The
evolution of terrorism in 2005
A
statistical assessment
By Prof. Dr. Rik Coolsaet
and Teun Van de Voorde, Department
of Political Science, University of Ghent, February, 2006
Introductory remarks
1. When dealing with terrorism, numbers
are only part of a broader picture. Behind each and every figure there is human
suffering and subsequent fear. Terrorists seek to foster a widespread
atmosphere of insecurity. Numbers provide for a reality check by helping to
equate reality and perception. This might help to deflate the angst terrorists
otherwise are eager to exploit.
2. In July 2004, the Department of
Political Science at Ghent University (Belgium) issued its first research paper
on the long-term evolution of international terrorism.[1]
Its main conclusion was that indeed a wide gap was looming between
perception and reality as far as
today’s international terrorism is concerned. Our figures contra-intuitively indicated that over time the importance of international terrorism
as a political tool had gradually but consistently declined. According to the data of the State
Department, the amount of terrorist incidents in 2002 and 2003 represented
an all-time low in international terrorism for the past 32 years. Parallel
data from the Rand Corporation showed the same downward trend. Accounted
for in absolute terms, 1997-2000 ranked as the most ‘terror free’ period,
followed by an increase between 2000 and 2002, but ending with a decline in
2003, down to the – relatively low – levels of 1977-1980. Consequently, since
it is upon perceptions that men act in shaping their conduct, the risk of
overreacting was real, the paper concluded.
3. The assessment in our 2004 research
paper was based on both the figures provided by the US State Department (Patterns of Global Terrorism) and the
databases of the Rand Corporation (RAND
Terrorism Chronology, Terrorism
Incident Database and the MIPT
Terrorism Knowledge Base). Upon publication in April 2004, the State
Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism
2003 became subject of widespread controversy, both politically and
methodologically, and was thereupon discontinued. Consequently, a different
methodology was elaborated by the National Counterterrorism Center, rendering
comparative analyses before and after 2005 infeasible.[2]
4. The present research paper is
therefore based solely upon the databases of the RAND Corporation/MIPT, and
more specifically upon the integrated MIPT
Terrorism Knowledge Base.[3]
For the year 2004, the MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base showed an increase in the number of international terrorist
attacks and the number of fatalities, respectively with 45 and 55 percent.[4] On the face of it this contradicted
the main conclusions of the 2004 research paper about the gradual demise of
international terrorism as a political tool.
1. The present 2006 research paper
proposes an overview and assessment of the evolution of (international and
domestic)[5]
terrorism during the year 2005. As is explained in more detail in annex 3, the
numbers in this assessment should not be seen as indisputable certainties.
However, it is only by using a constant yardstick over a relatively long period
(as the TKB databases do) that it is possible to assess the evolution of
terrorism and thus the increase or decrease of the terrorism threat.
The evolution of
international terrorism in 2005
2. The year 2005 showed an overall decline of international terrorism, both in number of victims and attacks. The
number of attacks dropped by one third and the number of casualties by 40
percent. The perception of international terrorism as a major external threat
is thus not corroborated in reality as far as its lethality is concerned.
International |
2005 |
2004 |
Number of incidents |
266 |
393 |
Number of casualties |
443 |
733 |
3. When regionally breaking down the
numbers of casualties of international terrorist attacks, it turns out that
international terrorism has evolved from a more or less dispersed international
threat to a largely regional threat, since it strikes primarily in the Middle
East. In 2005 almost nine in ten victims
of international terrorism fell in Iraq and Jordan (Amman, November 2005).
International |
2005 |
2004 |
2003 |
2002 |
Total number of casualties,
of which: |
443 |
733 |
470 |
970 |
in
the Middle East/Gulf, of which in
Iraq |
394 321 |
405 352 |
327 172 |
375 * |
in
South Asia |
35 |
74 |
30 |
105 |
in
Southeast Asia/Oceania |
0 |
10 |
42 |
214 |
in
North America |
0 |
* |
* |
3 |
in
Western Europe |
0 |
192 |
1 |
0 |
* Data not available
The evolution of
domestic terrorism
4. Contrary to international terrorism,
domestic terrorism is clearly on the rise. The number of incidents and
fatalities has increased by respectively ninety and sixty percent.
Domestic |
2005 |
2004 |
Number of incidents |
4217 |
2247 |
Number of casualties |
7041 |
4333 |
5. This increase is almost entirely the
result of the worsening situation in Iraq.
