Although the military purpose of the Qom facility is compelling, Ahmadinejad’s legal arguments are not. “According to the IAEA rules, countries must inform the agency six months ahead of the gas injection in their uranium enrichment plants,” he said last week. “We have done it 18 months ahead and this should be appreciated, not condemned.”

But Ahmadinejad got the IAEA rules wrong. At issue is a seemingly obscure but crucially important provision known as “Code 3.1”. This is contained within Iran’s “subsidiary arrangements,” the detailed legal agreement with the IAEA specifying the nuts and bolts of safeguards. [continued…]

U.S. aims to isolate Iran if talks fail
By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, September 29, 2009

The Obama administration is laying plans to cut Iran’s economic links to the rest of the world if talks this week over the country’s nuclear ambitions founder, according to officials and outside experts familiar with the plans.

While officials stress that they hope Iran will agree to open its nuclear program to inspection, they are prepared by year’s end to make it increasingly difficult for Iranian companies to ship goods around the world. The administration is targeting, in particular, the insurance and reinsurance companies that underwrite the risk of such transactions.

Officials are also looking at ways to keep goods from reaching Iran by targeting companies that get around trading restrictions by sending shipments there through third parties in Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Hong Kong; and other trading hubs. [continued…]

The U.S.-Iranian triangle

The U.S.-Iranian triangle
By Roger Cohen, New York Times, September 28, 2009

Sanctions won’t work. Ray Takeyh, who worked on Iran with Dennis Ross at the State Department before losing his job last month and returning to the Council on Foreign Relations, told me that “sanctions are the feel-good option.”

Yes, it feels good to do something, but it doesn’t necessarily help. In this case, sanctions won’t for four reasons.

One: Iran is inured to sanctions after years of living with them and has in Dubai a sure-fire conduit for goods at a manageable surtax. Two: Russia and China will never pay more than lip-service to sanctions. Three: You don’t bring down a quasi-holy symbol — nuclear power — by cutting off gasoline sales. Four: sanctions feed the persecution complex on which the Iranian regime thrives.

A senior German Foreign Ministry official last week told an American Council on Germany delegation: “The efficiency of sanctions is not really discussed because if you do, you are left with only two options — a military strike or living with a nuclear Iran — and nobody wants to go there. So the answer is: Let’s impose further sanctions! It’s a dishonest debate.” [continued…]

U.S. is seeking a range of sanctions against Iran
By Mark Landler, New York Times, September 28, 2009

Iran has proved resilient to sanctions, having weathered them in one form or another since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. And the political upheaval there creates a new complication: Western countries do not want to impose measures that deepen the misery of ordinary people, because it could help the government and strangle the fragile protest movement.

Citing those fears, the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, said last Monday he was opposed to an embargo of refined fuel products. Another senior Western diplomat said such a measure was not likely to be on the menu of options, even though sanctions experts say it is probably the most effective short-term cudgel.

At a dinner in New York last week, the night before he addressed the United Nations, Mr. Ahmadinejad told his guests he would “warmly welcome” additional sanctions because it would only make his country more self-sufficient, according to a person who was there.

“For sanctions to work, they not only have to be multilateral, but there has to be international solidarity over a prolonged period of time,” said Ray Takeyh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who was until last month a senior adviser to the Obama administration.

Mr. Takeyh said that he was skeptical that sanctions alone would alter Iran’s long-term behavior. But he said he would not be surprised if Iran came to the meeting on Thursday with an offer to allow inspectors to visit the secret uranium enrichment plant near the holy city of Qum.

That would fall well short of the administration’s demand that Iran hand over blueprints for the plant or produce key people involved in its design. But it might be enough to weaken solidarity, said Mr. Takeyh, who noted that the Iranians “tend to be tactically adroit.” [continued…]

The Iran attack plan
By Anthony H Cordesman, Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009

When the Israeli army’s then-Deputy Chief of Staff Dan Halutz was asked in 2004 how far Israel would go to stop Iran’s nuclear program, he replied: “2,000 kilometers,” roughly the distance been the two countries.

Israel’s political and military leaders have long made it clear that they are considering taking decisive military action if Iran continues to develop its nuclear program. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned at the United Nations this week that “the most urgent challenge facing this body is to prevent the tyrants of Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.”

Reporting by the International Atomic Energy Agency and other sources has made it clear that whether or not Iran ties all of its efforts into a formal nuclear weapons program, it has acquired all of the elements necessary to make and deliver such weapons. [continued…]

Iran conducts new tests of mid-range missiles
By Alan Cowell, New York Times, September 28, 2009

Locked in a deepening dispute with the United States and its allies over its nuclear program, Iran said that its Revolutionary Guards test-fired missiles with sufficient range to strike Israel, parts of Europe and American bases in the Persian Gulf.

“Iranian missiles are able to target any place that threatens Iran,” a senior Revolutionary Guard official, Abdollah Araqi, was quoted as saying by the semi-official Fars news agency.

