The theory behind President Obama’s Afghan surge (beyond the moronically simplistic “if it worked in Iraq, it should work in Afghanistan”) was the notion that after “sustained pressure,” “a more robust approach” — or whatever euphemism one chooses for an operation designed to kill more people — the US and Nato would be in a better position to try and negotiate an end to the war.

Now comes an unofficial Nato assessment: in spite of the surge, the Taliban are standing tall. In fact, when presenting a resistance to foreign forces at a ratio of 1:12, you have to wonder what the Pentagon, fielding its million-dollar-a-year soldiers, is learning from the Taliban in terms of the economics of warfare.

The Associated Press reports:

The Taliban are pitted against about 140,000 ISAF troops — two-thirds of them Americans — and over 200,000 members of the government’s security forces.

This gives the allies a numerical advantage of at least 12:1 — one of the highest such ratios in modern guerrilla wars. At the height of the Vietnam War, the U.S. and its allies had an advantage of between 4-5 to 1 over their Communist foes.

When one Afghan fighter with no body armor and little more than an AK-47 can effectively stand up to a dozen modern soldiers (obviously not all of whom are actually on the battlefield), even the war’s most stalwart defenders should be paying attention to the fabulous waste of money. The allies so-called numerical advantage means that for every dollar the Taliban spends, the Pentagon is wasting several hundred.

For how many more decades can the Pentagon continue fighting wars that it is incapable of winning — and draining the US economy in the process — before the knuckleheads across America who have been spellbound by the words “national security” finally wake up and say, enough?