Category Archives: P5 plus 1

Iran ‘has secret nuclear arms plan’

Iran ‘has secret nuclear arms plan’
By James Blitz, Daniel Dombey and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Financial Times, September 29, 2009

Britain’s intelligence services say that Iran has been secretly designing a nuclear warhead “since late 2004 or early 2005”, an assessment that suggests Tehran has embarked on the final steps towards acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

As world powers prepare to confront Iran on Thursday on its nuclear ambitions, the Financial Times has learnt that the UK now judges that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, ordered the resumption of the country’s weapons programme four years ago. [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — The American line is still, we’re all looking at the same intelligence but their are a variety of ways it can be interpreted. British intelligence is making an assertion which, if true, should be backed up by hard evidence. The US position implies that it regards this evidence as weak.

In dispute with Iran, path to Iraq is in spotlight
By Scott Shane, New York Times, September 30, 2009

Gary Sick, an expert on Iran at Columbia University, said that ever since 1992, American officials had claimed that Iran was just a few years away from a nuclear bomb. Like Saddam Hussein, the clerical government in Iran is “despised,” he said, leading to worst-case assumptions.

“In 2002, it seemed utterly naïve to believe Saddam didn’t have a program,” Mr. Sick said. Now, the notion that Iran is not racing to build a bomb is similarly excluded from serious discussion, he said.

Mr. Sick, like some in the intelligence community, said he believed that Iran might intend to stop short of building a weapon while creating “breakout capability” — the ability to make a bomb in a matter of months in the future. That chain of events might allow room for later intervention.

Without actually constructing a bomb, Iran could gain the influence of being an almost nuclear power, without facing the repercussions that would ensue if it finished the job.

Greg Thielmann, an intelligence analyst in the State Department before the Iraq war, said he believed that the Iran intelligence assessments were far more balanced, in part because there was not the urgent pressure from the White House to reach a particular conclusion, as there was in 2002. But he said he was bothered by what he said was an exaggerated sense of crisis over the Iranian nuclear issue.

“Some people are saying time’s running out and we have to act by the end of the year,” said Mr. Thielmann, now a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association. “I’ve been arguing that we have years, not months. The facts argue for a calmer approach.” [continued…]

Iran offers conflicting messages
By Paul Richter and Christi Parsons, Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2009

Tehran offers remarks by turns defiant and cooperative, leaving diplomats unsure if it will take seriously this week’s nuclear talks in Geneva. [continued…]

Iran is seeking a ‘two-way street’ at talks
By Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, September 30, 2009

The Iranian foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said Tuesday that talks between Iran and six major powers, which are to take place on Thursday, must be a “two-way street” and not just a long list of demands focused on his country’s nuclear program. [continued…]

Israel mutes its rhetoric against Iran as talks loom
By Richard Boudreaux, Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2009

Israeli leaders say they are willing to wait as President Obama plays out his strategy of negotiating with Iran while threatening stronger world sanctions if the talks fail. [continued…]

Iran plant could defer Israel strike
By Amy Teibel, AP, September 30, 2009

It may seem counterintuitive, but the news that Iran has a second, clandestine uranium enrichment plant, and has just test-fired long-range missiles, could actually put off any plans for a quick Israeli strike. [continued…]

China’s ties with Iran complicate diplomacy
By Michael Wines, New York Times, September 30, 2009

Leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee swept into Beijing last month to meet with Chinese officials, carrying a plea from Washington: if Iran were to be kept from developing nuclear weapons, China would have to throw more diplomatic weight behind the cause.

In fact, the appeal had been largely answered even before the legislators arrived.

In June, China National Petroleum signed a $5 billion deal to develop the South Pars natural gas field in Iran. In July, Iran invited Chinese companies to join a $42.8 billion project to build seven oil refineries and a 1,019-mile trans-Iran pipeline. And in August, almost as the Americans arrived in China, Tehran and Beijing struck another deal, this time for $3 billion, that will pave the way for China to help Iran expand two more oil refineries. [continued…]

Iran Guards group buys 50 pct stake in telecoms firm
By Hashem Kalantari, Reuters, September 30, 2009

A consortium affiliated to the elite Revolutionary Guards bought 50 percent plus one share in Iran’s state telecommunications company for the equivalent of around $7.8 billion, Iranian media reported on Sunday. [continued…]

Thoughts on Iran, mountains and winning without war

On mountains and metaphors
By Paul Woodward, War in Context, September 27, 2009

A few random thoughts and observations on the latest developments with Iran:

How big’s a mountain? It’s a clandestine nuclear facility under construction “inside a mountain“.