The reported tests of the liquid-fueled Shahab-3 and the solid-fueled Sejil-2 missiles were not the first, but they came only days after President Obama and the leaders of France and Britain used the disclosure of a previously secret nuclear plant in Iran to threaten Tehran with a stronger response to its efforts to enrich uranium, including harsher economic sanctions. [continued…]

Turkish PM to visit Iran over nuclear dispute
AFP, September 27, 2009

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he plans to visit Iran next month to help resolve the dispute over Tehran’s nuclear programme, Anatolia news agency reported Sunday.

Erdogan also warned that any military attack against Iran would be an act of “insanity.”

The announcement of his planned trip came as Iran admitted this week the existence of a previously secret uranium enrichment plant, raising the stakes in its standoff with major powers ahead of talks in Geneva on Thursday. [continued…]

Thoughts on Iran, mountains and winning without war

On mountains and metaphors
By Paul Woodward, War in Context, September 27, 2009

A few random thoughts and observations on the latest developments with Iran:

How big’s a mountain? It’s a clandestine nuclear facility under construction “inside a mountain“.

The only adjective that got left out was “deep,” yet knowing that detail might be the key to knowing exactly what “very heavily protected” means.

(This much we can already deduce about the extent of the tunneling: it has produced two very large adjoining flattened mounds of debris which are marked in the image above.)

Gary Sick seems to have been among the descriptively most precise in referring to “a small enrichment facility in an underground chamber on a Revolutionary Guards base.”

Inside an underground chamber it is; inside a mountain it is not — at least not unless one assumes a Lilliputian perspective and calls a 167ft tall hillock a mountain. That’s the difference in elevation between one of the tunnel entrances and the highest point along the ridge that the tunnel penetrates. (Use Google Earth to see specific elevations. For instance, the northern tunnel entrance is at 2,975ft. The adjacent ridge to the east is at 3,142ft.)

View Larger Map

Not so fast with the sanctions. When the president of a country sharing a 1,458km border with Iran says sanctions against Iran won’t work, there’s reason to think that he isn’t simply making a prediction; he might be making a promise.

Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani gave this warning on Saturday and no doubt it was warmly received in Tehran. China and Russia might be crucial when it comes to imposing sanctions. Iraq might turn out to be key when it comes to enforcing or being unable to enforce them.

Pity the IAEA. There it is — the world’s indispensable nuclear monitoring agency — but does anyone care to share their intelligence so that IAEA inspectors can do their work? Only when the powers that be deem it useful.

Bombs away. Maybe this isn’t the smoking gun Israel was waiting for. Evidence of a clandestine program may confirm some of Israel’s dire warnings, but how many other similarly well-concealed and hard-to-destroy facilities might there be? All that an Israeli attack might actually accomplish would be to legitimize Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT and a rush towards weaponization.

The meaning of a mountain. If “inside a mountain” might be a topographical stretch, it’s an image that serves multiple purposes:
1. It’s too good an image for any journalist to risk undermining with a skeptical question. (“And just how big is that mountain?”)
2. It tells the world that the Iranians are dastardly, sneaky fellows whose evil plans can only be hidden by something as big as a mountain.
3. It says the Americans are so smart that they can find anything, however well hidden.
4. It highlights the possibly insurmountable challenge Israel would face in launching an air strike against a target much harder to destroy than a reactor under construction in Syria, or a weapons convoy on the move in Sudan.
5. It says that Obama isn’t a daydream believer sending his representatives into a negotiating trap; he’s back in his superhero mode out to save the world.

What’s it all about? Once you get past the theatrics it comes down to the pursuit of national interests — it’s not (or at least should not be) about putting Iran in a box.

Every party has distinct national interests, but fruitful negotiations will hinge on identifying where these interests overlap — not simply the overlapping interests of the US and its allies, but also those that are shared by Iran.

Stepping off the war path requires that everyone, including the Iranians, can see a way of winning.

Locating Iran’s secret nuclear facility (updated, update II)

Update — Turns out ISIS already published a report [PDF] on this and suggest an alternative location NW of Qum in addition to the one described below. They also add dates to the imagery, the Google Earth images appearing below having been taken on March 25, 2005.

Locating Iran’s secret nuclear facility
By Paul Woodward, War in Context, September 26, 2009

In numerous dispatches, Iran’s newly-reported and until a few days ago undeclared nuclear facility, is described as being built “inside a mountain“. In an Obama adminstration background briefing it was described as being located in “a very heavily protected, very heavily disguised facility”. Reports have also said that it is located north east of the city of Qum.

Understanding what “inside a mountain” and “very heavily protected” actually mean is important. It could mean that the facility is effectively invulnerable to any form of military strike.

Facilities buried more than 1000ft away from the earth’s surface are “essentially invulnerable to nuclear attack” says the Union of Concerned Scientists.

If it turns out the the Qum facility (and perhaps others) are in fact so heavily protected that they cannot be destroyed through a conventional or even an unconventional military strike, then the military threat that supposedly remains placed on that proverbial table would not really be a strike that could cripple of destroy Iran’s purported nuclear weapons program. It would simply mean that the threat of war remains on the table.

If that’s the case, then during the past couple of years (and remember, this facility has apparently been under observation since 2006), all the veiled and unveiled threats of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities have probably been made for purely political purposes.

