Tony Karon writes: Nobody’s expecting a happy ending any time soon to Syria’s civil war. Here are just five things that could go badly wrong when the Assad regime falls.

1. The Sectarian Bloodbath Continues, or Intensifies

Renewed Arab offers of safe passage for President Bashar al-Assad if he agrees to abdicate miss the point: His isn’t simply a personality-cult regime; it survives because many thousands of Syrians remain willing to kill for Assad — or, at least, to hold the rebellion at bay. Assad runs a system of minority rule that has empowered the Alawite minority, supported by Christians, Druze and other minorities, and an elite from within the Sunni majority. And the reason the regime’s core forces remain intact, able and willing to fight on despite the defection of many thousands of Sunni conscripts and even senior officers, is fear of their fate if the rebellion triumphs. The 18 months of violence that has killed as many as 19,000 Syrians, and seen many thousands more wounded, tortured, raped and displaced may have helped make protracted violent retribution a self-fulfilling prophecy.

That’s why even if Assad were willing to go — and there’s no sign that he is — those who have fought for his regime and now feel their backs to the wall are likely to remain armed, organized and willing to defend their turf at all costs. But a triumphant Sunni rebellion that has buried many thousands of “martyrs” would not tolerate armed enclaves of regime supporters in its midst. It’s quite conceivable that a messy sectarian war rages long after Assad loses meaningful control of Syria as a nation state.

The obvious solution, in the minds of the U.S. officials, is for the opposition to reach out and reassure Alawites, Christians and other minorities of their place in a post-Assad future. Far easier said than done. For one thing, there is no single credible political leadership center that speaks for the rebellion — and the fact that this condition persists some 18 months into the uprising is a disturbing signal of prospects for stability after Assad goes.

Western and Arab powers have spent more than a year trying to turn the exile-based Syrian National Council into a legitimate alternative national leadership, to no avail. It remains divided and ineffectual, and lacking legitimacy among popular local opposition organizations on the ground. Nor does the SNC have any authority over the Free Syrian Army — itself a catch-all term for a wide array of localized military structures — or other insurgent groups, many of them openly sectarian.

The absence of a coherent political leadership over the rebel militias raises the specter of chaos after Assad goes goes — exacerbated by the likelihood that the pro-regime shabiha militias, whose thugs have most to fear, would fight on, independent of central political leadership of their own. And the fact that unemployment among fighting-age Syrians stands at 58% doesn’t bode well for the prospects of demobilizing the armed formations that have waged the civil war. Foreign troops may be needed on the ground not to bring down Assad, but to stop the violence after he’d gone. But there are unlikely to be many takers for such a thankless mission

U.S. officials claim progress had been made recently in getting exiles to agree broadly on terms of a transition. Given the status of the exile groups, that may not be especially reassuring. “The connections between the opposition and the Free Syrian Army are still tenuous, but they’re getting better,” a State Department official told McClatchy. ”If we can get Assad and his cronies out, that will at least create an atmosphere to have a dialogue. That can’t happen now.”

The problem, of course, is that the “dialogue” that begins after Assad goes could be conducted with bombs and bullets. [Continue reading…]

Marc Lynch writes: The stunning assassinations of several key Syrian leaders and the outbreak of serious combat in Damascus last week momentarily held out the possibility that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime will rapidly fall. Many hoped for a cascade of defections, a rise in popular demonstrations and a rebel surge to bring down the government.

Those hopes were exaggerated, fueled by a feverish rumor mill, psychological warfare and notoriously unreliable information coming out of Syria. While the regime has been shaken, its military capability stands as demonstrated by its bloody reassertion of control over Damascus. Along with the support of Russia, its determination to survive at any price could draw out the endgame.

The assassinations struck at the heart of the security machine that sustains the regime, and they highlight the extent to which political and military tide has long since turned against al-Assad. The assassinations were more of an inflection than a turning point.

Diplomatically isolated, financially strapped and increasingly constrained by a wide range of international sanctions, al-Assad’s regime has been left with little room to maneuver. It resorts to indiscriminate military force and uses shabiha gangs and propaganda to inflict terror.

