The War in Context  
  Iraq + war on terrorism + Middle East conflict + critical perspectives     
The tinderbox called Kashmir
Adil Najam, Boston Globe, May 25, 2002

[India's] hawks see this as a moment of opportunity when they can sneak behind the cover of the global war on terrorism. Their belief is that as long as Delhi can disguise the dispute as a threat of ''Islamic terrorism,'' the United States will have to look the other way. The problem is that the choice to keep the war ''limited'' is not India's alone. Since Sept. 11, General Pervez Musharraf's attempts to cleanse the military and intelligence establishments of religious zealots have won him many friends but have also created many enemies. Given the public's mood, the military's patience, and his own disposition, he cannot be seen as weak on Kashmir. To do so would be to validate all that the religious extremists have been saying. War histrionics from India provide the Islamic extremist fringe the ammunition they need: a rallying cry to help them regroup, recruit, and retaliate. Doing so would undermine the measures Musharraf has been taking and also the larger global war on terrorism. In short, domestic conditions in both India and Pakistan are ripe for escalation. For the sake of its own sanity, the rest of the world must not allow things to spiral out of control.
[The complete article]

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FBI culture blamed for missteps on Moussaoui
Agent says 'climate of fear' hurt probe

Bill Miller and Dan Eggen, Washington Post, May 25, 2002

Rowley asserted in her letter [to FBI Director, Robert Mueller] that Minneapolis field agents could have obtained a search warrant for Moussaoui's computer if headquarters had told them about the Phoenix memo. But FBI staff there resisted trying to obtain search warrants and scolded agents for seeking last-minute help from the CIA, she alleged, according to sources. She wrote that resistance to requests from Minneapolis was so fierce that agents there joked that Osama bin Laden must have infiltrated FBI headquarters.
[The complete article]

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The training-wheel President
Robert Parry, Consortiumnews, May 20, 2002

Bush has rarely been treated like a national leader who should be held to account for mistakes and misdeeds. It's as if major news outlets are set on treating Bush like a toddler wobbling off on a two-wheel bike kept aright by training wheels, with an adult hand at his back and only upbeat words of encouragement in his ears.
[The complete article]

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There is a firestorm coming, and it is being provoked by Mr Bush
Robert Fisk, The Independent, May 25, 2002

So now Osama bin Laden is Hitler. And Saddam Hussein is Hitler. And George Bush is fighting the Nazis. Not since Menachem Begin fantasised to President Reagan that he felt he was attacking Hitler in Berlin – his Israeli army was actually besieging Beirut, killing thousands of civilians, "Hitler" being the pathetic Arafat – have we had to listen to claptrap like this.
[The complete article]

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Here in the age of fanaticism
H.D.S. Greenway, Boston Globe, May 24, 2002

The age of religious fanaticism is destined to cast its shadow deep into the 21st century.
[The complete article]

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Terror trail leads from Kabul to Kashmir
Navnita Chadha Behera, Asia Times, May 24, 2002

What the Bush team appears not to have understood is that Kashmir and Kabul are closely knitted together, partly through the tangled web of terrorist networks in the region and partly due to Pakistan's - its frontline ally - vital national interests at stake in Kashmir, which it seeks to protect precisely through the instrument of jihadi groups. Washington's al-Qaeda-first policy overlooks the ground reality that al-Qaeda thrives on a vast, deeply entrenched and integrated jihadi infrastructure that straddles the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. This network includes more than 50 Pakistan-based radical groups who share deep bonds of an Islamic ideology, common political targets - the United States, India and Israel - training facilities and resources. These groups, unlike states, operate from a radically different frame of reference and are not predisposed to making rational calculations of the kind the West understands. They are unlikely to emulate the Musharraf regime and abandon al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
[The complete article]

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Axing the tough questions
Brendan Nyhan, Spinsanity, May 21, 2002

Since the story broke Thursday that President Bush received a general warning before Sept. 11 of possible hijackings, Democrats have been asking tough but fair questions about information the government had prior to the attack. Many Republicans and conservative pundits, however, have claimed such questions amount to suggesting that Bush had knowledge of the Sept. 11 attacks and failed to prevent them. This is only the latest example of GOP officials and their supporters in the media using bombastic, anti-democratic rhetoric to shut down debate on any issue related to the war. Whenever serious questions have been raised, this Republican-pundit alliance has launched a massive and aggressive counteroffensive to silence critics -- with grave implications for open debate about the war on terrorism.
[The complete article]