So where is this newly announced facility and how heavily protected is it?

The Daily Telegraph has published this image from Reuters with the caption: “Satellite photo of what is believed to be a uranium-enrichment facility near Qom.”

Satellite photo of what is believed to be a uranium-enrichment facility near Qom

I’m a novice at using Google Earth but I’ve got a good topographic eye, so with “inside a mountain, north east of Qum (alt spelling Qom)” as my starting point, I thought I’d take a look.

Here are some mountains north east of Qum:

Mountains north east of Qum

And what d’ya know? Here’s the location that appears in the Telegraph:

Iran's secret nuclear facility near Qum

Of course, we don’t know for sure whether the Reuters-distributed image is actually a photograph of the facility in question, but let’s assume it is.

The Google Earth image is older and a comparison of the two reveals extensive earthworks that doubled in area during the (to me) unknown lapse between the two images. It looks like open-cast mining, suggesting that wherever in proximity to that these earthworks the facility might be buried, it probably isn’t under a 1000ft of granite.

The question remains (and it’s obviously one I can’t answer): is this facility invulnerable to a military attack?

(Update: The photos from ISIS identify two tunnel entrances to the east of the excavated area.

Iran's secret nuclear facility near Qum

It seems quite possible that the tunnels do indeed extend deep enough into the mountains to provide strike invulnerability.)

If you want to examine the location more carefully, you can find it here on Google maps. And these are the coordinates: 34°53’8.74″N — 50°59’45.90″E

Iran's secret nuclear facility near Qum

Second update: Upon further examination of the Google Earth information, I’m having second thoughts about the “buried in a mountain” description.

While the satellite image is suggestive of mountains, the range in elevation between the tunnel entrances and the highest surrounding ridges is little more than a hundred feet! These aren’t mountains: they are hillocks. Situated in a few undulations that protrude slightly from a vast salt basin area that is mostly at about 3,000ft in elevation, this “very heavily protected” facility might not in fact be quite as invulnerable as I suggested above.

Iran’s newly revealed nuclear facility

Paradox: Now is the time to deal
By Geoffrey Forden, Arms Control Wonk, September 25, 2009

Iran has admitted that it has at least one (and there is no reason to believe that there are not more) secret enrichment facilities. More information will undoubtedly come out in the coming days but we can deal now with the most important issue: how to proceed from here. As President Obama has rightly said today, this is not the first time Iran has hidden nuclear facilities it should rightly declare to the IAEA.

Iran will undoubtedly claim that it has not introduced nuclear material into the centrifuges and therefore did not have the obligation to report it. In fact, when I was in Israel earlier this summer, everyone I spoke to was convinced that such a facility existed but that Iran had not introduced uranium into it. However, there is a lot that can be done to train personnel etc. with enriching other isotopes like xenon or silicon. And training personnel is the important aspect right now. When the history of these secret facilities is known, I suspect that we will discover that they were started during the enrichment “suspension” that ended in 2006. We will also discover, I firmly believe, that the Natanz facility has been used as a training center for workers for those covert facilities. That could explain why there has been a relatively slow start: they were constantly cycling new trainees through with the consequent inefficiencies new workers always introduce. [continued…]

The Iran nuclear revelation
By Marc Lynch, Foreign Policy, September 25, 2009

… despite what I expect to see swarming the media in the next few days — wanna bet that John Bolton or John Bolton-equivalent oped is already in production over at the ~~Washington Times~~ Washington Post (sorry, it’s hard to tell the difference on foreign policy issues sometimes) — I actually think that this public revelation makes war less rather than more likely. The timing of the announcement, immediately following the consultations at the UN and the G-20 and just before the Geneva meetings, makes it seem extremely likely that the Obama administration has been waiting for just the right moment to play this card. Now they have. It strengthens the P5+1 bargaining position ahead of October 1, changes Iranian calculations, and lays the foundations for a more serious kind of engagement. So now let’s see how it changes the game. [continued…]

How to keep Iran in check without war
By Gary Sick, The Daily Beast, September 23, 2009

For the better part of two decades, there have been cries of alarm that the United States must “do something” or else Iran would have an operational nuclear weapon within a few years. If these warnings of a “ticking clock” had been heeded, there would have been ample reason for the United States or Israel to go to war with Iran at almost any time. In fact, there have been as many serious predictions that a war was imminent and unavoidable as there have been false predictions about the timing of an Iranian bomb. Seymour Hersh, writing in the New Yorker beginning in 2006, quoted many sources inside and outside the U.S. government who claimed that the Bush administration was preparing to attack Iran because of its nuclear policies. It now appears that Vice President Cheney, based on his own words in retirement, was in fact pressing for such an attack, but President Bush vetoed it.

In June 2008, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton predicted that Israel “will attack Iran” before January 2009 when the new U.S. president was sworn in, but apparently the Israeli leadership decided otherwise. Just a few weeks ago, retired Air Force general Chuck Wald on National Public Radio outlined a sustained bombing campaign against Iran that would last “weeks or months,” then added, “Now, does anybody in their right mind want to attack Iran? No, not a bit. But sometimes you’ve got to do things you don’t like to do.” From the tone of his voice, the prospect of an attack did not seem to dismay him, and he has gone on to write a series of op-eds pushing the military option.