The only adjective that got left out was “deep,” yet knowing that detail might be the key to knowing exactly what “very heavily protected” means.

(This much we can already deduce about the extent of the tunneling: it has produced two very large adjoining flattened mounds of debris which are marked in the image above.)

Gary Sick seems to have been among the descriptively most precise in referring to “a small enrichment facility in an underground chamber on a Revolutionary Guards base.”

Inside an underground chamber it is; inside a mountain it is not — at least not unless one assumes a Lilliputian perspective and calls a 167ft tall hillock a mountain. That’s the difference in elevation between one of the tunnel entrances and the highest point along the ridge that the tunnel penetrates. (Use Google Earth to see specific elevations. For instance, the northern tunnel entrance is at 2,975ft. The adjacent ridge to the east is at 3,142ft.)

View Larger Map

Not so fast with the sanctions. When the president of a country sharing a 1,458km border with Iran says sanctions against Iran won’t work, there’s reason to think that he isn’t simply making a prediction; he might be making a promise.

Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani gave this warning on Saturday and no doubt it was warmly received in Tehran. China and Russia might be crucial when it comes to imposing sanctions. Iraq might turn out to be key when it comes to enforcing or being unable to enforce them.

Pity the IAEA. There it is — the world’s indispensable nuclear monitoring agency — but does anyone care to share their intelligence so that IAEA inspectors can do their work? Only when the powers that be deem it useful.

Bombs away. Maybe this isn’t the smoking gun Israel was waiting for. Evidence of a clandestine program may confirm some of Israel’s dire warnings, but how many other similarly well-concealed and hard-to-destroy facilities might there be? All that an Israeli attack might actually accomplish would be to legitimize Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT and a rush towards weaponization.

The meaning of a mountain. If “inside a mountain” might be a topographical stretch, it’s an image that serves multiple purposes:
1. It’s too good an image for any journalist to risk undermining with a skeptical question. (“And just how big is that mountain?”)
2. It tells the world that the Iranians are dastardly, sneaky fellows whose evil plans can only be hidden by something as big as a mountain.
3. It says the Americans are so smart that they can find anything, however well hidden.
4. It highlights the possibly insurmountable challenge Israel would face in launching an air strike against a target much harder to destroy than a reactor under construction in Syria, or a weapons convoy on the move in Sudan.
5. It says that Obama isn’t a daydream believer sending his representatives into a negotiating trap; he’s back in his superhero mode out to save the world.

What’s it all about? Once you get past the theatrics it comes down to the pursuit of national interests — it’s not (or at least should not be) about putting Iran in a box.

Every party has distinct national interests, but fruitful negotiations will hinge on identifying where these interests overlap — not simply the overlapping interests of the US and its allies, but also those that are shared by Iran.

Stepping off the war path requires that everyone, including the Iranians, can see a way of winning.

Iranians favor diplomatic relations with US but have little trust in Obama

Iranians favor diplomatic relations with US but have little trust in Obama
WorldPublicOpinion, September 18, 2009

A Obama and Iran new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of Iranians finds that six in 10 favor restoration of diplomatic relations between their country and the United States, a stance that is directly at odds with the position the Iranian government has held for three decades. A similar number favor direct talks.

However, Iranians do not appear to share the international infatuation with Barack Obama. Only 16 percent say that have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs. This is lower than any of the 20 countries polled by WPO on this question in the spring. Despite his recent speech in Cairo, where Obama stressed that he respects Islam, only a quarter of Iranians are convinced he does. And three in four (77%) continue to have an unfavorable view of the United States government.

“While the majority of Iranian people are ready to do business with Obama, they show little trust in him,” says Steven Kull, director of WPO. [continued…]

Editor’s Comment — Some of the other poll numbers are striking and indicate how little progress Obama has made in his efforts at public diplomacy aimed at the Middle East.

75% of the Iranians polled believe that the US definitely or probably has the goal of imposing American culture on Muslim society.