The numbers of victims of domestic terrorism in this country has risen sharply
from 2004 onwards.
|
2005 |
2004 |
2003 |
2002 |
Total number of casualties |
7041 |
4333 |
1877 |
1793 |
in Middle East/Gulf, of which: in Iraq |
5831 5679 |
2290 2120 |
557 367 |
189 3 |
in South Asia, of which: in
Afghanistan/Pakistan |
764 307 |
803 396 |
773 248 |
918 159 |
in Southeast Asia/Oceania |
71 |
192 |
30 |
137 |
in North America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
in Western Europe |
56* |
2 |
6 |
15 |
* London attacks, July 2005
Concluding remarks
6. In view of the number of
international terrorist incidents and victims it is difficult to uphold the
view that international terrorism represents a existential threat and that
counter-terrorism should be viewed as a ‘long war’. International terrorism is more of a challenge than a threat.
7. Contrary to widespread belief, it is
not international but domestic
terrorism that presents the gravest danger. Moreover, instead of being a threat
of a global nature, terrorism is largely
concentrated within one region, the Middle East. In 2005, Iraqi Sunni and
jihadi groups were responsible for 80 percent of all victims of domestic
terrorism.
8. This assessment leads to the
following conclusions:
a. The vast gap in the numbers of
fatalities in the West and in the
b. The concentration of fatalities in
the
c. The Iraq war has drastically
boosted terrorism, instead of lessening it – although this was the official
rationale for going to war. Considering the high level of domestic attacks and
fatalities in Iraq, we can only conclude that 9/11 and the ensuing war on
terror has above all contributed to a ‘clash
within one civilisation’. The Iraq war, being presented as part of the war
on terror, has contributed to turning Iraq into today’s epicentre of terrorism.
Annexes
Annex
1
Evolution of the number of
international terrorist attacks since 1977
Annex
2
Evolution of the number of
casualties of international terrorist attacks since 1977
Annex
3
Methodology
Data are drawn from the
databases as provided by the Rand Corporation and the MIPT (The National
Memorial Institute for Preventing Terrorism). More specifically we have based
our assessment on the Terrorism Knowledge Base which integrates the data of the
RAND Terrorism Chronology (international terrorism, 1968-1997) and the Terrorism Incident Database
(international and domestic terrorism, 1998-now).
The following definitions are
used:
“Terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity
of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the
threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These
acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise
undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are
crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war
existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against
civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist
actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity.
Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts.
Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate
physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a
particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to
cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of
the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce
compliance with their demands.”
“Domestic terrorism is defined as incidents perpetrated by local
nationals against a purely domestic target.”
“International terrorism: incidents in which terrorists go abroad to
strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state,
or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel
or equipment.”
The numbers in this
assessment only have an indicative value and should not be interpreted as
absolute certainties nor indisputable facts. This is partly due to the arbitrary
character of the notion ‘terrorism’, partly to the limits of the information
available (public sources), partly to the fact that crude data have always to
be interpreted, and are thus not unquestionable. However, it is only by using
the same yardstick over a relatively long period (as the TKB databases do) that
it is possible to assess the evolution of terrorism and thus the increase or
decrease of the threat. It thus provides for a longitudinal view that is often
lacking in today’s debates on terrorism and helps to put contemporary terrorism
into perspective.
A remark must also
be made on the adjective ‘international’. Today, most experts take the view
that al-Qaeda has seriously been degraded as an operational international
network, thanks to the tremendous national and international counter-terrorism
efforts since September 11. Present-day attacks are perpetrated predominantly
by local or regional terrorists inspired by jihadi ideology, but not directed
by al-Qaeda. Such attacks are largely planned, financed and conducted by local
forces. While jihadi terrorists often have international contacts, they do not
receive instructions nor are they connected to al-Qaeda from an organisational
point of view. Such attacks are often
dubbed ‘international terrorism’. This denomination is misleading or, at least,
is based upon sloppy analysis – if not inspired by partisan intentions.
Annex
4
The authors
Rik
Coolsaet is Professor of International Relations at Ghent University (Belgium)
and Director of the Security & Global Governance Department at the Royal
Institute for International Relations (Brussels)
Teun
Van de Voorde is research fellow at the Department of Political Science at Ghent
University. She is preparing a PhD on the rise and demise of successive waves
of major terrorist activities
Department
of Political Science
Universiteitstraat 8
B-9000 Gent (Belgium)
Tel. 32 (0)9 264 68 70
Fax 32 (0)9 264 67 00
[1] International Terrorism – a longitudinal
statistical analysis http://pswserv1.ugent.be/rc/English/Articles/IP/IPArt/IP08.htm
[2] Country Reports on
Terrorism 2004: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/c14813.htm (April 2005); A
Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents 2004: http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/NCTC_Report.pdf (April 2005)
[4] MIPT Terrorism Knowledge
Base classified the 11 March 2004 attacks in Spain as international terrorism
(191 casualties)
[5] See annex 3 for
definitions
[6] Islamic terrorism: common concern for Muslim and
Western publics.