These statements are admirably clear in recognizing that the end game in any concerted pressure campaign against Iran is war. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton threatened “crippling sanctions” to be imposed on Iran if it failed to cooperate with U.S. diplomatic efforts. That phrase was later echoed by Israeli prime minister Netanyahu during his visit to Germany, and it is expected to be a major focus of the U.S. Congress starting in September. Iran does not have sufficient refinery capacity to meet all its gasoline needs, and the Congress is expected to press for actions that would attempt to curtail or block such imports into Iran. A prohibition of Iranian petroleum imports—most likely restricted to the United States and perhaps some of its European allies since Russia, China and even many of Iran’s allies (think Venezuela) and immediate neighbors (think Iraq) are unwilling to cooperate—can only be truly enforced by a blockade, which is an act of war.

The perpetual plea for U.S. foreign policy to “do something” needs to be changed; we would be better served by adopting the physicians creed: “First, do no harm.” [continued…]

Iranian leader offers U.S. access to the country’s nuclear scientists
By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, September 24, 2009

Iran is willing to have its nuclear experts meet with scientists from the United States and other world powers as a confidence-building measure aimed at resolving concerns about Tehran’s nuclear program, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Wednesday.

At international talks next week on its nuclear ambitions, Iran also will seek to buy from the United States enriched uranium needed for medical purposes, Ahmadinejad told reporters and editors from The Washington Post and Newsweek. Agreement by the Americans, he suggested, would demonstrate that the Obama administration is serious about engagement, while rejection might give Iran an excuse to further enrich its stock of uranium.

“These nuclear materials we are seeking to purchase are for medicinal purposes. . . . It is a humanitarian issue,” Ahmadinejad said in the interview. “I think this is a very solid proposal which gives a good opportunity for a start” to build trust between the two countries and “engage in cooperation.” [continued…]

Russia’s president pledges to help U.S. nudge Iran on nuclear issue
By Christi Parsons, Los Angeles Times, September 24, 2009

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev offered closer cooperation with the United States in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions Wednesday, promising President Obama that Moscow would help the Islamic Republic make “a right decision” and hinting that sanctions might be necessary to achieve it.

U.S. officials said they regarded Medvedev’s comments, after meeting Obama on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, as a major shift in Russia’s position just a week before six major powers are to meet with Iranian officials in Geneva.

Russia, which has extensive economic ties with Iran, has consistently opposed sanctions. And, as its relations with Washington deteriorated in recent years, it has tended to view the Islamic Republic as a useful counterweight. [continued…]

Russia can sway Iran’s nuclear ambitions
By Adrian Pabst, The Guardian, September 25, 2009

So far, US-led efforts to increase pressure on Iran have failed in large part because of Russia’s hostile stance in the UN security council. During Vladimir Putin’s presidency (2000-08), Russia repeatedly opposed more punitive measures against Iran. Fuelled by a combination of anti-Americanism and renewed geopolitical ambition, Moscow insisted that Tehran had a sovereign right to build nuclear power stations – with Russian technological support.

But now that the Obama administration is moving its anti-ballistic missile shield from land-based installations in eastern Europe to mobile vehicles closer to Iran, the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, declared on Wednesday at the UN in New York that “sanctions are seldom productive but they are sometimes inevitable”.

With the “reset” of US-Russian relations, the Kremlin has performed a spectacular “rethink” of its Iran policy. The “secret” Moscow visit by Binyamin Netanyahu on 7 September seemed to reassure the Russian leadership that Israel would not launch unilateral pre-emptive strikes against suspected Iranian nuclear installations – on the condition that Moscow promise not to equip Iran with the advanced S-300 system, an offensive missile capability that could deliver nuclear warheads. [continued…]

Green movement ‘understands world’s concerns’ over nuclear Iran
By Meris Lutz, Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2009

A spokesman for Iranian opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi is telling the “citizens of the world” and especially “the people and government of America” that the opposition shares international concerns about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.

The statement by Mohsen Makhmalbaf — an Iranian film director — goes as far as to say that any agreement signed with President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s “coup-empowered illegitimate government” would not be honored by the opposition, known as the Green Movement. He added: “All such agreements will be subject to review in the future.” [continued…]

Iranians favor diplomatic relations with US but have little trust in Obama

Iranians favor diplomatic relations with US but have little trust in Obama
WorldPublicOpinion, September 18, 2009

A Obama and Iran new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of Iranians finds that six in 10 favor restoration of diplomatic relations between their country and the United States, a stance that is directly at odds with the position the Iranian government has held for three decades. A similar number favor direct talks.

However, Iranians do not appear to share the international infatuation with Barack Obama. Only 16 percent say that have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs. This is lower than any of the 20 countries polled by WPO on this question in the spring. Despite his recent speech in Cairo, where Obama stressed that he respects Islam, only a quarter of Iranians are convinced he does. And three in four (77%) continue to have an unfavorable view of the United States government.