81% believe that the US definitely or probably has the goal of weakening and dividing the Islamic world.

85% believe that in the way the US behaves towards the Iranian government it abuses its great power to make Iran do what the US wants.

That last number is one that the US and its allies should keep clearly in mind when they sit down for talks with Iran’s leaders in Istanbul on October 1. The Iranians cannot afford to look like they are getting pushed around and this no doubt explains the source of much of what the West perceives as belligerence.

IAF chief: We must stop S-300 delivery
By Yaakov Katz, Jerusalem Post, September 18, 2009

Israel needs to make every effort to stop the S-300 missile defense system from reaching countries where the air force may need to fly, IAF commander Maj.-Gen. Ido Nehushtan has told The Jerusalem Post in an exclusive interview.

“The S-300 is a Russian-made surface-to-air missile system that is very advanced, with long ranges and many capabilities,” Nehushtan told the Post in the interview, which appears in our Friday Magazine.

“We need to make every effort to stop this system from getting to places where the IAF needs to operate or may need to operate in the future,” he said.

The S-300 is one of the most advanced multi-target antiaircraft missile systems in the world and has a reported ability to track up to 100 targets simultaneously while engaging up to 12 at the same time. It has a range of about 200 km. and can hit targets at altitudes of 90,000 feet.

While Russia and Iran signed a deal for the sale of the system several years ago, according to latest assessments in Israel, it has yet to be delivered. [continued…]

The Grand Ayatollah unleashes his wrath
By Michael Theodoulou, The National, September 21, 2009

Small, frail and in his 80s, he looks no match for Iran’s tough regime. But Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri is made of steel. He wields considerable moral authority as the country’s highest-ranking and most fearless dissident cleric, representing a potent challenge to hardline authorities who have tried and failed to silence him for two decades.

He was once Ayatollah Khomeini’s designated successor but was unceremoniously cast aside by the founder of the Islamic Republic, just months before his death in 1989, because the Grand Ayatollah had criticised human rights abuses by the regime. Since then, despite official harassment of his aides and a six-year period of house arrest, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has remained the outspoken conscience of Iran’s religious community, an advocate of democratic pluralism and foreign policy moderation.

“Montazeri has refused to go away and is today more vocal and explicit in his criticism than ever,” said Anoush Ehteshami, an Iran expert and professor of international relations at Durham University in England. “If anything, his claim that he stands for freedoms and justice are even more important today,” Prof Ehteshami said in an interview. [continued…]

Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei says opposition protests failed
By Jeffrey Fleishman and Ramin Mostaghim, Los Angeles Times, September 21, 2009

Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei attempted to unify Iranians on Sunday by blaming foreign media for “poisoning the atmosphere” and urged his nation to resist the “killer cancer” of an Israel backed by Western powers.

Delivering a sermon at Tehran University before a crowd that included President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and opposition cleric Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khamenei said the West had failed in its attempts to undermine the government with large opposition protests during countrywide anti-Israel rallies Friday.

“It showed that their [Western politicians’] tricks, spending money and political evilness do not influence the Iranian nation,” said Khamenei, who was greeted with chants of “Leader, we offer our blood to you.” [continued…]

Medvedev: “Israel is not going to deliver any blows on Iran”

Medvedev: “Israel is not going to deliver any blows on Iran”
CNN’s Fareed Zacharia interviews Dmitry Medvedev, The Kremlin, September 20, 2009

FAREED ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about some of the other issues that you face. Russia has said that it does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Putin has said that, you have said that. Yet the IAEA says that Iran is not cooperating to give the world confidence that it has a purely civilian programme. Iran says it will no longer negotiate on this issue, and yet Russia says it will not support any further sanctions against Iran. So, is the policy of not wanting Iran to develop nuclear weapons on Russia’s part – are these empty words or do you have concrete steps you are willing to take to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: We have our fairly developed relations with Iran, that is why I can speak of Iran’s intentions not by hearsay, not on the basis of the information received from special services of other countries, but proceeding from the reality. Of course, I believe that Iran needs a set of motives to behave appropriately as far as its nuclear programme is concerned. There is no doubt about that.

Secondly, Iran must cooperate with the IAEA. It must be done, because it is its obligation.