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The Israel lobby
Michael Massing, The Nation, June 10, 2002

On May 2 the Senate, in a vote of 94 to 2, and the House, 352 to 21, expressed unqualified support for Israel in its recent military actions against the Palestinians. The resolutions were so strong that the Bush Administration--hardly a slouch when it comes to supporting Israel--attempted to soften its language so as to have more room in getting peace talks going. But its pleas were rejected, and members of Congress from Joe Lieberman to Tom DeLay competed to heap praise on Ariel Sharon and disdain on Yasir Arafat. Reporting on the vote, the New York Times noted that one of the few dissenters, Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, "suggested that many senators were after campaign contributions." Aside from that brief reference, however, the Times made no mention of the role that money, or lobbying in general, may have played in the lopsided vote.
[The complete article]

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Was Barak telling the truth?
Yoav Peled, The Guardian, May 24, 2002

Astute observers of Israeli politics have been wondering, ever since Ehud Barak was elected prime minister in 1999, whether his "peace offensive" was a real effort to achieve peace with Israel's neighbours or only an attempt to "expose" the Arabs' intention of destroying Israel
[The complete article]

Arafat didn't negotiate - he just kept saying no
[The Barak interview]

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Kashmir and terrorism aren't the problem, it's the bomb
Martin Woollacott, The Guardian, May 24, 2002

Four years ago this month, nuclear explosions in the Rajasthan desert and in the Baluchistan mountains ended the long period in which India and Pakistan had unwisely acquired nuclear military capacity but had nevertheless been wise enough to refrain from translating it into actual weapons. The blasts at Pokharan and Chagai changed the terms of war and peace in the subcontinent, and in the world.
[The complete article]

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IS THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM ABOUT TO GO NUCLEAR?

COMMENT -- Donald Rumsfeld says we should expect terrorists to try and use nuclear weapons, but the most immediate risk of a nuclear strike against civilians is posed by two governments both of which are US allies in the war on terror.

When George Bush launched his war on terrorism he also armed every bellicose leader around the world with rhetoric that would later be used to disarm American criticism. As India and Pakistan each make competing claims to be fighting against terrorism, Western diplomats have the unenviable task of counselling restraint on the sub-continent while US hawks simultaneously push for war against Iraq. The Indians are likely to say, "If you don't show restraint, why should we?"

Looking into the nuclear abyss
Sultan Shahin, Asia Times, May 24, 2002

How should one interpret Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee telling a group of his soldiers in Kupwara, Kashmir from a million-strong battle-ready army amassed at the borders of Pakistan at a time when every possible logistical preparation has been made for war: “Get ready for making supreme sacrifices in a decisive war. We are going to achieve a historic victory”? The real strongman of his party, Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani, had said a day earlier, “We are going to win a decisive victory as in 1971.”

Former premier Inder Kumar Gujral dismisses Vajpayee’s speech made on Wednesday just 25 kilometers from the Line of Control that separates the Indian and Pakistan-administered sections of Kashmir as political rhetoric. He thinks it should not be taken seriously. He is a politician; he should know.

Vice-Admiral K K Nayar, a member of the national security advisory board says, "No prime minister uses rhetoric while talking to his soldiers. Vajpayee’s statement should be taken very seriously.” He is a soldier; he should know.

The question is significant for the billion-plus frightened citizens of the South Asian sub-continent. The military rulers of Pakistan, too, will be trying to interpret this statement. Being soldiers, they would probably think like soldiers and opt for a soldier’s interpretation.