“While the majority of Iranian people are ready to do business with Obama, they show little trust in him,” says Steven Kull, director of WPO. [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — Some of the other poll numbers are striking and indicate how little progress Obama has made in his efforts at public diplomacy aimed at the Middle East.

75% of the Iranians polled believe that the US definitely or probably has the goal of imposing American culture on Muslim society.

81% believe that the US definitely or probably has the goal of weakening and dividing the Islamic world.

85% believe that in the way the US behaves towards the Iranian government it abuses its great power to make Iran do what the US wants.

That last number is one that the US and its allies should keep clearly in mind when they sit down for talks with Iran’s leaders in Istanbul on October 1. The Iranians cannot afford to look like they are getting pushed around and this no doubt explains the source of much of what the West perceives as belligerence.

IAF chief: We must stop S-300 delivery
By Yaakov Katz, Jerusalem Post, September 18, 2009

Israel needs to make every effort to stop the S-300 missile defense system from reaching countries where the air force may need to fly, IAF commander Maj.-Gen. Ido Nehushtan has told The Jerusalem Post in an exclusive interview.

“The S-300 is a Russian-made surface-to-air missile system that is very advanced, with long ranges and many capabilities,” Nehushtan told the Post in the interview, which appears in our Friday Magazine.

“We need to make every effort to stop this system from getting to places where the IAF needs to operate or may need to operate in the future,” he said.

The S-300 is one of the most advanced multi-target antiaircraft missile systems in the world and has a reported ability to track up to 100 targets simultaneously while engaging up to 12 at the same time. It has a range of about 200 km. and can hit targets at altitudes of 90,000 feet.

While Russia and Iran signed a deal for the sale of the system several years ago, according to latest assessments in Israel, it has yet to be delivered. [continued…]

The Grand Ayatollah unleashes his wrath
By Michael Theodoulou, The National, September 21, 2009

Small, frail and in his 80s, he looks no match for Iran’s tough regime. But Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri is made of steel. He wields considerable moral authority as the country’s highest-ranking and most fearless dissident cleric, representing a potent challenge to hardline authorities who have tried and failed to silence him for two decades.

He was once Ayatollah Khomeini’s designated successor but was unceremoniously cast aside by the founder of the Islamic Republic, just months before his death in 1989, because the Grand Ayatollah had criticised human rights abuses by the regime. Since then, despite official harassment of his aides and a six-year period of house arrest, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has remained the outspoken conscience of Iran’s religious community, an advocate of democratic pluralism and foreign policy moderation.

“Montazeri has refused to go away and is today more vocal and explicit in his criticism than ever,” said Anoush Ehteshami, an Iran expert and professor of international relations at Durham University in England. “If anything, his claim that he stands for freedoms and justice are even more important today,” Prof Ehteshami said in an interview. [continued…]

Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei says opposition protests failed
By Jeffrey Fleishman and Ramin Mostaghim, Los Angeles Times, September 21, 2009

Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei attempted to unify Iranians on Sunday by blaming foreign media for “poisoning the atmosphere” and urged his nation to resist the “killer cancer” of an Israel backed by Western powers.

Delivering a sermon at Tehran University before a crowd that included President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and opposition cleric Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khamenei said the West had failed in its attempts to undermine the government with large opposition protests during countrywide anti-Israel rallies Friday.

“It showed that their [Western politicians’] tricks, spending money and political evilness do not influence the Iranian nation,” said Khamenei, who was greeted with chants of “Leader, we offer our blood to you.” [continued…]

Medvedev: “Israel is not going to deliver any blows on Iran”

Medvedev: “Israel is not going to deliver any blows on Iran”
CNN’s Fareed Zacharia interviews Dmitry Medvedev, The Kremlin, September 20, 2009

FAREED ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about some of the other issues that you face. Russia has said that it does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Putin has said that, you have said that. Yet the IAEA says that Iran is not cooperating to give the world confidence that it has a purely civilian programme. Iran says it will no longer negotiate on this issue, and yet Russia says it will not support any further sanctions against Iran. So, is the policy of not wanting Iran to develop nuclear weapons on Russia’s part – are these empty words or do you have concrete steps you are willing to take to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: We have our fairly developed relations with Iran, that is why I can speak of Iran’s intentions not by hearsay, not on the basis of the information received from special services of other countries, but proceeding from the reality. Of course, I believe that Iran needs a set of motives to behave appropriately as far as its nuclear programme is concerned. There is no doubt about that.

Secondly, Iran must cooperate with the IAEA. It must be done, because it is its obligation.

Thirdly, we should create for Iran a system of positive motives, so that it wants such cooperation. On September 9, 2009 Iran submitted its proposals concerning these very complicated issues, and they are being analyzed now.

There have been voices that it is not enough, that those proposals are too general. You know, I believe, that it is obligation of all nations involved in this problem to study these proposals, at least. It took quite a long time for Iran to study the package of incentives that had been given to it through Solana’s mediation at that time. Now, we need to study its package.