Thirdly, we should create for Iran a system of positive motives, so that it wants such cooperation. On September 9, 2009 Iran submitted its proposals concerning these very complicated issues, and they are being analyzed now.

There have been voices that it is not enough, that those proposals are too general. You know, I believe, that it is obligation of all nations involved in this problem to study these proposals, at least. It took quite a long time for Iran to study the package of incentives that had been given to it through Solana’s mediation at that time. Now, we need to study its package.

As for the sanctions, I have just had a chance to talk about it during my meeting with political analysts, who attended a conference here. I told them one very simple thing: as a rule, sanctions result in nothing, though sometimes sanctions are necessary. But before speaking of applying additional sanctions, we should make full use of the existing possibilities. That would be a responsible behavior by the world community. Yes, of course, we should encourage Iran, but before taking any action we should be absolutely confident that we have no other options and that our Iranian colleagues do not hear us for some reason. This is, I believe, the simplest and most pragmatic position. By the way, I voiced this position during the consultations on this issue, which took place during the G8 summit in Italy, when we discussed this question. It was discussed by all G8 leaders.

FAREED ZAKARIA: But do I take you to be saying that Iran does have an obligation to cooperate with IAEA? And if it does not, is Russia willing to step up to its responsibilities as a world power and press in the UN and in other ways to ensure Iran does cooperate?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Iran must cooperate with the IAEA, this is an absolutely indubitable thing, if it wishes to develop its nuclear dimension, nuclear energy programme. This is its duty and not a matter of its choice, because otherwise a question will be raised all the time: what it is really doing? And this is as plain as a day.

FAREED ZAKARIA: And Russia is willing to exercise its responsibilities?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Certainly.

FAREED ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about another issue relating to this. Russia has agreed to sell Iran the S-300 antiaircraft and antimissile system. When you will deliver it to Iran?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Our relations with Iran really have a military component and we believe that this work should completely correspond to the international obligations both from the part of Iran and from the part of Russia. We have never supplied and will not supply to Iran anything that is beyond the valid system of the international law. What we have supplied and what we are going to supply, it has been and always will be the defense complexes and this is our firm position, and I will hold to it when making final decisions as to the all existing contracts with Iran.

FAREED ZAKARIA: You know that there are many people in Israel who say that if you deliver that system, the Israelis will feel they will have to strike Iran before that system is deployed because once that system is deployed, an Israeli attack on Iran becomes much more difficult. So by delivering that system you open up a window or a period of considerable tension.

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: In an hour I will have a conversation with President of Israel Mr. Peres, who, when he recently was visiting me in Sochi, said something that is very important for all of us, namely, that Israel is not going to deliver any blows on Iran, that Israel is a peaceful country and will not do it. Therefore any supplies of any weapons, all the more defensive weapons, can not increase tension; on the contrary they should ease it. But if there are people who have such plans, it seems to me that they have to think about it. For this reason, our task is not to strengthen Iran and weaken Israel or vise versa but our task is to ensure a normal, calm situation in the Middle East. I believe that is our task.

FAREED ZAKARIA: When Prime Minister Netanyahu was in Moscow, did you say that to him?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Prime Minister Netanyahu has visited Moscow. They did it in a close regime, it was their decision. I do not even understand very well the reasons for it, but our partners made such a decision and our reaction was absolutely normal and calm. I have had a conversation with him.

FAREED ZAKARIA: But did you feel like it was a positive meeting?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: It was a good, normal meeting. We have discussed the most different problems. Before that I met with President Peres, after that I met with Prime Minister Netanyahu. This is normal, this is our dialogue. And Ahmadinejad visited us, but, to be true, earlier than that and it was not a bilateral meeting, he came to attend as an observer the session of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We communicate with everybody. I believe that this is our advantage.

FAREED ZAKARIA: If Israel were to attack Iran, would Russia support Iran in such a conflict?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: Russia can not support anybody or act in such situation. We are a peaceful state and we have our own understanding of our defense strategy. This is the first point.