The government’s violence against peaceful protestors and innocent civilians has been manifestly self-defeating. Al-Assad has failed to kill his way to victory. Day by day, through accumulating mistakes, the regime is losing legitimacy and control of Syria and its people.

Nonetheless, it’s premature to think the end is close. [Continue reading…]

Ammar Abdulhamid describes being interrogated by Assef Shawkat, Syria’s deputy defence minister and former military intelligence chief who was killed in a suicide bomb attack on July 18: “The country is not ready for revolutions and civil disobedience,” he told me.

“That’s your opinion,” I replied.

“We won’t imprison you and let your friends in America turn you into a hero.”

“Do whatever you want.”

“This country is ours,” he said, “and we will burn it down rather than give it up.”

“Those who built it in the first place will rebuild it,” I replied.

He yelled at me, I yelled at him. He cursed me, I cursed him. He stood up, I stood up. He sat down, I sat down. He pondered, I pondered, as silence reigned.

Then I said: “What if I left Syria?”

He smiled.

“But I will not stop what I am doing and I will not change.”

His smile grew larger. Then he embraced me and sent me on my way.

The man was Assef Shawkat, brother-in-law of President Bashar al-Assad. His family relationship, coupled with his role as head of military intelligence, made him the second most powerful man in Syria and – until his assassination last week – probably the most widely feared.

That meeting in July 2005 was the last time I saw him; I left Syria with my family a couple of months later.

I had not wanted to leave, but I wanted to keep doing what I was doing – to keep agitating and tackling issues that very few wanted to tackle at the time, like minority rights, youth empowerment and citizen journalism – and I knew that distances would not matter much in the internet age.

My first encounter with Shawkat came in March 2005, two months after my return from a six-month fellowship at the Brookings Institution in Washington. I had been slapped with a travel ban on my return, and was interrogated – but not detained – by three different security branches until Shawkat finally decided to interrogate me personally.

His reasons for taking a special interest in my case were not entirely connected with politics. I am, after all, the son of Muna Wassef, Syria’s most celebrated actress, and Shawkat claimed to be “her biggest fan”.

In fact, he had met my mother a few days before our encounter to ask her permission to interrogate me. Such was his subtlety. She gave him her permission while reminding him that I was her only son, and should anything happen … [Continue reading…]

Faisal Al Yafai writes: Perched on a hilltop in the far west of Syria is the stunning Krak des Chevaliers, the best-preserved Crusader castle in the world. From the 11th century, it served as the base for raids by European Crusaders into Syria – a place from which to launch attacks, and a place that kept the Mediterranean coast safe from the Arab empires that sought to reclaim it.

Could something similar happen in the west of Syria soon? As the uprising enters a decisive phase, another “Plan B” is being discussed – if the Assad regime cannot destroy the rebels outright – that would see Alawites retreat to a stronghold in the mountainous far west, centred on the coastal city of Latakia, where an Alawite state could be created. With the Russian base at Tartus, and with millions stashed away in foreign banks, the Assads theoretically could hold out long enough to build a state.

Could this really happen? It may be happening already. Recent attacks, such as the massacre on July 12 in the village of Tremseh, appeared calculated to push Sunnis in western Syria out of their traditional homes and east, away from potential Alawite strongholds. The theory runs that the Assad regime plans to push fearful Sunnis out of the areas west of Homs and Hama, which both remain Sunni-majority cities.

It is certainly the case that once President Bashar Al Assad falls, there will be reprisal attacks against Alawites, who make up a minority in an offshoot of Shia Islam, whereas Syria is a Sunni-majority country.

Syria is not fiercely sectarian, but whatever rebel leaders say now, it is all but certain that members of the shabbiha – the regime thugs who have carried out some of the worst massacres and rapes, and who are overwhelmingly Alawite – will be hunted down. In the face of that reality, and after Alawite domination of a Sunni country for four decades, it is natural for many Alawites to fear for their safety after the Assads fall.