As for the sanctions, I have just had a chance to talk about it during my meeting with political analysts, who attended a conference here. I told them one very simple thing: as a rule, sanctions result in nothing, though sometimes sanctions are necessary. But before speaking of applying additional sanctions, we should make full use of the existing possibilities. That would be a responsible behavior by the world community. Yes, of course, we should encourage Iran, but before taking any action we should be absolutely confident that we have no other options and that our Iranian colleagues do not hear us for some reason. This is, I believe, the simplest and most pragmatic position. By the way, I voiced this position during the consultations on this issue, which took place during the G8 summit in Italy, when we discussed this question. It was discussed by all G8 leaders.

FAREED ZAKARIA: But do I take you to be saying that Iran does have an obligation to cooperate with IAEA? And if it does not, is Russia willing to step up to its responsibilities as a world power and press in the UN and in other ways to ensure Iran does cooperate?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Iran must cooperate with the IAEA, this is an absolutely indubitable thing, if it wishes to develop its nuclear dimension, nuclear energy programme. This is its duty and not a matter of its choice, because otherwise a question will be raised all the time: what it is really doing? And this is as plain as a day.

FAREED ZAKARIA: And Russia is willing to exercise its responsibilities?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Certainly.

FAREED ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about another issue relating to this. Russia has agreed to sell Iran the S-300 antiaircraft and antimissile system. When you will deliver it to Iran?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Our relations with Iran really have a military component and we believe that this work should completely correspond to the international obligations both from the part of Iran and from the part of Russia. We have never supplied and will not supply to Iran anything that is beyond the valid system of the international law. What we have supplied and what we are going to supply, it has been and always will be the defense complexes and this is our firm position, and I will hold to it when making final decisions as to the all existing contracts with Iran.

FAREED ZAKARIA: You know that there are many people in Israel who say that if you deliver that system, the Israelis will feel they will have to strike Iran before that system is deployed because once that system is deployed, an Israeli attack on Iran becomes much more difficult. So by delivering that system you open up a window or a period of considerable tension.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: In an hour I will have a conversation with President of Israel Mr. Peres, who, when he recently was visiting me in Sochi, said something that is very important for all of us, namely, that Israel is not going to deliver any blows on Iran, that Israel is a peaceful country and will not do it. Therefore any supplies of any weapons, all the more defensive weapons, can not increase tension; on the contrary they should ease it. But if there are people who have such plans, it seems to me that they have to think about it. For this reason, our task is not to strengthen Iran and weaken Israel or vise versa but our task is to ensure a normal, calm situation in the Middle East. I believe that is our task.

FAREED ZAKARIA: When Prime Minister Netanyahu was in Moscow, did you say that to him?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Prime Minister Netanyahu has visited Moscow. They did it in a close regime, it was their decision. I do not even understand very well the reasons for it, but our partners made such a decision and our reaction was absolutely normal and calm. I have had a conversation with him.

FAREED ZAKARIA: But did you feel like it was a positive meeting?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: It was a good, normal meeting. We have discussed the most different problems. Before that I met with President Peres, after that I met with Prime Minister Netanyahu. This is normal, this is our dialogue. And Ahmadinejad visited us, but, to be true, earlier than that and it was not a bilateral meeting, he came to attend as an observer the session of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We communicate with everybody. I believe that this is our advantage.

FAREED ZAKARIA: If Israel were to attack Iran, would Russia support Iran in such a conflict?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Russia can not support anybody or act in such situation. We are a peaceful state and we have our own understanding of our defense strategy. This is the first point.

The second point. We have our allies with which we have concluded one or other agreements. In case of Iran we do not have obligations of this kind. But it does not mean that we would like to be or will be impassible before such developments. This is the worst thing that can be imagined. I have already commented on this issue. Let us try together to reason upon it. What will happen after that? Humanitarian disaster, a vast number of refugees, Iran’s wish to take revenge and not only upon Israel, to be honest, but upon other countries as well. And absolutely unpredictable development of the situation in the region. I believe that the magnitude of this disaster can be weighted against almost nothing. For this reason before making decision to deliver blows it is necessary to assess the situation. It would be the most unreasonable developments. But my Israeli colleagues told me that they were not planning to act in this way and I trust them.

FAREED ZAKARIA: So you expect no Israeli strike on Iran?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: I hope that this decision will not be made. Iran should be pushed to cooperate. And indeed, Iran should not pronounce such things that it has stated, for example in relation to Israel, when it said that it did not recognize the existence of this state. It is unacceptable in the modern world, in the modern system of international relations. And this is the point Iran should start thinking about. [continued…]

To bomb, or to bunker? Israel’s Iran choices narrow

To bomb, or to bunker? Israel’s Iran choices narrow
By Dan Williams, Reuters, September 16, 2009

The orchestrated roar of air force exercises designed to signal Israel’s readiness to attack Iranian nuclear facilities are belied, perhaps, by a far quieter project deep beneath the western Jerusalem hills.

Dubbed “Nation’s Tunnel” by the media and screened from view by government guards, it is a bunker network that would shelter Israeli leaders in an atomic war — earth-bound repudiation of the Jewish state’s vow to deny its foes the bomb at all costs.
[…]
Aerial and naval manoeuvres, leaked to the media, have told of plans to reach Iran, though this time the targets are so distant, dispersed, and fortified that even Israel’s top brass admit they could deliver a short-term, disruptive blow at most.