The second point. We have our allies with which we have concluded one or other agreements. In case of Iran we do not have obligations of this kind. But it does not mean that we would like to be or will be impassible before such developments. This is the worst thing that can be imagined. I have already commented on this issue. Let us try together to reason upon it. What will happen after that? Humanitarian disaster, a vast number of refugees, Iran’s wish to take revenge and not only upon Israel, to be honest, but upon other countries as well. And absolutely unpredictable development of the situation in the region. I believe that the magnitude of this disaster can be weighted against almost nothing. For this reason before making decision to deliver blows it is necessary to assess the situation. It would be the most unreasonable developments. But my Israeli colleagues told me that they were not planning to act in this way and I trust them.

FAREED ZAKARIA: So you expect no Israeli strike on Iran?

DMITRY MEDVEDEV: I hope that this decision will not be made. Iran should be pushed to cooperate. And indeed, Iran should not pronounce such things that it has stated, for example in relation to Israel, when it said that it did not recognize the existence of this state. It is unacceptable in the modern world, in the modern system of international relations. And this is the point Iran should start thinking about. [continued…]

To bomb, or to bunker? Israel’s Iran choices narrow

To bomb, or to bunker? Israel’s Iran choices narrow
By Dan Williams, Reuters, September 16, 2009

The orchestrated roar of air force exercises designed to signal Israel’s readiness to attack Iranian nuclear facilities are belied, perhaps, by a far quieter project deep beneath the western Jerusalem hills.

Dubbed “Nation’s Tunnel” by the media and screened from view by government guards, it is a bunker network that would shelter Israeli leaders in an atomic war — earth-bound repudiation of the Jewish state’s vow to deny its foes the bomb at all costs.
[…]
Aerial and naval manoeuvres, leaked to the media, have told of plans to reach Iran, though this time the targets are so distant, dispersed, and fortified that even Israel’s top brass admit they could deliver a short-term, disruptive blow at most.

Hence Israel’s discreet arrangements for living with the possibility of a nuclear-armed arch-enemy — the bunkers, the missile interceptors, the talk of a U.S. strategic shield and of Cold War-style deterrence based on mutually-assured destruction.

One government intelligence analyst suggested that Israel had passed a psychological threshold by “allowing” Iran to manufacture enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) for a bomb.

“We keep fretting about whether they will have a ‘break-out capacity’, but really they’re already there,” the analyst said.

The U.N. national intelligence director has assessed Iran will not be technically capable of producing high-enriched uranium (HEU) for the fissile core of an atom bomb before 2013. [continued…]

Israel defense chief: Iran not an existential threat
Reuters, September 17, 2009

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak was quoted on Thursday as saying he does not view Iran as a threat to the existence of the Jewish state, a view that would seem to depart from Israeli statements of the recent past.

Israel’s mass-circulation Yedioth Ahronoth daily quoted Barak, the head of Israel’s center-left Labour party, as saying “Iran does not constitute an existential threat against Israel.”

In response to a question about Tehran’s nuclear programme which Israel has said it sees as destined to produce atomic weapons that could put its existence at risk, Barak said in an interview with the paper:

“I am not among those who believe Iran is an existential issue for Israel.” [continued…]

Intelligence agencies say no new nukes in Iran
By Mark Hosenball, Newsweek, September 16, 2009

The U.S. intelligence community is reporting to the White House that Iran has not restarted its nuclear-weapons development program, two counterproliferation officials tell Newsweek. U.S. agencies had previously said that Tehran halted the program in 2003.

The officials, who asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, said that U.S. intelligence agencies have informed policymakers at the White House and other agencies that the status of Iranian work on development and production of a nuclear bomb has not changed since the formal National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s “Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” in November 2007. Public portions of that report stated that U.S. intelligence agencies had “high confidence” that, as of early 2003, Iranian military units were pursuing development of a nuclear bomb, but that in the fall of that year Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program.” The document said that while U.S. agencies believed the Iranian government “at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,” U.S. intelligence as of mid-2007 still had “moderate confidence” that it had not restarted weapons-development efforts. [continued…]

How to talk to Iran
By Roger Cohen, New York Times, September 17, 2009

The president is right [to enter talks with Iran] for many reasons. The 30-year American-Iranian psychosis is a dangerous, logic-lite hangover. When Obama gathered his Iran advisers after the June election to review intelligence, the slim pickings were slim enough to prompt a presidential “That all you got?” Ignorance breeds treacherous incomprehension.