And yet there are strong reasons to believe such an Alawite state would not be welcomed by ordinary Alawites, and would not succeed in any event.

The Assad regime, although composed mainly of Alawites, is not about one sect – it is about one family. Many Alawites have remained poor, even though they have received preferential treatment in the armed forces. If they could be persuaded that a Sunni-led Damascus would not threaten them, they would be unlikely to side with this brutal regime that, once secure in its own state in the west, would certainly continue its systematic repression. [Continue reading…]

The Washington Post reports: Sixteen months into the uprising in Syria, the United States is struggling to develop a clear understanding of opposition forces inside the country, according to U.S. officials who said that intelligence gaps have impeded efforts to support the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

U.S. spy agencies have expanded their efforts to gather intelligence on rebel forces and Assad’s regime in recent months, but they are still largely confined to monitoring intercepted communications and observing the conflict from a distance, officials said.

Interviews with U.S. and foreign intelligence officials revealed that the CIA has been unable to establish a presence in Syria, in contrast with the agency’s prominent role gathering intelligence from inside Egypt and Libya during revolts in those countries.

With no CIA operatives on the ground in Syria and only a handful stationed at key border posts, the agency has been heavily dependent on its counterparts in Jordan and Turkey and on other regional allies.

The lack of intelligence has complicated the Obama administration’s ability to navigate a crisis that presents an opportunity to remove a longtime U.S. adversary but carries the risk of bolstering insurgents sympathetic to al-Qaeda or militant Islam.

The administration is exploring ways to expand non-lethal support, officials said.

“But we’ve got to figure out who is over there first, and we don’t really know that,” said a U.S. official who expressed concern over persistent gaps and who, like others interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was discussing intelligence matters. “It’s not like this is a new war. It’s been going on for 16 months.”

The lack of clarity has also fueled anxiety among U.S. allies in the region over who will control Syria if Assad falls. Even among Arab intelligence services eager to help rebels overthrow Assad, “the vetting process is still in the early stages,” said a Middle Eastern intelligence official, insisting on anonymity to discuss his country’s involvement in the Syrian crisis.

The foreign official cited concern that the opposition is at risk of becoming dominated by Islamists pushing for a Muslim Brotherhood government after Assad.

“We think this is a majority view, at least among those who are fighting in the streets,” the official said. [Continue reading…]

In January, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Benny Gantz said that Israel is preparing to absorb Alawite refugees once the Assad regime falls, but President Shimon Peres, in an interview on CNN today, wanted to make it absolutely clear that not a single Syrian is welcome in the Jewish state.

“What will happen if Syrian refugees try to cross the Israeli border? Will you help them?” CNN asked Peres.

“No,” he replied.

“Will you shoot them?”

“We will prevent them. I mean, you don’t go straight to the rifle. There are other means to prevent them. We should prevent it. Because it will be a double tragedy for them and for us. They will become homeless and we shall become defenseless.”

“If the Syrians start to come over the border, will you stop them by force?”

“First of all, until now none of them asked to come in,” Peres said. “If they will come by force, we shall stop them by force. If they shall come in without force, we shall stop them the way any country defended her border with civilian means.”

When CNN noted that the potential refugees are trying to escape bloodshed in their own country, not invade Israel, Peres said, “If they want to escape, they first of all have to appeal, ask for permission. None of them did it.”

With Israel facing a potential influx of refugees, Peres said although no Syrians have tried to enter the country, Israel would not help any refugees who want to cross the border and would use force against any armed individuals.

“If they will come by force, we shall stop them by force,” Peres said. “If they shall come in without force, we shall stop them the way any country defended her border with civilian means.”

Michael Gabaudan, president of Refugees International, writes: Syria’s border with Israel is the last national boundary that refugees so far have not crossed seeking safety, and to close this potential avenue of escape is unconscionable. With UNSMIS likely to depart within weeks — and with even the extension of the mission unlikely to stop refugees from having to flee — the need for safe havens will only increase. Four of the five countries that share borders with Syria have made the decision to keep the routes to safety open. Israel should do the same out of respect for international humanitarian principles.