Hence Israel’s discreet arrangements for living with the possibility of a nuclear-armed arch-enemy — the bunkers, the missile interceptors, the talk of a U.S. strategic shield and of Cold War-style deterrence based on mutually-assured destruction.

One government intelligence analyst suggested that Israel had passed a psychological threshold by “allowing” Iran to manufacture enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) for a bomb.

“We keep fretting about whether they will have a ‘break-out capacity’, but really they’re already there,” the analyst said.

The U.N. national intelligence director has assessed Iran will not be technically capable of producing high-enriched uranium (HEU) for the fissile core of an atom bomb before 2013. [continued…]

Israel defense chief: Iran not an existential threat
Reuters, September 17, 2009

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak was quoted on Thursday as saying he does not view Iran as a threat to the existence of the Jewish state, a view that would seem to depart from Israeli statements of the recent past.

Israel’s mass-circulation Yedioth Ahronoth daily quoted Barak, the head of Israel’s center-left Labour party, as saying “Iran does not constitute an existential threat against Israel.”

In response to a question about Tehran’s nuclear programme which Israel has said it sees as destined to produce atomic weapons that could put its existence at risk, Barak said in an interview with the paper:

“I am not among those who believe Iran is an existential issue for Israel.” [continued…]

Intelligence agencies say no new nukes in Iran
By Mark Hosenball, Newsweek, September 16, 2009

The U.S. intelligence community is reporting to the White House that Iran has not restarted its nuclear-weapons development program, two counterproliferation officials tell Newsweek. U.S. agencies had previously said that Tehran halted the program in 2003.

The officials, who asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, said that U.S. intelligence agencies have informed policymakers at the White House and other agencies that the status of Iranian work on development and production of a nuclear bomb has not changed since the formal National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s “Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” in November 2007. Public portions of that report stated that U.S. intelligence agencies had “high confidence” that, as of early 2003, Iranian military units were pursuing development of a nuclear bomb, but that in the fall of that year Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program.” The document said that while U.S. agencies believed the Iranian government “at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,” U.S. intelligence as of mid-2007 still had “moderate confidence” that it had not restarted weapons-development efforts. [continued…]

How to talk to Iran
By Roger Cohen, New York Times, September 17, 2009

The president is right [to enter talks with Iran] for many reasons. The 30-year American-Iranian psychosis is a dangerous, logic-lite hangover. When Obama gathered his Iran advisers after the June election to review intelligence, the slim pickings were slim enough to prompt a presidential “That all you got?” Ignorance breeds treacherous incomprehension.

The president is right because only creative diplomacy can head off the onrushing Iranian uranium enrichment (8,000 inefficient centrifuges and counting); because closer relations with the West represent the best long-term hope for reform in Iran; because Iran is negotiating from the relative weakness of post-June-12 revolutionary disunity; and because the strong U.S. interest lies in preventing an Israeli attack on Muslim Persia. (That’s also in Israel’s interest, by the way; the Arabs are already a handful.)

There’s a lot of verbiage — some that Orwell would have seized on — in the Iranian “package,” but that’s just the way of things in Iran. Like many much-conquered countries, not least Italy, Iran loves artifice, the dressing-up of truth in elaborate layers. It will always favor ambiguity over clarity. This is a nation whose conventions include the charming ceremonial insincerity known as “taarof” (hypocrisy dressed up as flattery), and one that is no stranger to “tagieh,” which amounts to the sacrifice of truth to higher religious imperative.

These traits are worth recalling. Gary Sick, the Carter administration official who negotiated the American hostages’ release, told me that immediately before the critical breakthrough he received a voluminous and preposterous Iranian “proposal” that almost led Carter to walk away. It proved a sideshow with a couple of useful nuggets buried in the outpourings. [continued…]

Iran bullish ahead of nuclear talks
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi, Asia Times, September 18, 2009

Unless the US and its allies come up with new evidence to substantiate their allegations against Iran, their purported effort to pin on Iran the label of clandestine proliferator is destined to fall short. This is particularly so since there is as of yet no official US revision of the conclusions of its 2007 intelligence estimate. According to this, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, shortly after the downfall of Iran’s chief nemesis, Saddam, who was also said to be aggressively pursuing a nuclear program.
Fourth, Iran’s confidence stems from Tehran’s reliance on a multi-faceted negotiation strategy, reflected in its recent “package” that states Iran’s preparedness to cooperate on the issues of “non-proliferation and disarmament” as well as on regional security, energy security, cultural and economic issues.