And the Pakistani response did not take long. A senior minister and former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, Javed Asharaf Qazi, said on Wednesday that his country would exercise the nuclear option if its survival was put at stake. Echoing what his boss, President General Pervez Musharraf has said before, he commented, "If it ever comes to annihilation of Pakistan, then what is this nuclear option for? We will use it against the enemy."
[The complete article]

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Indian Prime Minister urges troops into battle
Luke Harding, The Guardian, May 23, 2002

India's prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee yesterday gave his strongest hint yet that a war with Pakistan is imminent when he told an audience of Indian soldiers during a tour of the Kashmir frontline that the time for a "decisive battle" against Islamic militants had arrived. In an ominous departure from his normally cautious language, Mr Vajpayee told 600 troops sitting cross-legged in a field that they should be ready for sacrifice. "Your goal should be victory. It's time to fight a decisive battle," he said, during a trip to frontline positions in Kupwara, northern Kashmir.
[The complete article]

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George W. Bush should learn the lessons of history
Jonathan Alter, MSNBC, May 18, 2002

The terrorist attacks aren’t the “fault” of anyone except the terrorists. But that hardly excuses what until now has been an astonishing lack of interest in who was asleep at the switch. By contrast, the last sneak attack stirred immediate interest in that question. On the evening of Dec. 7, 1941, Navy Secretary Frank Knox called President Franklin Roosevelt to ask permission to go to Pearl Harbor to begin learning “why the Japanese had caught U.S. forces unprepared.” By Dec. 15—with the nation now fighting both Japan and Germany—Knox returned to report that the United States was “not on the alert.”
[The complete article]

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State Dept. report: Weakening of Palestinian Authority increased attacks on Israel
Nathan Guttman, Ha'aretz, May 23, 2002

The U.S. State Department on Tuesday said that Israel had made Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority less effective by destroying its security infrastructure, and it absolved Arafat and his senior associates of responsibility for attacks on Israelis in 2001.
[The complete article]

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Phoenix FBI agent's report in July "was very specific. It named names"
Eric Lichtblau and Josh Meyer, Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2002

A Phoenix FBI agent who wrote a memo last year warning about suspicious Middle Easterners at flight schools had developed detailed information before Sept. 11 linking Arizona students to Osama bin Laden and to a radical British Islamic group, and he shared some of his concerns with the CIA, law enforcement sources said Wednesday.
[The complete article]

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Doubts on Iraq plan kept quiet
Alex Johnson and Jim Miklaszewski, NBC, May 22, 2002

Senior military officials have serious doubts about the wisdom of a U.S. invasion of Iraq, but their concerns have not been passed on to civilian leaders because of the Bush administration’s determination to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
[The complete article]

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Ever bigger FBI flails at the enemy within
James Ridgeway, Village Voice, May 22, 2002

With Vice President Dick Cheney proclaiming the certainty of a new attack of some sort, somewhere, at some time, we are once again at the mercy of President Bush's main terror-busters in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The modern FBI was built by J. Edgar Hoover not on a record of solving crimes but with the steady accretion of a bureaucracy designed to combat Hoover's favorite adversary, the enemy within—one secretive criminal conspiracy after another. As such, it's no match for a sophisticated, well-financed network of highly trained international terrorists.
[The complete article]

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Probe deep, and fairly
Senator John McCain, Washington Post, May 22, 2002

The government of the United States, which [President Bush and Vice-President Cheney] now have the privilege of leading, failed the American people in the weeks, months and years leading up to Sept. 11. The Sept. 11 attacks were incredibly depraved but not, as it turns out, unimaginable.
[The complete article]

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Hekmatyar loyalists on the warpath
Supporters of the Afghan warlord say they are ready to launch a holy war against the Americans

Fazal Malik, IWPR, May 20, 2002

In the sprawling Shamshatoo refugee camp on the outskirts of the Pakistani city of Peshawar, the supporters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar remember when US aid flowed to the militant Islamic leader to fuel his 1980s battle with the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan. Now, despite the distrust many Afghans have felt since Hekmatyar helped reduce the Afghan capital to rubble during a 1992-96 power- struggle between the mujahedin factions, his backers are furious with the US, as they believe it wants him dead.
[The complete article]

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Unnoticed Nablus may have taken West Bank's worst hit
Edward Cody, Washington Post, May 21, 2002

In the tight little alleys of central Nablus, a maze of hole-in-the-wall shops and ancient homes cloistered behind stone walls, a deadly, destructive but largely unheralded battle took place last month. As the city starts to dig out and assess the damage to families, homes and archaeological sites, Palestinian officials, human rights investigators and aid groups have begun to conclude that Nablus was the hardest-hit of all the West Bank cities attacked by Israeli forces during Operation Protective Shield.
[The complete article]

