The Daily Beast reports: U.S. intelligence officials have previously assessed that the Assad regime is getting significant backing from Iranian ground forces, and that the support continues to grow, but that it’s not necessarily translating into victories. They think that while some tactical swings along the frontline might favor Assad’s regime in the near term, many provincial capitals occupied by his army remain under threat.

That may help explain Assad’s decision to be seen publicly aligning with Putin, who has supplied essential air cover to forces on the ground. The official characterized Assad’s Moscow visit as a publicity stunt that doesn’t bode well for the dictator’s future. “It only reinforces the notion that Assad has lost control of his country, and is now firmly under Putin’s thumb,” the official said.

“Should the regime’s offensive fail to dislodge opposition elements or suffer major setbacks, the blame will land on Assad’s shoulders,” the official added. “Putin is not one to bet on a losing horse, and Assad’s track record in Syria suggests the regime faces long odds of a military victory. At some point, Putin will have to decide on how far Russia will go to support one man.” [Continue reading…]

The New York Times reports: In brief remarks in Moscow, released on Wednesday after Mr. Assad’s departure, the two leaders promised to pursue “a long-term settlement, based on a political process that involves all political forces,” as Mr. Putin put it.

At the same time, they emphasized their united front against terrorists, which is how both characterize not just the Islamic State but all armed opponents of Mr. Assad’s government. And they said that a political solution was only possible after success on the battlefield, which neither defined, leaving the timing of any negotiations entirely unclear.

The question now is whether Mr. Putin can press Mr. Assad to accept a negotiated end to his rule. “Putin’s influence over Assad is like Obama’s over Netanyahu,” a diplomat based in Syria told a group of colleagues several months ago, before the Russian military intervention began, referring to the often truculent relationship between the American and Israeli leaders.

Mr. Assad has, in fact, proved at times to be a reluctant partner in Russia’s efforts to end the conflict. He has stood up on many occasions to the Kremlin, to the extent that diplomats and analysts say it has irritated Mr. Putin.

“I think they know how confused the Assad regime is, and they’re frustrated by it,” said Andrew J. Tabler, an expert on Syria at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who has followed the conflict closely, referring to the Russians.

He and others noted Russia’s efforts in January and April to broker talks in Moscow between Mr. Assad’s government and some of the armed groups rebelling against it. Those were coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and headed by Vitaly V. Naumkin, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Mr. Assad’s representative, Bashar al-Jaafari, showed little flexibility in those talks, refusing to agree to confidence-building measures Moscow wanted, such as releasing political prisoners who might take part in a political solution.

The talks suggested the limits of Russia’s influence — even Mr. Putin’s. In 2012, Abdelaziz al-Khayer, a Syrian dissident, disappeared immediately upon returning to the country from China to participate in talks that were endorsed by Moscow. Diplomats and opposition figures have long said he was arrested by Mr. Assad’s security forces.

A Western diplomat recalled approaching his Russian counterpart to ask if Russia could pressure the Syrians to release him. “What do you think I’ve been doing?” the Russian diplomat responded.

Last year, another dissident, Louay Hussein, was arrested just before he was preparing to attend talks the Russians had organized in Moscow. He remained in prison for months, and came out declaring that he would no longer remain inside Syria trying to change the system from within. He had learned, he said, that Russia was unable, and Iran unwilling, to push Mr. Assad to any meaningful negotiations. [Continue reading…]

Charles Lister writes: Thus far, after two weeks of operations, pro-regime forces have made small territorial gains north of Homs, south of Aleppo, and in Hama’s Sahl al-Ghab region. But despite Russia’s efforts, ground forces — composed of the Syrian Army, the paramilitary National Defense Force, Hezbollah, Shia militias and increasing numbers of Iranian military personnel — aren’t achieving the victories one might have expected.

One pro-Assad source recently lamented the loss of “24 tanks and 250 men” in Hama, all for “50cm.” While Iran’s infamous Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani has now arrived openly in Syria, Russia has shown no sign of deploying its own ground forces. Its new military facility in Latakia, however, contains the necessary infrastructure for at least 2,000 personnel, leaving the potential for a Russian ground component open to question.

One key reason for the minimal territorial shifts so far is the use of American BGM-71 TOW anti-tank guided missiles by CIA-backed Free Syrian Army rebels. The missiles, which first appeared in rebel hands in April 2014, have been used far more (a nearly 850% rise) since the Russian intervention: there were 82 recorded uses from October 1 to 20, compared to only 13 in all of September. With each missile valued at least $50,000, that equates to over $4.1 million of expenditure in three weeks.

Having initially had an effective, but strategically subdued effect on the conflict, the CIA coordinated provision of TOW missiles has suddenly shown its true potential. Combatants on the ground — including 13th Division leader Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Saoud and the leaders of three other CIA-backed FSA groups — all told me that they have received more TOWs than normal recently and stressed how useful they have been. “TOWs will destroy the Russians and their objectives, and we’ve received many more recently,” Saoud said. [Continue reading…]