The president is right because only creative diplomacy can head off the onrushing Iranian uranium enrichment (8,000 inefficient centrifuges and counting); because closer relations with the West represent the best long-term hope for reform in Iran; because Iran is negotiating from the relative weakness of post-June-12 revolutionary disunity; and because the strong U.S. interest lies in preventing an Israeli attack on Muslim Persia. (That’s also in Israel’s interest, by the way; the Arabs are already a handful.)

There’s a lot of verbiage — some that Orwell would have seized on — in the Iranian “package,” but that’s just the way of things in Iran. Like many much-conquered countries, not least Italy, Iran loves artifice, the dressing-up of truth in elaborate layers. It will always favor ambiguity over clarity. This is a nation whose conventions include the charming ceremonial insincerity known as “taarof” (hypocrisy dressed up as flattery), and one that is no stranger to “tagieh,” which amounts to the sacrifice of truth to higher religious imperative.

These traits are worth recalling. Gary Sick, the Carter administration official who negotiated the American hostages’ release, told me that immediately before the critical breakthrough he received a voluminous and preposterous Iranian “proposal” that almost led Carter to walk away. It proved a sideshow with a couple of useful nuggets buried in the outpourings. [continued…]

Iran bullish ahead of nuclear talks
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi, Asia Times, September 18, 2009

Unless the US and its allies come up with new evidence to substantiate their allegations against Iran, their purported effort to pin on Iran the label of clandestine proliferator is destined to fall short. This is particularly so since there is as of yet no official US revision of the conclusions of its 2007 intelligence estimate. According to this, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, shortly after the downfall of Iran’s chief nemesis, Saddam, who was also said to be aggressively pursuing a nuclear program.
Fourth, Iran’s confidence stems from Tehran’s reliance on a multi-faceted negotiation strategy, reflected in its recent “package” that states Iran’s preparedness to cooperate on the issues of “non-proliferation and disarmament” as well as on regional security, energy security, cultural and economic issues.

The advantage of this comprehensive linked approach is that it connects any US engagement with Iran to a host of issues that bind the two countries, such as drug trafficking and security in the region. This belies the contention of some US pundits that the “goal of engagement is not improved relations”, to paraphrase Chester Crocker, a former US diplomat, who in an opinion column in the New York Times under the title “Terms of Engagement” forgets that the Iranian side may also have its own ideas about engagement and that it takes two to have a diplomatic tango. [continued…]

Iran agrees to meeting on nuclear program

Iran agrees to meeting on nuclear program
By Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2009

The Obama administration, hoping to persuade Tehran to curtail its nuclear program and initiate a dialogue that focuses on other issues, will have its first formal meeting since it took office with Iran on Oct. 1.

The four other United Nations Security Council permanent members — China, Russia, France, and the U.K. — along with Germany will participate in the meeting, which was brokered Monday in a call between Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, and Saeed Jalili, Iran’s main nuclear negotiator.

The event, whose location hasn’t been decided, won’t be a “formal negotiation,” a spokeswoman for Mr. Solana said. There will be no set agenda or specific goals. Instead, she said, it will serve as an opportunity to question Iran on a proposal it released last week calling for a discussion with the international community on a range of security and development issues. [continued…]

Obama’s tough choice on Iran

Obama’s tough choice on Iran
By Tony Karon, Time, September 13, 2009

The U.S. and its allies are not saying Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons; they’re warning that allowing Iran to assemble the full nuclear fuel cycle to which it is entitled as a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty — particularly uranium enrichment — gives it an infrastructure that could quickly be converted to produce bomb materiel. Stating Washington’s case at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna this week, Ambassador Glyn Davies warned that Iran had already created enough low-enriched uranium that, if it kicked out nuclear inspectors and reconfigured its enrichment plant, could be re-enriched to provide materiel for a single bomb. “We have serious concerns that Iran is deliberately attempting, at a minimum, to preserve a nuclear option,” Davies said.