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Too little, too late
Kashmir could become the world's most dangerous region - and the west's lack of interest is partly to blame

Luke Harding, The Guardian, May 22, 2002

Since last autumn, the US and Britain have struck up a shamelessly expedient friendship with Pakistan's suave military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, their ally in the battle against al-Qaida. They have chosen to overlook the fact that Gen Musharraf has continued to allow Pakistan-based militants to creep across the border into Indian Kashmir, despite his promises of tough action against "terrorists".

The west's disengagement from Kashmir and, as India sees it, its double standards on terrorism have brought the region to the brink of crisis. India claims Gen Musharraf has "suckered" the international community, by promising to rein in the jihadis while privately encouraging them. It has a point. In January Gen Musharraf locked up several thousand Islamist extremists. The following month he let most of them go.
[The complete article]

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Get real and get your own house in order!

An investigation into who knew what and when did they know it, might satisfy those of us who already suspect that America is being run by a bunch of incompetent opportunists. But let's face it, it'll be months before some damning 5000-page report comes out. In the meantime, another war will have been launched against Iraq, the average American will have lost interest in the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Afghanistan will have been forgotten, and if terrorists have struck on US soil yet again, the country will firmly be back in its united-we-stand mode. The best thing we can do while much of the American media and public have just rediscovered the power of skepticism, is to question the whole rationale for a war on terrorism.

Last week, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer attempted to paint a picture of a pre-9/11 government and its intelligence organizations in hot pursuit of al Qaeda, yet thwarted in their valiant efforts by a lack of clear leads. To assure us that there weren't any slackers in the White House, Fleischer referred to the "national security presidential directive", finalized on September 10th. This "was a comprehensive, multifront plan to dismantle the al Qaeda. It involved a direction to the Pentagon to develop military options for the dismantling of al Qaeda. It involved action on the financial front to dry up their resources. And it also involved working with [...] the Northern Alliance, in an attempt to dismantle the al Qaeda." The CIA, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the National Security Council were the authors of this plan. The Los Angeles Times reported that the price tag on this operation was a modest $200 million. Ten days later, when President Bush presented to Congress his plan for a war on terror, its expanded goal was that "every terrorist group of global reach [must be] found, stopped and defeated." Al Qaeda, however, remained the primary target. The price for this expanded operation had leapt two hundredfold to $40 billion, and that was just a down payment.

Here we are eight months later, $17 billion already spent on a war in Afghanistan, the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and most of the leading members of al Qaeda still unknown, the threat of terrorist attacks in the US ever present, India and Pakistan, embroiled in their own version of a war on terror, poised at the edge of a nuclear abyss and post-Taliban Afghanistan drifting back towards pre-Taliban warlordism.

Now although none of the key players in Washington are willing to engage in "what if" speculations, for the rest of us some speculation may not only satisfy a natural impulse, but it may also serve as a reality check that exposes the flaws in current policy.

Suppose the now famous "Phoenix memo" from FBI agent Kenneth Williams had promptly filtered up the appropriate channels of the FBI and Justice Department and that the subsequent arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui had then resulted in the unraveling of the whole hijacking conspiracy. It's really easy to imagine this having happened. News reports on this counter-terrorism success might have cited parallels to Ramzi Yousef's 1995 plan to blow up eleven U.S. commercial aircraft in a one-day terrorist blitzkrieg. FBI director Robert Mueller would have applauded his agents and told the public that we had again received a salutary lesson about the continued threat posed by al Qaeda. By mid-September, without fanfare, the national security presidential directive would have been signed and the CIA would have launched its covert operation to dismantle al Qaeda. In this scenario, the al Qaeda that might have been dismantled through a $200 million covert operation is the very same al Qaeda that (with 19 fewer members) after September 11th could only be thwarted through a $40 billion "war on terrorism."