Out of the 114,000 registered Syrian refugees in the region, Jordan and Lebanon have received well over half — largely into some of their most resource-poor areas along the Syrian border. When I visited both countries recently, officials, villagers, and aid workers spoke of having reached saturation point. Their capacity to host more Syrians was running out, and they did not know what they would do to protect them going forward.

That was in early June. Since that time, thousands more Syrians have crossed the borders, and Lebanon and Jordan are still struggling to make good-faith efforts to accommodate them.

The world is searching desperately — and rightly so — for ways to get humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians inside Syria. So far those efforts have been effectively blocked, while a handful of aid agencies inside the country battle to help those who are trapped however they can. But while the world continues to grapple with how to get greater access in Syria, we must keep in mind that those who have already fled can actually be helped right now. The most basic way the world can assist Syria’s battered population is to allow them to escape the violence by whatever path is most expedient for them.

The people of Israel know what it is to be vulnerable; to be refugees. Their country now has an opportunity to show just how deep that understanding really is. Everyone deserves a safe haven in their time of need, even — or perhaps especially — when it comes from an unlikely source.

Zvi Bar’el writes: Saudi Arabia’s Prince Bandar bin Sultan, 62, fell in love with the United States when he was still a pilot in his country’s air force and took aerobatics training on an American air base. The romance was renewed several years later when he was named his country’s ambassador to Washington, a tenure that lasted 22 years, during which he was a regular guest of both George Bushes and was the only ambassador who was guarded by the U.S. Secret Service.

Last week King Abdullah named him director-general of the Saudi Intelligence Agency, replacing Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, on top of his post as secretary general of the National Security Council, which he’s held since 2005.

Bandar’s appointment to the most important position in the Saudi security echelons is no coincidence. Aside from the fact that he is very well connected to the kingdom’s leaders (his wife, Haifa, is the daughter of King Faisal who was assassinated in 1975, her brother, Turki al-Faisal, was once head of Saudi intelligence and another brother, Mohammed al-Faisal, is one of the kingdom’s richest men), it seems that the primary reason for his appointment now is that Saudi Arabia is preparing for the next stage in Syria, after President Bashar Assad finally gets off the political stage, one way or another, and Syria turns into a focus of international struggles for control of the inheritance.

There is already an intense campaign over this inheritance between the United States with the European Union and Russia, but the ramifications of Assad’s fall on the positions of Iran and Hezbollah – and no less so, Iraq – are more important. And when Egypt is hobbling on crutches in its effort to establish its “Second Republic,” and its position in the Middle East is that of a disabled person needing nursing care, and when the Arab League is paralyzed, Saudi Arabia is left to assume responsibility for drawing up the new map of the Middle East.

From Washington’s perspective, Bandar’s appointment is important news. Bandar, the rugby fan and man-about-town, whose wife, more than a decade ago, was being investigated by Congress about her connections to Al-Qaida activists, is considered the CIA’s man in Riyadh. He’s known as a can-do person who makes quick decisions and doesn’t spare any resources to achieve his objectives.

When there was a need to transfer money to the rebels in Nicaragua in the 1980s, Bandar was the one who dealt with the Saudi “grants” that were requested by the White House. He was also the one who arranged things when Saudi Arabia was asked to help fund the mujahedeen’s battles in Afghanistan against the Soviet conquest.

Bandar is a member of that part of the royal family that is against the revolutions in the Arab states, and who see the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood no less of a threat than Iranian influence in the region. [Continue reading…]

If the Assad regime resorts to the use of chemical or biological weapons on its own people, it sounds as though in that event, it will attribute the use of such weapons to foreign powers who supplied the weapons to rebels “so that Syrian forces can then be blamed.”

The New York Times reports: With street battles still flaring in Syria’s two main cities, the Syrian government said on Monday that its forces would never use chemical weapons in its domestic conflict, describing them as outside the bounds of the kind of guerrilla warfare they are fighting.

Jihad Makdissi, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, read a statement at a news conference addressing repeated questions about Syria’s chemical weapons that have arisen in recent days. The Syrian army has all stocks of such weapons under secure guard and would only use them in case of an external attack, he said.