The advantage of this comprehensive linked approach is that it connects any US engagement with Iran to a host of issues that bind the two countries, such as drug trafficking and security in the region. This belies the contention of some US pundits that the “goal of engagement is not improved relations”, to paraphrase Chester Crocker, a former US diplomat, who in an opinion column in the New York Times under the title “Terms of Engagement” forgets that the Iranian side may also have its own ideas about engagement and that it takes two to have a diplomatic tango. [continued…]

‘Nuclear-free zone impossible in anti-Israel Mideast’

‘Nuclear-free zone impossible in anti-Israel Mideast’
By Yossi Melman and Zvi Bar’el, Haaretz, September 15, 2009

[Shaul Chorev, chairman of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission, in an address to the International Atomic Energy Association in Vienna] stressed that in order for the Middle East to function as a nuclear-free zone, the Arab states in the region needed to alter that approach to Israel.

“Progress toward realizing this vision cannot be made without a fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a significant transformation in the attitude of states in the region toward Israel,” he said.

“The constant efforts by member states in the region to single out the State of Israel in blatantly anti-Israel resolutions in this General Conference is a clear reflection of such hostile attitude. [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — Chorev made the proforma declaration that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region yet by voicing Israel’s reluctance to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone implicity and unambiguously confirmed that such a goal would require Israel’s disarmament.

Clinton lays out Iran requirements
By Mark Landler, New York Times, September 16, 2009

When the United States sits down with Iran early next month for face-to-face talks, the Iranian nuclear program will be at the top of the American agenda, even though Iranian officials insist it is off the table, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Tuesday.

“Iran says it has a number of issues it wishes to discuss with us,” Mrs. Clinton told reporters. “But what we are concerned about is discussing with them the questions surrounding their nuclear program and ambitions.”

She said the meeting, to be held Oct. 1, would fulfill President Obama’s pledge to engage with Iran. But she insisted that the United States would not be drawn into a lengthy and fruitless diplomatic dance with Iran, as some analysts have warned. [continued…]

Iran agrees to meeting on nuclear program

Iran agrees to meeting on nuclear program
By Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2009

The Obama administration, hoping to persuade Tehran to curtail its nuclear program and initiate a dialogue that focuses on other issues, will have its first formal meeting since it took office with Iran on Oct. 1.

The four other United Nations Security Council permanent members — China, Russia, France, and the U.K. — along with Germany will participate in the meeting, which was brokered Monday in a call between Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, and Saeed Jalili, Iran’s main nuclear negotiator.

The event, whose location hasn’t been decided, won’t be a “formal negotiation,” a spokeswoman for Mr. Solana said. There will be no set agenda or specific goals. Instead, she said, it will serve as an opportunity to question Iran on a proposal it released last week calling for a discussion with the international community on a range of security and development issues. [continued…]

Obama’s tough choice on Iran

Obama’s tough choice on Iran
By Tony Karon, Time, September 13, 2009

The U.S. and its allies are not saying Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons; they’re warning that allowing Iran to assemble the full nuclear fuel cycle to which it is entitled as a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty — particularly uranium enrichment — gives it an infrastructure that could quickly be converted to produce bomb materiel. Stating Washington’s case at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna this week, Ambassador Glyn Davies warned that Iran had already created enough low-enriched uranium that, if it kicked out nuclear inspectors and reconfigured its enrichment plant, could be re-enriched to provide materiel for a single bomb. “We have serious concerns that Iran is deliberately attempting, at a minimum, to preserve a nuclear option,” Davies said.

Moscow sees the problem in terms of strengthening the safeguards against Iran weaponizing nuclear materials, rather than trying to prevent it attaining “breakout” capacity by denying its right to enrich uranium.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reiterated this week that Iran no intention of ending uranium enrichment, or of negotiating away its nuclear rights. That doesn’t necessarily preclude a diplomatic solution to the standoff, but it underscores the likelihood that the Western powers might have to compromise on their own demands in order to achieve one. In some previous rounds of negotiation, Iran has been more open to discussing strengthening of the IAEA monitoring regime and other safeguards against weaponization. Right now, however, it’s far from clear that Iran is in an accommodating mood, given its fierce and ongoing domestic power struggle. [continued…]

Secret Iranian missile memos
By Geoffrey Forden, Arms Control Wonk, September 14, 2009

I have been given a series of what appear to be internal secret Iranian documents by sources I trust. If authentic, and I believe they are, they provide important insights into Iran’s missile development program and have important implications for North Korea’s as well. Unfortunately, to protect my sources and the Iranians who spirited these documents out to the West, I cannot be too explicit about their contents. The following examination of these memos contains both information from and my analysis of them. I have tried to explicitly point out what is my speculation.

The memos cover, in a somewhat sketchy way, a lot of ground. Perhaps the most important aspects are those that deal with how several countries collaborate in either developing missiles or selling missile technology to Iran. The memos use codes for the different collaborator countries but I think I know the meanings of the codes. If my understanding is correct, they indicate that representatives from North Korea and China have been present at all phases of production and flight testing. Iran has also gotten important help from Russia, though Russians do not appear to have been as ubiquitous as the Chinese and the North Koreans. The evidence from the memos indicates that this help is on the governmental level rather than “rogue” individuals. This includes Russian help though Russia has been particularly vocal in its denials of such assistance. Despite these denials, the evidence of foreign assistance, both images of engines and turbopumps that are obviously of Russian origin—either their actual production or at the very least their designs—and these internal Iranian memos, make the case overwhelmingly. [continued…]