Moscow sees the problem in terms of strengthening the safeguards against Iran weaponizing nuclear materials, rather than trying to prevent it attaining “breakout” capacity by denying its right to enrich uranium.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reiterated this week that Iran no intention of ending uranium enrichment, or of negotiating away its nuclear rights. That doesn’t necessarily preclude a diplomatic solution to the standoff, but it underscores the likelihood that the Western powers might have to compromise on their own demands in order to achieve one. In some previous rounds of negotiation, Iran has been more open to discussing strengthening of the IAEA monitoring regime and other safeguards against weaponization. Right now, however, it’s far from clear that Iran is in an accommodating mood, given its fierce and ongoing domestic power struggle. [continued…]

Secret Iranian missile memos
By Geoffrey Forden, Arms Control Wonk, September 14, 2009

I have been given a series of what appear to be internal secret Iranian documents by sources I trust. If authentic, and I believe they are, they provide important insights into Iran’s missile development program and have important implications for North Korea’s as well. Unfortunately, to protect my sources and the Iranians who spirited these documents out to the West, I cannot be too explicit about their contents. The following examination of these memos contains both information from and my analysis of them. I have tried to explicitly point out what is my speculation.

The memos cover, in a somewhat sketchy way, a lot of ground. Perhaps the most important aspects are those that deal with how several countries collaborate in either developing missiles or selling missile technology to Iran. The memos use codes for the different collaborator countries but I think I know the meanings of the codes. If my understanding is correct, they indicate that representatives from North Korea and China have been present at all phases of production and flight testing. Iran has also gotten important help from Russia, though Russians do not appear to have been as ubiquitous as the Chinese and the North Koreans. The evidence from the memos indicates that this help is on the governmental level rather than “rogue” individuals. This includes Russian help though Russia has been particularly vocal in its denials of such assistance. Despite these denials, the evidence of foreign assistance, both images of engines and turbopumps that are obviously of Russian origin—either their actual production or at the very least their designs—and these internal Iranian memos, make the case overwhelmingly. [continued…]

U.S. accepts offer from Tehran for broad talks

U.S. accepts offer from Tehran for broad talks
By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, September 12, 2009

The United States has decided to ignore Iran’s refusal to discuss its nuclear program and instead accept a vague Iranian plan for talks on security issues as the opening gambit to draw Tehran into real negotiation.

The effort to “test” Iran’s intentions, announced on Friday, came after Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said his country is skeptical of the need for new sanctions on Iran, giving the Americans little choice but to treat seriously Iran’s latest offer.

Iran this week ruled out talks on its program, instead offering a five-page plan that it said would lay the groundwork for peace and stability in the region. The document, first posted Thursday on the Web site of ProPublica news service, made no reference to international demands that Iran suspend its efforts to enrich uranium, but did mention ending proliferation in nuclear weapons as well as a broad offer of dialogue. [continued…]

Why Washington should welcome Iran’s broadening of the agenda
By Trita Parsi, Huffington Post, September 11, 2009

The Iranian proposal is best understood not from the prism of the West’s focus on the nuclear program, but from the vantage point of Iran’s long standing objective to be recognized as a regional power with a permanent seat at the table of regional decision making. Iran believes it suffers from severe role deficit — though it is one of the most powerful countries in the region, its neighbors view it by and large as a disruptive, anti-status quo power and have consequently refrained from giving it access to recognized and institutionalized avenues of influence.

After all, the reigning order in the Middle East is one defined and upheld by the United States, which for the past thirty years has sought Iran’s isolation and exclusion, not its inclusion and rehabilitation. Breaking out of this isolation and forcing Washington and the regional capitols to grant Iran the role it craves have been overarching strategic goals of Iranian foreign policy for several decades now.

Iran believes that the nuclear stand-off provides it with an opportunity to achieve this objective. By broadening the agenda for negotiations, Iran takes the opportunity to discuss with the great powers matters where the views of the Iranian government hardly have been taken into account in the past. The broader aim is to institutionalize the great power’s recognition of Iran’s role and seat at the table.

Perhaps more importantly, the Iranians refuse to permit the P5 plus 1 to single-handedly set the parameters of the talks. By presenting its own proposal, Iran is introducing its own parameters. The Iranians are in essence negotiating about the shape of the table before negotiating matters of substance. This is hardly surprising. During the EU-Iranian negotiations on the nuclear issue, Tehran was immensely frustrated by Europe’s dismissal of several Iranian proposals and its insistence on solely discussing its own set of ideas and demands. By now, Iran seems determined not to let that happen again. [continued…]