If we consider this wholly plausible scenario and ask why it didn't happen this way, the answer clearly has nothing to do with FBI or CIA analysts lacking a capacity to imagine evil being perpetrated on a grand scale. After all, before Kenneth Williams speculated about an al Qaeda attack on New York, Ramzi Yousef had already described in chilling detail his objectives in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. His stated intention had been to send the city's tallest tower crashing onto its twin, amid a cloud of cyanide gas, killing tens of thousands of Americans in the process. In a similarly dramatic scenario Algerian terrorists had talked about flying a passenger jet into the Eiffel Tower. A 1994 report for the Pentagon had described the risk of terrorists flying an explosive-filled plane into the Pentagon or the White House.

The failures in August and September sprang not from the limits of imagination but from the operations of dysfunctional and competitive intelligence organizations whose problems were sustained and exacerbated by government officials and political leaders plagued by a chronic fear of assigning blame or accepting responsibility. After September 11th, instead of being provided with an explanation about how the attacks had been allowed to happen, the American people were sold a solution, a so-called "war on terrorism" that was nothing more than a $40 billion smokescreen. Its proponents believed that patriotism and sustained fear would short-circuit every criticism and silence all appeals to understand the failure of US intelligence.

As we move through the ninth month of the campaign against terrorism, the Vice-President having risen from his bunker to make emergency talk show appearances, warns everyone that more attacks are a near certainty. At the same time, the Director of Homeland Security keeps the nation on "yellow alert" with periodic vague warnings, the Director of the FBI warns of the inevitability of suicide bombings, who knows where, who knows when, and the Secretary of Defense warns that terrorist states will engage in nuclear blackmail. There's a name for what they are doing and it's not called "fighting the war on terrorism." It's called fear-mongering and covering your ass.

President Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice and their cohorts might presently want to hang their fortunes on the argument that the government and its agencies are no more powerful than their imaginations, but if this is really what they believe, the effectiveness of their "war on terrorism" should not now be our only concern. How many other, perhaps even greater failures can we expect to be excused because our leaders claim that they or their staff "couldn't imagine"? The idea of a missile defense shield captured Ronald Reagan's fanciful imagination. If it now gets built and some day fails, will its vulnerabilities then be attributed to another even greater failure of the imagination?

When those who already failed to prevent the worst ever act of terrorism still claim that they can lead a campaign to eradicate terrorism, it's time for their paymasters, the American taxpayers, to stand up and shout, get real and get your own house in order!

© Paul Woodward, 2002 -- contact paulswo@yahoo.com

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America the fearful
James Carroll, Boston Globe, May 21, 2002

The ''war on terrorism'' has strengthened the hand of those who hate America. The US example of ''overwhelming force'' has pushed the Middle East into the abyss and has dragged India-Pakistan to its edge. The only real protections against cross-border terrorism are international structures of criminal justice like the recently established International Criminal Court, yet an ''unsigning'' United States slaps the court down with contempt.
[The complete article]

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The U.S. ignored foreign warnings, too
John Cooley, International Herald Tribune, May 21, 2002

When the hubbub about what the White House did or didn't know before Sept. 11 dies down, Congressional or other investigators should consider the specific warnings that friendly Arab intelligence services sent to Washington in the summer of 2001.
[The complete article]

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Bush's little secret
David Corn, The Nation, May 20, 2002

By the way, we, uh, forgot to mention, that in August of 2001, while the President was taking a long vacation at his ranch in Crawford, the CIA told him that, uh, Osama bin Laden might be planning to hijack an airliner as part of some, who-knows-what terrorist action against the United States.
[The complete article]

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What went wrong
Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff, Newsweek, May 27, 2002

Because Bush has long insisted he had no inkling of the attacks, the disclosures touched off a media stampede in a capital long deprived of scandal. The fact that the nation’s popular war president might have been warned a little over a month before September 11—and that the supposedly straight-talking Bushies hadn’t told anyone about it—opened up a serious credibility gap for the first time in the war on terror.