“They will not be used against Syrian civilians,” Mr. Makdissi told the news conference in Damascus. “They will never be used domestically no matter how this crisis evolves. Those weapons will only be used in the case of exterior aggression.”

The Syrians were evidently taking a lesson from Iraq, where accusations of a chemical weapons stockpile was among the reasons used to justify the March 2003 American invasion. The Iraqi stockpile never materialized.

Mr. Makdissi said all the attention focused on the chemical weapons — also referred to as weapons of mass destruction — “aims to justify and prepare the international community’s military intervention in Syria under the false pretext of WMD.”

Al Arabiya reports: But Makdissi said the government was concerned that foreign states might supply rebels with unconventional weapons.

He warned against “the possibility of foreign parties arming terrorist groups… with bacteriological weapons that might explode in a village, so that Syrian forces can then be blamed.”

It appeared to be the first time that Syria acknowledged it might possess non-conventional weapons. Damascus is not a signatory to the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention that bans their use, production or stockpiling.

Stephen Starr writes: “You can write about anything you want,” friends and acquaintances regularly told me during my five-year stay in Syria. “But do not touch politics or religion.” For Syrians, the open discussion of politics was something on few people’s minds. Before the current revolt took hold, managing to secure a good job in spite of crippling graft and sparse opportunities was a far more pressing concern.

Pre-March 2011, the vast majority of Syrians I know kept their heads down and enjoyed life as they could. In wealthy areas of the country, politics and open discussion were gladly sacrificed for economic security and streets where their children could play in peace.

Before the uprising, western-styled malls were flung up in Aleppo, Damascus and one on the outskirts of Homs. New private banks made cheap credit available to thousands of young men and women wanting to buy houses and cars, and to get married. The Damascus Securities Exchange opened in 2009. A Mediterranean cafe culture swelled in the major cities.

But there was also an emerging anger that few well-to-do Syrians ever saw: the suburbs around Aleppo and Damascus, and in Daraa, became cramped with displaced farmers and labourers from Syria’s Jazeera region to the east: hundreds of thousands had fled a three-year drought from 2008 and came to the cities in search of work. They moved to Qaboun, Harasta and Douma – all districts we are familiar with today.

The brutal arrogance immediately adopted by the Syrian regime to the current uprising meant it was doomed from the revolt’s beginning. There was a way for it to stay in power had it at the beginning engaged in serious dialogue with Syrian society and taken seriously the grievances of the poor. It could have released the many political prisoners (themselves a sideshow to this revolution) and asked international observers to monitor real elections. It could have allowed commentators and journalists to write freely in media forums. [Continue reading…]

Joshua Landis writes: Will the Alawites try to establish an Alawite State centered in the Coastal Mountains?

Many opposition figures and journalists insist that the Alawites are planning to fall back to the Alawite Mountains in an attempt to establish a separate state. This is unconvincing. Here are the top five reasons why there will not be an Alawite State.

1. The Alawites have tried to get out of the mountains and into the cities. After the French conquered Syria in 1920, the earliest censuses showed a profound demographic segregation between Sunnis and Alawis. In no town of over 200 people did Alawis and Sunnis live together. The coastal cities of Latakia, Jeble, Tartus and Banyas were Sunni cities with Christian neighborhoods, but no Alawi neighborhoods. Only in Antioch did Alawis live in the city and that city was the capital of a separate autonomous region of Iskandarun, which was ceded to the Turks in 1938. In 1945 only 400 Alawis were registered as inhabitants of Damascus. Ever since the end of the Ottoman era, the Alawis have been streaming out of the mountain region along the coast to live in the cities. The French establishment of an autonomous Alawite state on the coast and their over-recruitment of Alawis into the military sped up this process of urbanization and confessional mixing in the cities of Syria. Assad’s Syria further accelerated the urbanization of the Alawites as they were admitted into universities in large numbers and found jobs in all the ministries and national institutions for the first time. [Continue reading…]