At the Russian site, Katehon.com, the ultranationalist ideologue, Aleksandr Dugin, writes:
[Donald Trump] is an extremely successful ordinary American. He is crude America, without gloss and the globalist elite. He is sometimes disgusting and violent, but he is what he is. It is true America.
Most likely, Donald Trump is another designed product, a virtual figure. However, it is him who makes people feel fresh and hopeful. He is trustworthy: the black peacekeeper promised to change everything, but was unable to change anything, nothing at all, and Hilary Clinton, with a quickly aging poker face, doesn’t promise to change anything, maybe Trump will be able to get America’s natural borders back.
Maybe, that redhead rude Yankee from the saloon will get back to the problems inside the country and will leave humanity alone, which is tired of American hegemony and its destructive policy of chaos, bloody rivers and color revolutions?
Trump is a leader. Most likely, he is fake, but even if he is not fake, he has no chance of winning, as the globalist elites and financial oligarchy control practically everything in the USA.
But we want to put trust in Donald Trump.
Vote for Trump, and see what will happen.
[I]n spring 2015, when I traveled to Moscow, I found the once-triumphant Duginists and ultranationalists no longer saw Putin as an ally, and even considered him a traitor to the cause. Some had been pressured by security services, which they took as a sign that their views were no longer tolerated. Meanwhile, Putin had largely dropped his grand Eurasianist rhetoric.
In retrospect, it seems likely that Putin’s short-lived embrace of Duginism was opportunistic and superficial. In other words, Putin decided to invade Ukraine for narrow political reasons, then reached for Eurasianism and neo-imperialism in order to justify his actions and to whip up public support.
But when Putin’s Novorossiya project floundered — his actions in eastern Ukraine succeeded in destabilizing the country but not in dominating it outright — he shifted strategies, seeking to maintain a low-level conflict rather than to escalate. The neo-imperialist ideological justifications no longer fit the strategy. And far-right movements, newly empowered, were pushing Putin to go further than he wanted to. So Putin turned on them.
It turned out that Dugin’s apparent importance to the Kremlin’s ideology had been overstated. This is not to criticize those who considered Dugin important — it was a reasonable conclusion to draw at the time — but rather just to say that we now know Dugin’s ideas were never all that important, and that today he is at the nadir of his influence.
Therefore, we should probably not conclude that Dugin’s Trump endorsement tells us anything useful about the Kremlin’s view of the US presidential race. It’s true that Trump has praised Putin and that Putin has returned the favor, but Trump likely appeals to these two Russians on different grounds and for different reasons.