There were, in fact, failures at every level that summer: from the shortcomings in the law-enforcement trenches—the FBI’s poor record at domestic surveillance, the CIA’s poor record at infiltrating Islamic groups and the lack of cooperation between the two agencies—to the fixed strategic mind-set of the Bush administration. Between the claims by the FBI and CIA that they didn’t get enough information and the White House’s insistence that it didn’t receive any reports—”He doesn’t recall seeing anything,” Rice said when asked if Bush had read the Phoenix memo—the buck seems to be stopping nowhere. “If I were an average citizen, I’d be pissed at the whole American government,” says a senior official who has worked on counterterrorism.
[The complete article]

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Bush's selective distaste for dictators
Laocoön, TomPaine.com, May 16,2002

Demand freedom in Malaysia and you're likely to wind up in prison and, no, George W. Bush won't be standing with you. He's standing instead with Dr. Mahathir, a repressive bigot who is another of our new best friends in the War on Terrorism.
[The complete article]

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Ashcroft drawn into row over September 11
Julian Borger, The Guardian, May 21, 2002

The row about whether the September 11 attacks could have been averted has begun to focus on the US attorney general, who is accused of playing down the terrorist threat in the first months of the Bush administration. Since the attacks on New York and Washington, John Ashcroft has been criticised for rounding up more than 1,000 people on suspicion of being connected to al-Qaida. Many were held for months, despite a alack of credible evidence. He has accused his critics of undermining the fight against terrorism. But it is becoming clear that before September 11 he had little interest in counter-terrorism, and diverted resources from measures to prevent terrorism towards those aimed at more traditional targets, such as drugs and child pornography. In the late 90s the threat of a terrorist attack on US soil became a near obsession in the Clinton administration, particularly in the justice department under Janet Reno. But her successor had other ideas. On September 10 last year, the last day of what is now seen as a bygone age of innocence, Mr Ashcroft sent a request for budget increases to the White House. It covered 68 programmes, none of them related to counter-terrorism. He also sent a memorandum to his heads of departments, stating his seven priorities. Counter-terrorism was not on the list. He turned down an FBI request for hundreds more agents to be assigned to tracking terrorist threats.
[The complete article]

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BUSH WON'T LISTEN TO HIS FOES, BUT WILL HE IGNORE HIS FRIENDS?

The Weekly Standard's neocon editors are arch supporters (even co-authors) of the war on terrorism. When Kristol and Kagan say it's time for an investigation, George Bush and Dick Cheney better believe it - this is advice coming from their closest buddies.

Weekly Standard tells Bush: time for an investigation
William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Weekly Standard, May 17, 2002

If President Bush knows what's good for the country -- and we think he does -- he will immediately appoint an independent, blue-ribbon commission to investigate the government's failure to anticipate and adequately prepare for the terrorist attacks of September 11. Make George Shultz and Sam Nunn co-chairmen. Give the commission full and unfettered access to all intelligence from the CIA and FBI and to all relevant internal administration documents. Instruct the commission to produce a public report in six months that can stand as the definitive judgment of what went wrong and why.
[The complete article]

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Forgotten victims: 20,000 dead Afghans
Jonathan Steele, The Guardian, May 20, 2002

The direct victims of American bombs and missiles have commanded most political and media attention, though no one is certain how many even of these there were.

A Guardian report in February estimated these casualties at between 1,300 and 8,000 deaths. A Guardian investigation into the "indirect victims" now confirms the belief of many aid agencies that they exceeded the number who died of direct hits.

As many as 20,000 Afghans may have lost their lives as an indirect consequence of the US intervention. They too belong in any tally of the dead.
[The complete article]

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Ismail Khan: warlord, profiteer, ideologue, chief
Ahmed Rashid, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23, 2002

In western Afghanistan, the United States is facing off against Iranians of all stripes -- and charismatic warlord Ismail Khan is skilfully playing all sides to his own advantage. Welcome to Herat, the new front line in the U.S. battle against the 'axis of evil.'
[The complete article]

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A bad call?
Ed Vulliamy, The Observer, May 19, 2002

For eight months now, Bush and his presidency have ridden on the political crest of the wave of 11 September, legitimised by its professed defence of America from the global terrorist menace. But now its bluff is called, as layer after layer of the warnings it received that al-Qaeda would strike at America's heart is unpeeled. Now Bush and his aides are having to explain to the people, the press and even to themselves why and how they either misread or failed to read the clear warning signs that al-Qaeda would strike in exactly the way it did.
[The complete article]

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